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Abstract  
One of the most notable changes to the industrial workplace in post-apartheid South Africa has 
been the rise of precarious forms of employment. In almost any given factory in South Africa 
today, a large number of workers are often employed under labour brokers, outsourced 
companies or on casual contracts. This dissertation analyses how the industrial labour process 
is being reorganised through the increased use of precarious labour and the impact this has on 
workers and their organisations.  The dominant sociological literature on the post-apartheid 
workplace often treats precarious workers as a substratum of the labour process, categorising 
them as a ‘non-core’ section of the labour force (see Webster & Von Holdt, 2005). This 
dissertation returns to Marxist labour process theory to demonstrate that precarious forms of 
employment have in fact become central to capital’s valorisation model in the current period. 
Through a multi-sited case study of four manufacturing workplaces in Ekurhuleni, east of 
Johannesburg, this study presents a detailed picture of how manufacturing capital is choosing 
to organise its labour power. The findings reveal that precarious workers are found at every 
level of the industrial labour process, alongside and increasingly in place of permanent 
workers. In addition, this dissertation documents the response of capital to the 2015 
amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA), which attempted to restrict labour broking to 
work of a ‘genuinely temporary nature’. The study documents a number of ways in which 
manufacturing companies have attempted to restructure in order to circumvent the amendments 
and persist with precarious employment schemes in different forms. The dissertation argues 
that the rise of precarious forms of employment has resulted in an extreme fracturing of the 
labour process, atomising workers inside the factory. This has radically transformed the terrain 
of workplace struggle. The findings indicate that decades of these neoliberal restructuring 
initiatives have contributed to a crisis of trade unionism at workplace level, but have also 
generated new struggles from below where precarious workers have been testing out a wide 
range of tactical and organisational approaches in their struggles for permanent jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
Apartheid’s industrial workplaces embodied and intensified the major contradiction of 
apartheid capitalism itself, by bringing masses of black workers into large workplaces where 
they were brutally oppressed and exploited by a white managerial class for the benefit of a 
white capitalist class. This eventually resulted in the explosion of militant worker struggles, 
beginning with the Durban Strikes in 1973. The independent trade union movement that 
developed out of these strikes had its base in the black industrial working class, which had 
grown exponentially as a result of the turn towards mass production in the manufacturing 
industries from the 1960s (Webster, 1985). As the trade unions developed and the social weight 
of industrial workers grew, this section of the class found itself at the head of the anti-apartheid 
movement and leading the struggle for socialism (Lehulere, 2015). 
In the post-apartheid period, however, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
focussed on expanding into the public sector, whose workers fast emerged as the federation’s 
largest constituency (Bezuidenhout et al., 2017). At the same time, the trade union movement 
as a whole rapidly began to lose a major section of its traditional base in the manufacturing 
industries. 70.16% of workers in manufacturing were union members in 1990, but by 2002 this 
figure had fallen to 35.1% and by 2012 it stood at just 31.2% (Macun, 2014: 44). The latest 
available data marked union density in manufacturing at just 29.8% in 2017 (see Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey Q4, 2017; Annual Labour Market Bulletin, 2016-2017). On the one hand, 
these figures vividly capture the rapid decline of trade unionism in manufacturing and are 
indicative of the falling social weight of industrial workers in the post-apartheid period. On the 
other hand, these figures also show that in spite of the decades of mass retrenchments, which 
resulted in employment in manufacturing falling by a compound annual rate of 1.3% between 
1994 and 2011 (Black et al., 2017), there are still masses of industrial workers located in 
manufacturing industries in South Africa today. Organising these workers remains central to 
the task of rebuilding a labour movement.  
A large number of these industrial workers today are, however, found in precarious forms of 
employment and work in factories that have undergone decades of restructuring. Although the 
rise of precarious work over the last 25 years has become the focus of a growing body of 
sociological literature, there has not been much focus on exactly how precarious workers fit 
into the industrial labour process in the current period. The literature has ultimately not been 
able to keep pace with the rate of workplace change in the current period, where precarious 
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forms of employment have clearly become the centrepiece of manufacturing capital’s 
valorisation model. The extent to which the industrial workplace has been restructured in the 
post-apartheid period under neoliberalism – and, indeed, the extent to which the industrial 
working class itself has been restructured as a result – quite simply requires more research and 
better analysis.  
This dissertation, therefore, aims to uncover exactly how manufacturing capital has reorganised 
its labour process in recent decades, and more specifically it looks to unveil how manufacturing 
companies are choosing to organise their labour power inside their factories today. Part of the 
motivation for this research is also to document the different restructuring initiatives that 
manufacturing companies have embarked upon in response to the 2015 amendments to section 
198 of the Labour Relations Act (LRA), which imposed a limit on labour broking. It is 
ultimately hoped that a better understanding of how the contemporary industrial labour process 
is organised will be useful in order to contribute towards strengthening the struggles that are 
emerging from ordinary (and often precarious) workers in these workplaces today.  
1.1 Research questions 
In light of the abovementioned aims of the research, the following research question was posed:  
• How has the contemporary industrial labour process been restructured as a result of the 
rise of precarious forms of employment and what effect has restructuring had on 
workers and their organisations?  
In order to answer this question, the following sub-questions were also posed: 
• How do manufacturing companies organise labour power inside their factories in South 
Africa today?  
• What role do precarious forms of employment play in the industrial labour process? 
• How have manufacturing companies responded to the 2015 LRA amendments that 
imposed a limit on labour broking? 
• How have trade unions and workers responded to workplace restructuring in recent 
decades and what is the state of workplace organising today?  
To answer these questions, this dissertation employed a methodological approach to the 
research based on a multi-sited case study of four industrial workplaces in Ekurhuleni, east of 
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Johannesburg. These are: Reckitt Benckiser’s factory in Jet Park, a PFG Building Glass plant 
in Springs, a Pioneer Foods factory in Clayville and a Simba Chips factory in Isando.  
1.2 Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter 2, Labour process theory and literature on precarious forms of employment in post-
apartheid South Africa, begins by arguing that both the literature and general debate on 
precarious forms of employment have often mistakenly located precarious workers as a 
substratum of the capitalist labour process. By going back to Marx (1990), Braverman (1974) 
and other contributors to labour process theory, the chapter instead begins to frame the debate 
around precarious forms of employment in relation to a long history of capital’s struggle for 
control over the labour process. In other words, it argues that precarious forms of employment 
ought to be studied primarily as mechanisms for management control over workers and over 
the extraction of surplus value.  
Chapter 3, Methodology, details the background to the research project and explores its 
methodological approach. This project takes the form of a multi-cited case study, focussing on 
four industrial workplaces in Ekurhuleni. This chapter reflects upon the pros and cons of 
generalising from qualitative case study research. The chapter also reflects upon the data 
gathering techniques and questions of ethics and reflexivity in the research process. 
Chapter 4, Precarious workers and the industrial labour process, presents the findings of each 
of the four cases in relation to four broad themes. Firstly, each case presents a description of 
how the labour process is organised, and more specifically how management organises its 
labour power along the production process. Each case, secondly, reflects on the forms of 
control that the different precarious employment schemes afford management over workers 
and over the production of surplus value. Thirdly, each case details management restructuring 
in response to the section 198 amendments and in response to worker struggles for permanent 
jobs. Finally, the cases reflect on the state of worker organising and trade unionism in each 
workplace today.  
Chapter 5, Discussion and Conclusion, reflects back upon the theory in light of the empirical 
findings and argues that all analyses of precarious forms of employment should be grounded 
in an understanding of the role that they play in a client company’s valorisation process. By 
building on a Marxist reading of the political economy of the labour process, it shows how 
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different forms of precarious employment have become central to manufacturing capital’s 
ability to extract higher rates of surplus value in the current period. 
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2. Literature review: Labour process theory and literature on precarious forms of 
employment in post-apartheid South Africa 
This literature review provides a history of the major theoretical contributions made to 
understand the changes to the capitalist labour process. It begins with Marx’s (1990) analysis 
of transformations to the labour process under the stage of early competitive capitalism. Since 
Capital Volume 1 (1867) laid the theoretical foundations for all subsequent studies on the 
labour process, this chapter offers a detailed description of some of its core theorisations. 
Following on from this, the chapter covers Braverman’s (1974) resurrection of Labour Process 
Theory (LPT), which sought to make sense of the changes that took place under the phase of 
monopoly capitalism, most notably the technological advances and managerial innovations 
associated with mass production. It also details some of the important responses to 
Braverman’s (1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital – responses which focussed on the role of 
worker agency (in the form of both resistance and consent) in the development of the labour 
process in this period. The chapter then turns towards some of the contributions made to 
understand the changes to the labour process in the era of neoliberal-financialised capitalism. 
The discussion identifies that under neoliberalism changes to the labour process have taken 
place both at a global level, with the outsourcing of labour-intensive work to the Global South, 
as well as at plant level, where the turn to lean production has resulted in attacks on workers 
and has led to the proliferation of precarious forms of employment. Finally, I take a closer look 
at the literature that tracks the changing nature of work in post-apartheid South Africa, 
focussing on literature that documents the rise of precarious forms of employment. In much of 
this literature there has been a generalised drift away from studying the workplace as a labour 
process. This section of the chapter closes by reflecting upon some of the immediate 
implications of the 2015 amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) which imposed a 
limit on labour broking.  
2.1 The labour process under early competitive capitalism 
A study of the capitalist labour process must begin with Marx’s (1990 [1867]) founding 
contribution in Capital Volume 1. Marx’s magnum opus is, among other things, largely a 
history of capital’s early transformation of the labour process and yet it remains a sturdy 
analysis of the trajectory of capitalist production over 150 years later. This section will begin 
with the basic conceptual tools needed to understand capitalism as a mode of production that 
is distinct from earlier forms of production. It will then cover Marx’s central ideas on changes 
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to the labour process under the early phase of competitive capitalism, which includes its major 
transformation during the First Industrial Revolution.   
2.1.1 The general labour process: creating use values 
Marx begins with an analysis of the labour process prior to it being brought under the control 
of a capitalist. He starts by identifying the key factor that distinguishes human labour from the 
labour of animals: that is, a person must actively ‘conceive’ of the product of their labour before 
setting to work to create it (Marx, 1990: 284). Human labour is, therefore, characterised by the 
unity of conception and execution. Animal labour, on the other hand, is understood to belong 
to the realms of instinct. Thus, for Marx, human labour is a ‘purposeful’ activity which 
transforms nature into useful items (or use values) which satisfy some or other social need. In 
Chapter 1, he notes:  
labour then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labour, is a condition of 
human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal 
natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and 
therefore human life itself. (Marx, 1990: 132) 
While the labour process takes different forms throughout human history, Marx identified three 
‘simple elements of the labour process’ which are present in all modes of production. These 
are: ‘purposeful activity, that is work itself; the object on which that work is performed; and 
the instrument of that work’ (Marx, 1990: 284). These three simple elements of the labour 
process we call the forces of production and under capitalism we confront them as the following 
commodities: labour power, the objects of labour and the instruments of labour. The latter two 
together we refer to as the means of production. 
Marx’s formulation of the general (or simple) labour process is useful for this study because, 
despite the complexity of production in certain branches of industry today, we can always break 
things down to these three basic components. In plain language, the general labour process can 
be understood as follows: A person works (labour) using a tool or machine (instruments of 
labour) to change the form of a material (objects of labour) into something useful (use values). 
2.1.2 The capitalist labour process: creating surplus value 
Under capitalist control, the labour process is not directed simply at producing useful things or 
use-values. Capitalist production is concerned with producing commodities that can be sold on 
the market for a profit. Marx explains:  
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Our capitalist has two objectives: in the first place, he wants to produce a use-
value which has exchange-value, i.e. an article destined to be sold, a 
commodity; and secondly he wants to produce a commodity greater in value 
than the sum of the values of the commodities used to produce it, namely the 
means of production and labour-power he purchased with his good money on 
the open market. His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; 
not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus-value. (Marx, 
1990: 293) 
Thus, for Marx, the capitalist labour process is the unity of the general labour process and the 
‘valorisation process’ – i.e. the process of surplus value creation (ibid: 302). This is a key 
starting point for this study, since the real reason for studying the workplace as a labour process 
is to understand it, first and foremost, in political economic terms as a site for the valorisation 
of capital. Of course, as a result, it also becomes a site of resistance against exploitation and 
capitalism in general. 
In capital’s ceaseless search for profit it must constantly look for new avenues to extract surplus 
value. This process is called capital accumulation (ibid: 709). A portion of previously extracted 
surplus is reinvested in new productive ventures or used to render existing ones even more 
profitable. Marx argued that once this takes place on a mass scale it results in a general 
development of the productive forces of capital – i.e. a general development of the means of 
production (constant capital) and labour power (variable capital) (ibid: 307-319). The drive to 
accumulate ever greater masses of surplus value leads to revolutions in the sphere of 
production, which culminate in transformations in the capitalist labour process. In attempting 
to explain the nature of these changes, what they mean for workers and how they relate to the 
different methods of increasing surplus value, Marx argued that the capitalist labour process 
goes through three major phases: from cooperation (ibid:439) to manufacture (ibid: 455) and 
then to large scale industry or machinofacture (ibid: 492).  
2.1.3 Capital’s early transformations of the labour process: cooperation, manufacture and large-
scale industry 
Prior to capital’s direct control over the labour process, petty-commodity production took place 
in workers’ homes or in small workshops. Merchant capitalists, who would simply sell the 
finished commodities on the market for a profit, had little control over the speed and methods 
of work and, therefore, over the production of surplus value. The assembly of a large number 
of workers into factories allowed the new industrial capitalist to closely enforce production 
targets which, Marx argued, required a level of ‘simple cooperation’ between workers in order 
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to be met (Marx, 1990: 433). However, the actual nature of work in these early ‘cooperative’ 
factories mostly resembled the workshops of the earlier period where skilled craft workers each 
made a product from start to finish. This meant that workers retained a significant level of 
individual control over their work, despite now working towards collective targets under the 
command of a capitalist.  
The labour process only becomes truly capitalist when a capitalist takes control over the precise 
way in which commodities are made. In the transition from the phase of cooperation to 
manufacture, the capitalist begins to impose a strict division of labour between workers (ibid: 
455). This first takes place somewhat naturally in those industries in which the products of 
different craft workers are assembled together to build one commodity. Marx gives the example 
of the natural division of labour needed for the production of carriages, where the tailor and 
the locksmith, for example, work independently of one another in the production of one 
commodity (ibid). The capitalist, however, soon begins to also enforce a division of labour in 
the production of single crafts (e.g. instead of making a shoe from start to finish, one worker 
makes only the sole, another makes the upper, while a third stitches them together). Capitalists 
across different industries realise that craft work can be broken up into smaller and smaller 
independent tasks, which requires greater cooperation between a large number of more 
‘specialised workers’ to produce a single product (ibid: 481). Thus, for Marx, under the phase 
of manufacture you have the creation of the ‘collective worker’ or the ‘collective working 
organism’ – i.e. a mass of less skilled, more specialised workers whose collective labour is 
needed to create a finished product that was once produced by a single craft worker (ibid).   
The introduction of machinery into production during the industrial revolution marked the 
transition towards the final phase of the labour process, according to Marx – that of large-scale 
industry or machinofacture (ibid, 492). Here machines or systems of connected machines do 
much of the work. Under the command of capital, workers, Marx says, become mere 
appendages to the machine, working as either operators on the machines or auxiliary workers 
that feed or relieve the machines. The different varieties of useful labour (specialised labour) 
that emerged under the phase of manufacture are steadily eroded (or appropriated by the 
machine) as workers begin to perform tasks that are less and less distinguishable from one 
another – largely focussed around feeding, operating and relieving the machine. In other words, 
the mechanisation of industry tends to create a mass of more ‘homogenous labour’, according 
to Marx (ibid: 134).  
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2.1.4 The impact of machinofacture on workers and the working class: the real subsumption of 
labour and the creation of a reserve army 
The transition from cooperation to manufacture and then to large scale industry is also a 
development of the relations of control that emerged in their embryonic forms in the early 
factories. With each phase, capital brings the labour process further under its control while the 
labour of the individual worker contributes to a smaller and smaller fraction of the final 
commodity. The control that the capitalist exerts over the labour process under the phase of 
cooperation, Marx says, results in only a ‘formal subsumption of labour’ (ibid: 645). In other 
words, although the labour process is subordinated to capital, it goes on much as it did before. 
While the craft worker is alienated from the product of their labour, they retain control over 
their methods of work, which limits capital’s control over the creation of surplus value. The 
division of labour and the application of machinery to production, Marx argues, gives rise to 
the ‘real subsumption of labour’ (ibid). This allowed capital to gain greater control over 
extraction of real labour from the labour power it purchases, and, therefore, over the production 
of surplus value. This will be explored more clearly in the next section (see 2.1.5).  
For Marx, who was writing about the First Industrial Revolution, the introduction of machines 
into production had three major effects on workers. First, the worker no longer needed to exert 
the same levels of physical force. This, however, did not set the worker free from toil and usher 
in an era of ‘decent work’. Instead it allowed capital to put women and children (the male 
worker’s family) to work on the machines, in what Marx calls the ‘appropriation of 
supplementary labour power by capital’ (ibid: 517). Second, the new technology also resulted 
in the ‘prolongation of the working day’ (ibid: 526). This, as we will see in the next section, is 
because the capitalist runs the machine around the clock to make the most of this technological 
advantage. Third, advances in machinery result in the ‘intensification of labour’ and breaks the 
worker’s control over the labour process since the machine sets the speed at which a worker 
works (ibid: 533). 
Ultimately, the introduction of machinery also takes over what used to be the job of the worker. 
In this way, Marx explained how the rising mass of unemployed workers in the 1800s in Britain 
was a direct result of the transformation of the labour process under the phase of 
machinofacture. The creation of a reserve army of labour then acts as a downward pressure on 
wages, which renders uncertain and unstable the existence of the entire working class. Thus, 
through his analysis of the labour process, Marx effectively also developed what Jonna and 
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Bellemy Foster (2016) refer to as his theory of working class precariousness. They make sure 
to note, however, that Marx’s theory differs significantly from the current academic fashion 
that understands ‘precariousness’ as a phenomenon unique to neoliberal capitalism and which 
singles out ‘the precariat’ as a class of its own (see Standing, 2011). 
Marx (1990) identified four different sections of the reserve army of labour in terms of their 
relation to capitalist production: the floating, latent, stagnant, and pauperized populations 
(Jonna and Bellemy Foster, 2016). The ‘repulsion and attraction’ of workers from the floating 
population, Marx argues, becomes a common feature of large-scale industry, coinciding with 
the endemic boom and bust cycles of capitalist production (Marx, 1990: 575). This layer of the 
class, which has always suffered from job precarity, is central to any regime of accumulation 
for it provides capital with access to a flexible labour force. The creation of the latent and 
stagnant layers of the class are similarly central to all regimes of accumulation due to the 
downward pressure that an oversupply of workers has on the price of labour power (i.e. on 
wages). For this chapter I will return to the importance of Marx’s understanding of working 
class precariousness and the reserve army in the section on neoliberal capitalism, where 
theories of precarity have re-emerged in the literature and require a comparison with Marx’s 
original formulations.  
2.1.5 The impact of machinofacture on the rate of surplus value  
In order to explain the exponential increase in the rate at which surplus value is produced under 
the phase of large-scale industry, Marx makes a distinction between absolute and relative 
surplus value: 
I call that surplus-value which is produced by the lengthening of the working 
day, absolute surplus-value. In contrast to this, I call that surplus-value which 
arises from the curtailment of the necessary labour-time, and from the 
corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the 
working day, relative surplus-value. (Marx, 1990: 432 emphasis in the 
original) 
Under the phase of cooperation, capital’s central means to increase the rate of surplus value is 
to extend the length of the working day (absolute surplus value). Since the working day cannot 
be extended indefinitely (ibid: 340), capital is forced to look for ways to increase the rate of 
relative surplus value. One major source of relative surplus value is the cheapening of labour 
power (i.e. the curtailment of necessary labour time), which emerges as a consequence of the 
transition to large scale industry. The mechanisation of the wage goods industries leads to a 
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fall in the cost of those commodities that make up the basket of goods that a worker consumes, 
thus driving down the cost of labour power and increasing the rate of relative surplus value for 
the entire capitalist class (ibid: 432). But more important for our analysis are the methods 
available for individual capitalists in competition with one another to increase their production 
of relative surplus value. The cutthroat competition between capitalists, all of whom are able 
to force longer working hours on their workers (absolute surplus value) and all of whom benefit 
from the cheapening of labour power (relative surplus value), results in a race to extract higher 
rates of relative surplus value primarily through increasing the productivity of labour.   
As we have discussed above, under the phase of manufacture increases in productivity are 
achieved via the division of labour. But under large scale industry, it is the introduction of new 
machinery to production that allows for almost exponential increases in productivity. The 
capitalists who mechanise first generate huge profits because they can produce far more 
commodities in a shorter space of time and at a fraction of the cost of the capitalists that lag 
behind. These capitalists, Marx notes, can undercut the rest by selling their commodities above 
their individual value (a value equal to the actual labour time objectified in the commodity) but 
below their social value (a value equal to the labour time socially necessary for the production 
of the same commodity in the industry as a whole) (ibid: 434). The capitalists that benefit from 
major leaps in productivity are able to extract higher rates of relative surplus value because 
they ultimately spend a smaller portion of their day’s product on replacing the value of the 
labour-power that they have purchased (i.e. the curtailment of necessary labour time) (ibid: 
530). Mandel (1978: 192) refers to the process of benefitting from technological advantages as 
the extraction of ‘technological rents’.   
It is important to note, however, that this method of extracting relative surplus value via gains 
in productivity is only good for a certain period of time. Once other capitalists in the same 
industry achieve similar levels of productivity and intensity of labour, the above capitalists 
have to bring down the price of their commodities to their new social value, reducing their rate 
of surplus value in the process. It is this that compels capitalists to constantly develop the 
capacities of their productive forces to chase gains in productivity. However, it is only powerful 
companies that can generally afford to reorganise production or invest in developing new 
machinery. Competition, which drives the pursuit of relative surplus value, thus turns into its 
dialectical opposite: the concentration of capital. As Lenin notes in Imperialism, the Highest 
Stage of Capitalism: 
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half a century ago, when Marx was writing Capital, free competition appeared 
to the overwhelming majority of economists to be a ‘natural law’. Official 
science tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, who by a 
theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had proved that free 
competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a 
certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. (Lenin, 2008: 196) 
It was Marx’s analysis of changes to the capitalist labour process, and in particular his 
identification of the limited window of opportunity that gains in productivity open for relative 
surplus value creation, that allowed him to uncover the tendency for competition to develop 
into monopoly. Marx did not live to see the full development of monopoly capitalism. As such, 
it was left to others to make sense of the changes to the labour process that took place under 
this phase of capitalism and test them against Marx’s original formulations.  
2.2 The labour process under monopoly capitalism 
The merging of financial and industrial capital at the beginning of the 20th Century 
characterised the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism and ultimately opened an 
epoch in which massive investments would be made in production (Lenin, 2008). Braverman’s 
(1974) Labour and Monopoly Capital was the first major attempt to apply a Marxist analysis 
to study changes to the labour process brought upon by the rise of mass production under 
capitalism’s monopoly phase. His work builds on the core of Marx’s (1990) own analysis that 
we have covered so far in this chapter in that it treats changes to capitalist production primarily 
in terms of capital’s struggle for control over the labour process – that is, its struggle for control 
over workers and ultimately over the production of surplus value.  
Braverman (1974) returned to the labour process to try and explain what almost a century of 
technological and managerial innovations meant for workers in America, and the working class 
in that country in general. According to Braverman, the massive increase in white collar work 
in the mid-1900s and the decline in the relative size of the industrial working class was assumed 
in academia both to reflect a shift towards the enrichment of work under monopoly capitalism 
and to disprove Marx’s bipolar class structure (ibid: 424). Similarly, the increasing application 
of high-tech machinery across industries was assumed to require a more skilled workforce. By 
going back to Marx, Braverman’s Labour and Monopoly Capital demonstrated how capital’s 
struggle for control over the labour process in both blue- and white-collar industries had, in 
fact, resulted in the erosion of workers’ skills and the degradation of work in general. 
Braverman’s controversial findings reinvigorated the study of the labour process both in 
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Marxist literature and industrial sociology. This section looks more closely at some of his major 
findings as well as the critiques that they garnered.  
2.2.1 Braverman’s key findings: skill and control 
Braverman (1974) demonstrates capital’s tendency to deskill the labour process and exert 
greater control over it in two ways: first, with an analysis of Taylorist and Fordist management 
strategies, and, second, with an analysis of capital’s application of new machinery to 
production.  
Frederick Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ strategies aimed to eliminate ‘soldiering’ (a 
worker’s downtime) by applying time-measurement studies to work processes in order to 
identify the most efficient way for management to use the labour-power it had purchased (ibid: 
85). Scientific management would go on to form the basis of modern forms of work 
organisation, but for Braverman it was more than just an influential strand of management 
theory; he understood Taylorism to be the most ‘conscious and systematic’ expression of the 
‘formerly unconscious tendency of capitalist production’ – that of alienating workers from their 
control over the labour process through deskilling (ibid: 121).  
Taylor’s three principles of scientific management, Braverman (ibid: 119) argues, illustrated 
the tendency towards deskilling in the form of a required management objective. The first 
principle was for management to gather and develop knowledge of the labour process, by 
studying the techniques of the workers who had already developed this knowledge through 
years of practice. The second principle was to remove the knowledge of the labour process 
from the shop floor and place it squarely in the hands of management. The third principle was 
for management to limit the worker to a set of menial tasks that only contribute to a small 
fraction of the entire labour process, each with a set of instructions that detail exactly how the 
task should be carried out. The first two principles result in the separation of ‘conception’ from 
‘execution’ in the labour process, while the third calls for management to utilise its ‘monopoly 
over knowledge to control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution’ (ibid: 
119).  
If an analysis of Taylorism proved useful for Braverman to delineate the deskilling process, 
then his analysis of Fordist mass production is used to demonstrate capital’s tendency to exert 
ever greater levels of control over the labour process (ibid: 149). The simple innovation of 
placing workers and machines along a line of conveyor belts led to leaps in the productivity of 
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labour because a worker no longer had to carry things from one work station to the next. It also 
significantly increased the intensity of labour because workers had to keep pace with line 
speeds set by management. Taylorism and Fordism were both ultimately management 
strategies concerned with the organisation of labour. The former by taking the division of 
labour to its furthest possible conclusion in the separation of mental and manual labour, and 
the latter as a continuation of this process on a mass scale and with added control over 
production speeds. However, in order to extract as much real labour from the labour-power it 
buys (or to render labour more productive), Braverman also understood that capital can also 
choose to mechanise. 
Braverman, who had worked for years as a metalworker, investigated the impact of numerical 
control machine tools that were introduced to the metal industries in the mid-1900s. Numerical 
control allowed capital to employ machine tools that could produce a wide range of complex 
movements that were previously performed by highly skilled craft metal workers. Braverman 
showed how numerical control machines used a piece of coded tape, which is designed by an 
engineer, to direct the movements made by a turret lathe, reducing the machinist or operator to 
a mere overseer. This allowed management to remove mental labour from the shop floor and 
place it firmly under the control of management. Noble (1984) would later contribute to this 
work with a comparative analysis of numerical control and record playback technology which 
was also available to capital at the time. Record playback was a similar form of machine tool 
automation, but instead of using a punch card designed by an engineer, it simply recorded the 
movements of the skilled worker and reproduced them. Noble argued that capital chose to forge 
ahead with numerical control technology precisely because it reduced capital’s reliance on 
skilled workers and gave it greater control over the labour process.  
Managerial innovations like Taylorism and Fordism combined with the constant invention of 
new productive technologies formed the basis of what Braverman (1974: 155) called the 
‘scientific-technical revolution’. For Braverman, this revolution began in the last quarter of the 
1800s as the financial might of monopolistic enterprises opened an era in which large 
investments into scientific research for mass production purposes became the norm. The 
scientific-technical revolution took the form of a systematic ‘attack’ on every component of 
the labour process, leaving no stone unturned in the search for ever more efficient means of 
transforming labour-power into real labour, and, therefore, surplus-value (ibid: 169). This 
revolution is ultimately presented as capital’s conscious struggle for control as it looked to 
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‘dissolve the labour process as a process conducted by the worker and reconstitute it as a 
process conducted by management’ (ibid: 170).  
2.2.2 Responses to Braverman: the role of worker agency in the labour process 
In the two decades after Braverman (1974) published Labour and Monopoly Capital there was 
an explosion of literature on the capitalist labour process. The majority of these responses 
criticised Braverman (as well as Marx) for neglecting the role that worker agency plays in the 
construction of the labour process (see Friedman, 1977; Elger, 1979; Edwards, 1979; 
Montgomery, 1979; Burawoy, 1982). The central bone of contention of this school of thinkers 
is with the following disclaimer that Braverman makes in the introduction to Labour and 
Monopoly Capital: 
No attempt will be made to deal with the modern working class on the level of 
its consciousness, organisation or activities. This is a book about the working 
class as a class in itself, not as a class for itself. (Braverman, 1974: 27) 
In other words, Braverman (ibid: 27) chose to pursue what he called a study of the ‘objective 
content of class’ as opposed to a study of the ‘subjective’ experiences and organisational 
responses that emerge as a result of class antagonisms. Critics argued that both Braverman and 
Marx could not achieve an accurate enough understanding of the tendential trajectory of the 
capitalist labour process without taking into account the role played by worker resistance 
(Friedman, 1977; Elger, 1979; Edwards, 1979; Montgomery, 1979; Webster, 1985) and 
consent (Burawoy, 1982).  
The literature on worker resistance varies between accounts that present an image of a radical 
working class able to exert its own control over the capitalist labour process (Montgomery, 
1979) or successfully resist management attempts to deskill (Friedman, 1977), to accounts that 
portray resistance as a mechanism to merely regulate management’s drive to control the labour 
process (Edwards, 1979). Possibly the most far reaching critique of Braverman’s work is put 
forward by Elger (1979: 60), who argues that it treats workers ‘as an object of capital’ and 
presents a picture of an ‘inert working class’. For Elger, capitalist production does not hurtle 
unceasingly towards a total deskilling and the full control of management. This process, he 
argues, is mediated by the overarching regime of accumulation at a given point in history, 
which is itself shaped by class struggle both inside and outside the workplace (ibid). In other 
words, the argument is that workers may retain their skills and a level of control over the labour 
process depending on the balance of class forces in society. 
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Burawoy’s (1982) influential book, Manufacturing Consent, starts from a similar premise as 
the above-mentioned authors in that he identifies worker agency as a determining feature in the 
construction of a labour process. However, he argues that this agency is not just oppositional, 
it also takes the form of a worker’s ‘willingness to cooperate in the translation of labour power 
into labour’ (ibid: 27). In light of this, Burawoy developed the concept of the ‘workplace 
regime’ as the determining factor in the construction of a labour process. Such a regime, he 
argued, could either be ‘despotic’ and based on ‘coercion’, or ‘hegemonic’ and based on 
‘consent’ (ibid). As a result of his experience at the ‘Geer and Allied’ engine factory in the 
1970s in the United States, where workers ‘organised their own activities’ in the workplace 
and made their own decisions on which metal cutting techniques to use, he disputed 
Braverman’s assertion of a general tendency towards increasing management control over the 
labour process via the separation of conception from execution (ibid: 72). He chose, instead, 
to reframe Braverman’s deskilling tendency as a ‘tendency toward the expansion of choices 
within ever narrower limits’ (ibid: 94). 
Despite the unquestionable importance of highlighting the role of class struggle and class 
collaboration in the development of the capitalist labour process, much of the post-Braverman 
literature has come under criticism of its own. Wardell (1990) argues that a major flaw in this 
body of literature can be put down to a misreading or misrepresentation of Braverman’s views 
on the role of class struggle. He has called for a closer reading of Labour and Monopoly Capital 
that acknowledges what may not be explicitly said but rather implied in its analysis. Wardell 
(ibid: 154) argues that the ‘theoretical substructure of [Braverman’s] work contains the 
recognition that production is distinctively a social process’. This builds on Zimbalist’s (1979: 
xiii) initial defence of Braverman, where it is argued that Labour and Monopoly Capital is 
premised upon a clear understanding that capital’s development of its forces of production can 
only take place within the definite limits imposed by each specific set of relations of 
production. The point, Zimbalist (ibid: xv) insists, is not to treat Braverman’s deskilling thesis 
as an immediate inevitability that applies evenly to every industry or workplace, but rather to 
understand deskilling as a ‘long-run tendency through fragmentation, rationalisation and 
mechanisation for workers and their jobs to become deskilled’. 
A second major critique of the post-Braverman literature is that much of the analysis is 
grounded in an empiricist approach that often uses case studies or anecdotal evidence as an 
easy way to falsify Braverman’s generalisations (see Thompson, 1989; Burrell, 1990). The 
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rejection of the deskilling tendency (see Friedman, 1977) or the hesitancy to fully accept it (see 
Burawoy, 1982) is often supported by pointing towards schemes of ‘job enrichment’ or ‘work 
humanisation’ which were beginning to emerge at the time. Although these schemes suggest a 
potential drift away from the more clearly coercive Taylorist and Fordist management models 
of mass production, they are nonetheless management control strategies in themselves that 
were formulated in response to worker struggles (Zimbalist, 1979). They are the small yet 
important victories in an ongoing class struggle, but they should not be understood as 
signifying a negation of the long-run tendency towards deskilling of the labour process and 
work degradation under capitalism.  
I would argue that a final difficulty for much of the literature published in the immediate 
aftermath of Labour and Monopoly Capital is that many of its conclusions appear to be drawn 
from an inward-looking assessment of changes to the labour process in imperialist nations, due 
to the focus on case studies based mostly in Britain and the USA. Braverman’s pessimistic 
thesis on the degradation of work may have been difficult to digest considering that half a 
century of welfare capitalism and the post-War pact between labour and capital meant that 
workers still had some sort of basic protections in many countries in Europe and North 
America. But at the very moment that job enrichment schemes were emerging in some 
industries in the imperialist centres, capital had already begun to outsource an increasing 
number of low-wage, labour-intensive jobs to sweatshops in the rest of the world as a means 
to exploit huge reserves of unskilled labour (Milberg, 2004). It is perhaps that they were writing 
in a period just before this trend became readily apparent that many of these scholars attempted 
to over-modify Braverman’s deskilling and degradation of work theses.  
2.3 The labour process under neoliberal-financialised capitalism 
The neoliberalisation of the global economy began in the last quarter of the 20th Century and 
has taken a number of forms in different parts of the world, but at its core it can be understood 
as a project to radically redistribute wealth and power in favour of the capitalist class 
internationally (Moody, 1997; Lehulere, 2015; Ness, 2016; Smith, 2017). A defining feature 
of this period is the restructuring of capital itself, with the unbundling of monopolistic 
corporations that dominated entire national economies with big subsidiaries in each sector and 
their reconstitution as massive Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that monopolise along 
whole industries of the global economy. This section of the chapter begins by describing how 
changes to the industrial labour process at a global level formed an integral part of this project, 
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most notably through the development of a new global division of labour. It then looks into 
how neoliberal ideology took hold of the labour process at plant level in the form of lean 
production strategies. Finally, it argues that the result of both macro and micro neoliberal 
restructuring has been the subsequent restructuring of the working class globally, which 
renders the entire class more precarious.  
2.3.1 Changes to the global production regime under neoliberalism: global labour arbitrage  
Lehulere (2015: xi) describes neoliberalism as a ‘social, economic and political programme’ 
that formed ‘part of international finance capital’s attempt to resolve the international capitalist 
crisis which first became evident in the mid- to late-1960s’. A central aspect of this crisis, he 
argues, was the steadily rising organic composition of capital in imperialist nations at the time 
– i.e. a rise in the proportion of investments in machinery (means of production) relative to 
labour power – which resulted in a declining rate of profit. Up until this period, the imperialist 
economies had relied on large internal reserves of relatively cheap labour to arrest falls in the 
rate of profit. But by the mid 1960s this was no longer possible as the growth of trade unionism 
and the depletion of labour reserves (as a result of Keynesian full employment) resulted in an 
upwardly floating wage bill. The second major aspect of this crisis, according to Lehulere, was 
the overaccumulation of capital goods in the imperialist nations without sufficient productive 
outlets.  
One of capital’s major solutions to the crisis was the liberalisation of the global economy to 
open up the Global South1 to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a means to exploit large 
reserves of cheap labour. The result, as Ness (2016: 2) argues, is that ‘the industrial working 
class has not disappeared but has been relocated and reconstituted in the South in larger 
numbers than ever before in history’. In fact, in a recent online debate with Harvey (2018) on 
the nature of imperialism in the 21st Century, Smith (2017) argues that the outsourcing and 
relocation of production to low wage countries is the single most important transformation of 
the neoliberal era. He describes this as a fundamental transformation in the dominant mode of 
‘surplus value extraction’ that now takes place ‘through the global labour arbitrage-driven 
 
1 The term ‘Global South’ is used here to refer to all countries that are not considered traditional imperialist 
powers, and is not a reference to geographical location. Countries like China, which are today beginning to 
challenge the hegemony of the traditional imperialist powers, are considered part of the Global South for this 
section which deals with the imperialist division of the world as it existed in the last quarter of the 20th Century.  
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globalization of production’ (ibid: 1). In other words, under the phase of neoliberal-
financialised capitalism, surplus value is increasingly created through low-paid, labour-
intensive work in the Global South and appropriated by MNCs (and their financial backers) 
that are headquartered in the imperialist centres.  
Milberg (2004) highlights the counterintuitive nature of the changes to the global production 
regime under neoliberalism, when he notes that: 
The irony is that precisely at the moment computerisation has led to a 
revolution in the mechanisation of production, the ability to outsource has 
reasserted the importance of the labour component of production costs. Instead 
of being inconsequential as the result of technological change, labour costs are 
now an important determinant in the production location decision. (Milberg, 
2004: 10).  
International capital had essentially developed a two-pronged strategy for relative surplus value 
extraction by computerising production processes for greater productivity in the imperialist 
centres and exploiting masses of cheaper labour powers in the rest of the world. Appolis (2018: 
6) argues that the coexistence of hi-tech (capital intensive) and low-tech (labour intensive) 
spheres is not coincidental but rather a necessary feature of capital accumulation, since the 
extraction of ‘technological rents’ (see 2.1.5) can only take place while the average production 
process of a given commodity remains largely labour-intensive. As noted in section 2.1.5, once 
technology or machinery is diffused equally across an industry, the ability to generate relative 
surplus value from greater productivity (i.e. the ability to extract technological rents) is 
eliminated.  
Under capitalism, however, there does exist a tendency for technology or machinery to equalise 
across companies, industries and even national boundaries. This is primarily because 
competition compels capitalists to keep up with productivity levels of the pace-setters or risk 
losing access to markets, but also because it is in the interest of the manufacturers of new 
technologies to sell them far and wide (Mandel, 1978: 192; Hlatshwayo, 2013: 41).  
To explain why then the duality between high-tech (capital intensive) and low-tech (labour 
intensive) labour processes continues to exist, Appolis (2018: 6) argues that the ‘global 
production regime’ throws up a number of ‘barriers to the uniform diffusion of technology’. 
Firstly, the extraction of massive technological rents from advances in productivity means that 
the diffusion of technology is not in the interests of the biggest corporations or the imperialist 
countries where their headquarters are located. New technologies, which are extremely costly 
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to develop, are protected under private property rights and are prevented by law and even by 
political/military force from being used by companies in other parts of the world. Secondly, 
the periodic crises in the capitalist system requires periods in which the destruction of capital 
is necessary to create new opportunities for surplus value creation, while the political instability 
that is generated by replacing workers with machines also presents a barrier to wholesale 
diffusion of new productive technologies (ibid). Finally, Appolis (ibid) reminds us that the 
‘most fundamental barrier to the generalisation of technology lies in the very purpose of 
technological advances under capitalism’ – that is, the introduction of new machinery is 
primarily a means to save on labour costs. Or in other words, there is very little incentive for 
capital to ‘adopt new technology if the new technology is going to cost more than the cost of 
labour that it is replacing’ (ibid).  
The cheapening of computer chip technology, thanks to rises in productivity in its production, 
saw an eventual diffusion of this technology across the globe which offered capital the best of 
both worlds (Sewell, 2012). By being able to computerise production processes more 
affordably, capital was able to better exploit the large supply of unskilled labour in the Global 
South, since the computer chip builds the ‘mental labour’ or the ‘skills’ of a worker into the 
machine (Schroeder, 2007: 90). In this way we can see that while technology can be applied to 
the labour process to replace expensive labour powers in some instances, it can also be applied 
to the labour process to draw in cheaper labour powers in others. Of course, as soon as it 
becomes affordable to computerise production processes in the Global South to better exploit 
unskilled labour, capital continues to develop newer technologies and even whole new 
industries in the imperialist centres – thus constantly re-establishing the global division 
between areas of high- and low-tech as well as high- and low-skill (Lehulere, 2015). On top of 
this, there also remains a division between high- and low-wage spheres. The ease with which 
MNCs can relocate production (thanks to trade liberalisation, cheaper machinery, and less need 
for skills) means that globally the bargaining power of workers has weakened. Workers in the 
Global South are generally worse off because the extreme dependence of their economies on 
FDI means that their governments have an added incentive to act as watchdogs for capital, 
clamping down on worker rights and struggles to ensure that they do not radically alter the 
wage share of value (ibid).   
In summary, the changes to the capitalist labour process under the age of neoliberalism must 
be understood in the context of an imperialist division of the globe which has resulted in the 
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development of geographically distinct spheres of high and low wages, high and low 
technology, as well as high and low skills. To acknowledge this is not to deny the fact that 
inconsistencies and divergences exist, but rather to proceed from an understanding of South 
Africa’s location in the imperialist division of the globe as being, first and foremost, a source 
of primary commodities (mostly precious metals) and cheap, unskilled labour for international 
capital. It is capital’s access to cheap labour power and the mechanisms available to keep it 
cheap (such as a favourable labour relations framework) that are the determining factors in the 
form that labour process takes in this country today. The findings in the next chapter will bear 
this claim out.  
2.3.2 Changes to production at plant level under neoliberalism: lean production  
The capitalist crisis of the 1960s and 70s had its roots in Fordist approaches to mass production. 
The stockpiling of commodities, which tends towards generating crises of overproduction, 
combined with the aforementioned overaccumulation of capital goods and rising organic 
composition of capital, meant that mass production ran into major obstacles for further capital 
accumulation (Lehulere, 2015). These crises pre-empted capital’s turn towards lean production 
methods which had already been developed in Japanese car plants in the 1960s. ‘Toyotism’ 
became the mantra for firms across the globe in the following decades (Hlatshwayo, 2013; 
Womack et al., 1990). The basic premise of lean production is primarily to reduce the cost of 
inputs in the production process.  
Just in time production, just in time distribution, flexible labour strategies (like outsourcing, 
subcontracting or casualisation), the reorganising of production to focus on a company’s core 
activities and new computer-based technologies for both production and surveillance all 
became go-to measures in capital’s adoption of lean production ideology. Hlatshwayo (2013: 
34) notes that ‘liberal economists’ such as Woodward (1980) and Womack et al. (1990) 
interpreted these changes to signify a shift towards a ‘post-Fordist regime’. This school of 
analysis believed that lean production would do away with the oppressive Taylorist methods 
of control associated with mass production and simultaneously overcome the obstacles to 
accumulation generated under mass production. On the one hand, they identified the move 
towards work teams and Human Resources (HR) management approaches to signify a 
reinvestment in the knowledge and skills of workers and a democratisation of the workplace. 
On the other hand, they saw just in time production as a solution to overproduction, the 
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reduction of input costs as a solution to shrinking profit margins, and quality control as a 
solution to falling demand (Hlatshwayo, 2013).   
The liberal economists’ rosy picture of ‘post-Fordism’ was rejected by Marxist and neo-
Marxist analysts, according to Hlatshwayo (2013: 34). Firstly, scholars like Machsane (1993) 
and Thompson (2013) argued that lean production did not lead to the harmonisation of work 
relations and an upgrading of work conditions. In fact, they insist that the lean production 
approach to teamwork was actually accompanied by a greater standardisation and intensity of 
work rather than increased autonomy. Macshane (1993) also argues that team leaders and HR 
representatives are employed primarily to undermine trade unions and collective bargaining by 
resolving disputes individually and in smaller groups. Secondly, analysts such as Mashilo 
(2010) argue that lean production did not resolve the obstacles to accumulation with clever 
‘just in time production’ strategies. Such strategies were shown to be simply impractical for 
many companies and industries, since any stoppage along the line might result in a breakdown 
in production for the entire supply chain (ibid). To the extent that lean production managed to 
resolve the obstacles to accumulation, it did so by squeezing workers and cutting costs through 
mechanising, downsizing, outsourcing and generally turning towards cheaper, precarious 
forms of employment (see Thompson, 2013 and Thompson & Cushen, 2016). 
In an important new contribution, Thompson and Cushen (2016) argue that lean production is 
often driven by the financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs). Their research 
shows that investors in NFCs are placing heightened emphasis on short-term cash returns, 
which drives a company’s management down a path of cost-cutting as opposed to a project of 
growth or value creation. Attempting to increase growth is associated with increased risk 
because ‘value creation gains are only likely to appear in five to ten years’ (ibid: 6). This means 
that only the most powerful corporations can explore new value creation strategies while the 
rest remain in a constant struggle to reduce the bottom line of the growth/cost ratio. For 
Thompson and Cushen, the financial targets of the NFC ultimately have to be delivered by 
workers which results in attacks on wages, longer work hours, retrenchments, outsourcing, 
downsizing, perpetual restructuring, and punitive performance regimes (or increased work 
intensity). This research project will demonstrate that this is indeed the state of lean production 
in South African workplaces today, where precarious forms of employment form the basis of 
capital’s valorisation approach.  
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2.3.3 Neoliberal restructuring and working class precariousness 
The concept of precariousness has come into prominence in the social sciences over the last 
ten years or so, as the effects of decades of neoliberal attacks on the working and middle classes 
across the globe were felt more severely in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
Standing’s (2011) book, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class, is possibly the most well-
known contribution to the concept of precariousness. For Standing, workers under ‘new’, 
vulnerable forms of employment in formal industries, workers in the informal economy and 
the unemployed are beginning to develop into a new globalised ‘class of their own’ – a class 
that he describes as being unpredictably volatile. The precariat, in Standing’s schema, is treated 
separately from the traditional concept of the working class or the proletariat, and is ultimately 
viewed as a phenomenon that is unique to neoliberalism. Seymour (2012) along with Bellamy 
Foster and Jonna (2016), however, reject the concept of the precariat and call for a better 
understanding of precariousness as a condition on which the entire capitalist mode of 
production is built.  
Bellamy Foster and Jonna (2016) note that the concept of precariousness was first linked to the 
development of the reserve army of labour in Engels’ (1993) The Conditions of the Working 
Class in England as well as in Marx and Engels’ (1964) Communist Manifesto. By returning 
to the theory of the reserve army, they argue, we can better explain the phenomena of growing 
precariousness under neoliberalism. For example, it can be argued that the neoliberal 
restructuring of the global production regime constitutes a conscious effort to exploit what 
Marx (1990) would refer to as the ‘latent surplus populations’ in the Global South. This section 
of the working class was proletarianised through centuries of colonialism as people were 
moved off their land and forced into rural and urban townships. As the proletarianization of 
latent surplus population continues under neoliberalism, through a process of ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (see Harvey, 2018), it drags down the bargaining power of the active army 
of labour because the precarious existence of the latent population means that there are masses 
of would-be workers willing to accept very low wages (Marx, 1990). And as capital developed 
the means with which to exploit it across the globe with the cheapening of computerised 
production processes (see 2.3.1), it pits workers against each other and renders more precarious 
even those previously ‘privileged’ sections of the working class (i.e. labour aristocracies) in 
the imperialist centres.  
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Similarly, neoliberal restructuring at a company or industry level, which is characterised by the 
turn to lean production methods, resulted in the explosion of precarious forms of employment 
all over the world. It can be argued that this has increased, in relative terms, the size of the 
‘floating populations’ which move in and out of employment more regularly. But as with the 
above case, this simultaneously renders more precarious the jobs of even those workers who 
have more permanent employment – i.e. the active army of labour. By treating the concept of 
precariousness in relation to the role that the reserve army of labour plays in the accumulation 
of capital, we are able to see how the increasingly precarious existence of a certain section of 
the working class under neoliberalism does not result in its separation into a new class. Rather, 
the fragmentation of the working class under neoliberalism and the growing weight of the 
different sections of the reserve army only serves to drag down the entire class into greater 
levels of precariousness.  
I now turn to look at how precarious forms of employment have taken root in South Africa. I 
argue that the growing body of literature on precarious work can benefit from being reunited 
with labour process analysis.  
2.4 The labour process in South Africa and the rise of precarious forms of employment  
This section begins by tracking the development of the industrial labour process under 
apartheid, which came to rely so heavily on the exploitation of cheap black labour. It then looks 
at the role that post-apartheid labour legislation has played in safeguarding this accumulation 
model under the African National Congress (ANC) government, by promoting a regime of 
‘regulated flexibility’ and opening avenues for the growth of precarious forms of employment 
– most notably labour broking. Following this, it is argued that a return to labour process 
analysis is required to understand the role that precarious forms of employment play in capital’s 
control over workers and over the rate of surplus value in the current period. Lastly, it reflects 
on the failure of trade unions to organise precarious workers in the post-apartheid period and 
shows how, as a result, capital has effectively been able to navigate their way around the 2015 
amendments to the LRA which impose a limit on labour broking and contract work.  
2.4.1 The labour process and worker struggles under apartheid 
In South Africa, a number of scholars studied the role of worker agency in the construction of 
the labour process under apartheid (Bozzoli 1979; Sitas 1983; Webster 1985; Moodie & 
Ndatshe, 1994; Adler 1997). Webster’s (1985) Cast in a Racial Mould is the most notable of 
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these contributions. His research showed how white craft unions initially resisted the 
introduction of machinery and flow production processes in the metal foundries in the mid-
1900s. When the industry eventually made the move to mass production based on 
machinofacture in the 1960s, it destroyed many of the craft skills but also generated a demand 
for a larger semi-skilled workforce to operate machinery. In an important contribution to the 
debate on worker agency and skills, Webster showed how white workers used their 
organisational power to negotiate a reclassification of job grades, retaining the category of 
‘skilled work’ to ensure higher wages for members of the craft unions despite the objective 
deskilling of craft work in the labour process. This resulted in a system of ‘de facto’ job 
reservation for white workers, where these workers held onto jobs that could have been 
performed by less-skilled black workers. As their power declined following the mechanisation 
of the industry and in order to ensure that their members would continue to secure positions in 
higher job grades, the white craft unions eventually struck a deal with employers to accept the 
‘upskilling’ of black workers for new ‘semi-skilled’ positions which would result in white 
workers being moved out of production to take on more managerial positions (ibid). 
Webster’s central contribution was to identify the contradictory nature of the mechanisation of 
the labour process in the South African context. On the one hand, as Marx (1990: 645) argued, 
machinery provides capital with greater control over the labour process via the ‘real 
subsumption of labour’. However, on the other, the result of black workers taking up positions 
central to production increased their bargaining power and opened up the possibility for these 
workers to build militant industrial unions to contest the control of capital both inside and 
outside of the workplace (Webster, 1985: 14). For Hlatswayo (2013: 45), this contradiction 
meant that ‘South African capitalism was digging its own grave as it unleashed the forces which 
challenged it later on in the 1970s and 1980s’. Ultimately, Webster demonstrated how changes 
to the labour process in the foundries and the responses of both white and black workers 
contributed to the development of a despotic and racially divided, but also highly contested 
workplace order in the final decades of apartheid. The conflict generated by this ‘apartheid 
workplace regime’ (Von Holdt, 2003) was understood to have culminated in a ‘chaotic 
transition’ in the 1980s and 1990s (Moodie and Ndatshe, 1994).  
The Durban Strikes of 1973 and the moments of mass worker mobilisations in the years that 
followed shook the very foundations of capital’s regime of accumulation in South Africa. As 
black trade unions grew and workers began to assert themselves as a social force in society, 
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capital and the state were forced into amending the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 1979 to 
finally recognise black workers as ‘employees’ which came with the right to unionise. In 1981, 
the newly formed unions debated whether they should participate in the Industrial Councils 
(precursors to the Bargaining Councils) and risk being hamstrung by the apartheid industrial 
relations regime (Webster, 1985). In the end, the decision by the Federation of South African 
Trade Unions (FOSATU) to join the councils paid off as union membership grew significantly 
(ibid). In 1985, the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
consolidated the growth of worker power under one large federation. During this period, ideas 
around workers control were being tested out in factories as black workers began to more 
regularly challenge the authority of a white managerial class which was responsible for the 
brutal enforcement of capital’s ‘apartheid workplace regime’ (Von Holdt & Webster, 2005). 
By the mid- to late-1980s, a significant percentage of the COSATU rank and file espoused a 
socialist politics, which directed the question of workers control towards the state and society 
in general (Lehulere, 2015). We can therefore say that not only did the rise of an independent 
workers movement threaten capital’s factory regime based on cheap black labour, but it 
threatened apartheid and capitalism itself (ibid). 
2.4.2 Post-apartheid labour legislation: re-segmenting the labour market 
One of the first pieces of post-apartheid legislation was the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA). 
This made sense as capital’s priority was to address power relations at the point of production 
which, when they were at their most contested in the 1980s, had threatened its very existence. 
In 1997 the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) would then establish minimum 
conditions of work for all workers and was followed by the passing of the Employment Equity 
Act (EEA) the following year. Together these Acts were supposed to signal a shift away from 
an accumulation regime based on the extreme exploitation of cheap black labour and afford all 
workers the same employment rights. Despite the passing of new legislation, Kenny and 
Webster (1998) identified that capital’s turn towards ‘flexible’ employment strategies meant 
that a ‘re-segmentation’ of the labour market was already taking place. Von Holdt and Webster 
(2005) would later argue that the lines of inclusion and exclusion generated under the apartheid 
workplace’s racial division of labour had been reproduced in post-apartheid workplaces in the 
form of a ‘core’ of permanent and often unionised workers and a ‘non-core’ of workers under 
new precarious forms of employment.  
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Two contrasting arguments have emerged to explain how capital managed to recreate a dual 
labour market and ultimately persist with an accumulation regime based on the exploitation of 
cheap black labour in the post-apartheid period. The first, which is the dominant position in the 
sociological literature, argues that capital turned towards schemes of labour flexibility and re-
segmentation to undermine post-apartheid labour legislation, which had codified the rights that 
the labour movement had won through two decades of struggles under apartheid (see Kenny & 
Webster, 1998; Von Holdt and Webster, 2005; Theron, 2014; Englert & Webster, 2019). The 
second, which can be found in the activist literature on the subject, argues that the re-
segmentation and flexibilization of the labour market was, in fact, written into the very 
legislation itself (see Schroeder, 2002; Lehulere, 2015). This debate has not been recognised 
in the official academic literature until very recently (see Runciman, 2019), and, therefore, 
requires a brief delineation, beginning with the more mainstream position from the academic 
literature.  
Theron (2014) as well as Englert and Webster (2019) refer to the 1995 LRA as a ‘product of 
its time’ which summed up many of the rights that the labour movement fought for under 
apartheid. They explain its current insufficiencies by arguing that it has not been able to keep 
pace with the changing nature of employment under neoliberalism. The Act is ultimately said 
to rest on two major ‘assumptions’ (ibid). First, it assumed that that workers in the post-
apartheid period would continue to be employed directly (or in a binary employment 
relationship) and on a full-time basis. Second, it assumed that in the post-apartheid period 
strong unions would be able to continue to address the imbalance of power between workers 
and employers through sector-wide bargaining. By turning towards various subcontracted 
forms of employment, these analysts argue that capital has effectively been able to undermine 
the rights and bargaining power of a large number of workers who (as was the case with black 
workers under apartheid) are not considered ‘employees’ at their actual places of work, 
inevitably contributing to the weakening of trade unions. Theron (2014) notes that the 
proliferation of labour broking as capital’s chosen form of subcontracting in South Africa was, 
however, facilitated by the 1995 LRA itself. The new LRA had retained a 1983 amendment 
that defined labour broker workers as the employees of the broker and not the client company 
and also crucially did not limit the period that a brokered worker could be placed at a client 
(ibid).  
  
 
40 
Lehulere (2015) insists that the above line of argument frames the LRA as an essentially social 
democratic document with loopholes that have left it vulnerable to being undermined by 
neoliberal restructuring. Along with Schroeder (2002), Lehulere insists that that the 1995 LRA 
was, in fact, the first explicit elaboration of neoliberal policy by the ANC government and, by 
extension, its Alliance partners. Lehulere (2015) argues that:  
the birth of the LRA was indeed a summing up of more than 20 years of 
struggles since 1973; but not a summing up in the manner in which Theron and 
many others would have us believe. At the least, what was summed up in the 
LRA and struggles against it that it unleashed in the streets and the shop-floor, 
was also a victory of capital over labour; it presaged the coming victory of 
neoliberalism over social democracy. (Lehulere, 2015: VII) 
The struggles against the proposed LRA that Lehulere reminds us of culminated in a march of 
an estimated quarter million mostly COSATU members in Johannesburg in 1995 (Lehulere, 
2015). Workers and shop stewards involved in the march rejected the new LRA which 
Schroeder (2002) says was actually ‘worse than the apartheid LRA it replaced in two critical 
respects’: Firstly, it no longer imposed a legal duty to bargain on employers. This means that 
workers are only able to bargain with their bosses is when they are powerful enough to force 
them to do so. Secondly, the new LRA took away the right to strike over retrenchments which 
had existed under the old Act (ibid). Both Schroeder (2002) and Lehulere (2015) argue that 
these changes constitute a conscious neoliberal thrust of the l995 LRA which paved the way 
for high levels of labour market flexibility. Indeed, the decades since the LRA passed have 
been characterised by waves of mass retrenchments of permanent, unionised workers who have 
often been replaced by non-unionised workers under precarious forms of employment – most 
notably under labour brokers as a result of the loophole that Theron (2014) identified.  
To further highlight the neoliberal character of the post-apartheid labour legislation, Schroeder 
also notes that the 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Bill (BCEB) openly called for a 
regime of ‘regulated flexibility’ which would ‘balance the protection of minimum standards 
and the requirements of labour market flexibility’ (Government Gazette, 1996 cited in 
Schroeder, 2002). The BCEA eventually imposed a regime of regulated flexibility by setting a 
minimum standard of rights for all workers whilst including a clause which allows workers or 
unions to lower many of those standards upon agreement. This is called ‘downward variation’ 
(ibid). The majority of workers in South Africa are not unionised and therefore rely almost 
solely on the BCEA for protection (since the LRA deals with rights to collective bargaining). 
These workers are more vulnerable and often in precarious forms of employment which almost 
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inevitably means they sign away many of their basic rights in the BCEA (ibid). Bassier’s 
(unpublished) research has recently shown how, in some industries, even trade unions have 
been signing Bargaining Council Agreements which lower the floors of worker rights well 
below those that are set in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA). As their 
bargaining power continues to decline in the current period, unions appear to be trading off 
basic worker rights often simply in return for inflation-level wage increases (ibid). When these 
Bargaining Council Agreements are extended to cover all the workers in a given sector, the 
unions effectively pass off their defeats to workers that are not even their members – many of 
whom are precarious workers. Downward variation ultimately provides capital with the 
‘flexibility’ to better exploit a labour force of vulnerable workers (under both triangular and 
binary employment relationships), effectively legalising the process of ‘re-segmenting’ the 
labour market that Kenny and Webster (1998) had identified.  
Despite differing interpretations over the political character of the labour legislation, all the 
above analysts agree on the fact that the legislation ultimately opened the space for greater 
flexibility and the explosion of precarious forms of employment. Although the dearth of labour 
statistics in South Africa means that is impossible to reach accurate figures for the number of 
workers in precarious employment (see Budlender, 2013), Von Holdt and Webster (2005) 
estimate that by 2004 there were already 3.1 million ‘non-core’ workers across all industries – 
i.e. workers in the formal sector that are not in a Standard Employment Relationship (SER). 
Webster and Francis (2018) have since estimated that by 2017 this figure had risen to 5.3 
million workers.  
2.4.3 Precarious employment in the labour process: numerical flexibility or control? 
Although the dichotomy of core/non-core is a useful descriptive tool to categorise the re-
segmentation of the labour market, Englert and Runciman (forthcoming: 2) have recently 
pointed that out that at an analytical level ‘it risks to understate the role of the “non-core” in 
the formal workplace’. ‘Indeed,’ they argue, ‘as Webster’s migrant foundry worker in 1985 
played a fundamental role in the production process, precarious workers are at the core of the 
production process today’ (ibid: 2). The reason for the analytical weakness of the core/non-
core schema is that despite identifying the rise of precarious forms of work as the most 
fundamental and widespread change to the workplace in the post-apartheid era, Webster and 
Von Holdt did not investigate the actual role that precarious workers play in the labour process. 
It is fair to say that this is symptomatic of much of the post-apartheid literature on the 
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workplace, where the question of precarious work is generally studied in isolation from the 
daily process of producing commodities – which is still widely assumed to be carried out by 
permanent workers. Theron (2005: 299) argues that this line of thought has its roots in the 
‘doctrine of flexibility’, which capital trumpeted in the 1990s. The argument being that to 
compete in the international arena, capital needed to be able to vary the number of workers 
employed at any given time ‘so as to achieve numerical or employment flexibility’ (ibid). As 
a result, casual, outsourced and labour broker workers have generally come to be viewed as 
merely temporary workers that capital employs on the fringes of the workplace during periods 
of heightened demand. Considering that these workers often spend years doing the same work 
as a company’s permanent workers, Theron argued that many of these forms of employment 
actually have very little to do with the question of numerical flexibility. To therefore subsume 
all these precarious forms of work under the category of ‘casualisation’, he argued, ‘represents 
a denial of what is really happening’ (ibid: 300). As Englert and Runciman (forthcoming) 
suggest, the same can be said of subsuming these forms of work under the category of ‘non-
core’.  
Theron (2000) chose instead to distinguish between examples of ‘casualisation’ and examples 
of ‘externalisation’. Casualisation is when capital employs workers directly but with flexible 
working hours or for short periods. This can take the form of part-time work or zero-hour 
contracts as well as full-time work but on fixed-term contracts. It also very often means that 
workers are employed without any contract at all. Externalisation, on the other hand, is 
essentially the outsourcing of the legal responsibility and other such ‘risks’ associated with 
being an employer (ibid). For Theron, an externalised worker (such as a labour broker, 
outsourced or any subcontracted worker) works for one company, and often at the premises of 
that company, but is technically employed by another company. This allows capital to buy 
labour power from other capitals instead of buying it directly from the worker. As a result, 
capital can effectively buy labour power via a commercial contract without risks associated 
with an employment contract, which Theron (2005: 30) argues opens up whole new avenues 
for capital to exert control over workers and exploit them. Dickinson’s (2017a: 789) research 
shows how ‘labour broking and other forms of externalisation’ effectively result in workers 
being ‘contracted out of the constitution’ due to the difficulty that such workers face in claiming 
even their most fundamental rights. He argues that ‘the assignment of the labour broker as the 
workers’ de jure employer’ increases management control because it ‘means that workers’ 
bargaining power can no longer be mobilised against their de facto employer, the client’ (ibid).  
  
 
43 
Although the literature often refers to ‘new forms of employment’, externalised or triangular 
employment relationships are not new. Marx (1990) himself noted that subcontracting was 
integral to the capitalist’s control over the labour process in the early period of modern industry 
in Britain. The early industrial capitalists often chose to purchase the products of labour from 
a subcontractor (instead of buying labour power directly from a worker) because they had little 
control over the intensity of work in the early factories (see Braverman, 1974: 64). The 
capitalist ultimately passed on the responsibility of extracting surplus value to the 
subcontracted employer, often inside the factory itself. However, as the factory system 
mechanised and work processes rationalised, the industrial capitalist was able to bring the 
labour process and work intensity under tighter control (the real subsumption of labour), 
eventually reducing the need for subcontractors. But at the same time, the collection of masses 
of workers into factories had simultaneously increased the organisational power of workers 
whose struggles resulted in the establishment worker rights under the Factory Acts (Marx, 
1990: 599). These rights effectively placed a limit on the rate of exploitation and therefore the 
rate of surplus value, which meant that capital continued to subcontract out certain functions 
of the labour process to the ‘domestic industries’ which were not covered by the Acts. Marx 
says:  
In the so-called domestic industries this exploitation is still more shameless 
than in modern manufacture, because workers’ power of resistance declines 
with their dispersal; because a whole series of plundering parasites insinuate 
themselves between the actual employer and the worker he employs. (Marx, 
1990: 591) 
In the case of the so-called ‘new’ forms of externalised employment in South Africa today, the 
only difference is that by externalising the employment contract capital has found ways to by-
pass workers’ rights and weaken their power of resistance without having to remove the worker 
from the factory. The control that this affords capital means that it does not have to rely on the 
parasites themselves to direct production but merely to act as a mechanism to divide workers 
and increase the rate at which they are exploited. This dissertation investigates in greater detail 
the particular forms of control that various employment schemes provide the manufacturing 
company over its labour process.  
2.4.4 Trade union responses to the rise of precarious work 
The failure of trade unions to organise precarious workers has been well documented (Von 
Holdt & Webster, 2005; Theron, 2005; Bischoff, 2015). COSATU initially raised the alarm 
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about the growth of precarious forms of employment in its 1997 September Commission and 
made a commitment to organise all vulnerable workers (September Commission, 1997). The 
latest COSATU survey, however, revealed that 90% of its members were in permanent 
employment in 2014 (Bischoff & Tame: 2017: 66). The failure to come good on its 
commitment is often attributed either to the difficulty of the task of organising precarious 
workers or to the federation’s rightward drift over the two decades. But Runciman (2019) 
argues that this overlooks the strategic choices that COSATU made at the time about which 
workers it would prioritise. She highlights the fact that: 
in Chapter 7 of the September Commission, which focusses on organising new 
sectors, fifty-eight references are made to white collar work or workers, 
compared to eleven mentions of non-standard work/employment and five 
mentions of vulnerable layers. (Runciman, 2019: 147) 
Bischoff and Tame (2017) note that COSATU’s post-apartheid orientation to white collar and 
public sector workers eventually generated a debate over whether the federation came to 
represent a ‘labour aristocracy’ (Buhlungu et al., 2006) or a ‘marginal labour elite’ (Werbner, 
2010). In response to COSATU’s changed demographic, Bezuidenhout et al. (2017) pose a 
more straightforward question by asking whether or not COSATU is ‘still a working class 
movement’. Just as important would be an assessment of the changing class character of the 
entire trade union movement, which, for the most part, has lost its base in the industrial 
proletariat – not because de-industrialisation has eliminated it but rather as a result of the union 
movement’s inability to respond to the neoliberal attacks which have restructured it. This is 
corroborated by Macun’s (2014: 44) research on changes in union density which revealed that 
70.16% of workers in the manufacturing sectors were in unions in 1990. By 2002 this figure 
was already down to 35.1% and by 2012 it stood at just 31.2% (Ibid). The latest available data 
suggests that union density in manufacturing has declined further, standing at just 29.8% in 
2017 (Quarterly Labour Force Survey Q4, 2017; Annual Labour Market Bulletin, 2016-2017).  
2.4.5 Amendments to section 198 of the LRA and its implications 
By the mid-2000s it had become clear that the explosion of labour broking was taking over the 
jobs previously performed by permanent, unionised workers in both the private and public 
sector. Instead of addressing this by organising brokered workers, COSATU embarked on a 
top-down campaign to call for labour broking to be banned (Dor, 2017). Although it took 
almost a decade, parliament eventually amended section 198 of the LRA in 2014 to impose a 
limit on labour broking and contract work. The amendments, which came into effect on 1 
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January 2015, declared that labour broker and contract workers are ‘deemed’ to be the 
permanent workers of the client company after three months of work (LRA, 2015). The 
amendments also declared that these workers be treated ‘not less favourably’ than the client’s 
permanents who perform the same jobs as them. In other words, they should be ‘equalised’ on 
the same wages, benefits and work hours as permanent workers and be granted access to the 
same facilities such as clinics, canteens and gyms. Despite not constituting an outright ban, the 
amendments posed a major threat to capital’s rate of surplus value, which had come to depend 
so heavily on the cheap labour power and workplace control that labour broking provided.  
Trade unions did not mobilise brokered workers on any significant scale in the immediate 
aftermath of the amendments, leaving labour broking largely intact at a national level (see Rees, 
2019). In fact, the Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO), a small worker organising centre 
based in Germiston on the East Rand, was the only organisation in the country to embark on a 
coordinated effort to mobilise labour broker and contract workers from across different 
industries around their new section 198 rights. CWAO distributed pamphlets at train stations 
and taxi ranks under the banner of the Big New Rights Campaign, calling for workers to claim 
their rights to permanent jobs and equal working conditions. On 25 April 2015, a first general 
meeting was held in the Germiston City Hall, bringing together labour broker workers from 
different workplaces and across different industries to discuss the potential to unite workers in 
their struggles for permanent jobs. Further general meetings would continue to be held every 
two weeks at CWAO’s offices, which later led workers to launch their own formation called 
the Simunye Workers Forum (SWF). Not long after CWAO first launched the Big New Rights 
campaign in 2015, however, workers’ section 198 rights to permanent jobs and better working 
conditions were thrown into jeopardy.  
A labour broker called Assign Services had taken up a case against the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) soon after the amendments were passed. In 
September 2015, Acting Labour Court Judge Martin Brassey handed down the infamous ‘dual 
employer’ interpretation of section 198, which declared that after three months a labour broker 
worker becomes the employee of both the client and the labour broker. This rendered the 
amendments completely meaningless as it allowed capital to keep workers locked in a 
triangular employment relationship. This meant that client companies could effectively 
abdicate all responsibility associated with being an employer by continuing to hide behind the 
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labour broker. In other words, the Brassey judgment ultimately cleared the way for capital to 
persist with labour broking as normal for almost three years.  
Before it reached the Constitutional Court, CWAO joined the Assign case as an Amicus Curiae 
(friend of the court) to support NUMSA by providing evidence of the negative effect of the 
dual employer ruling on ordinary labour broker workers. In July 2018, the Constitutional Court 
eventually overturned the Brassey ruling in favour of the ‘sole employer’ interpretation of 
section 198. This means that, by law, a brokered worker is now ‘deemed’ to be the permanent 
employee of only the client company immediately after three months and must be ‘equalised’ 
with the client’s older permanents who do comparatively similar work.  
But even before the Constitutional Court handed down this judgment, client companies had 
already embarked on restructuring initiatives in order to circumvent the amendments altogether 
and persist with labour broking in disguised form (CWAO, 2019). This came as no surprise, as 
Theron (2014: 9) had warned of this likelihood immediately after parliament first passed the 
legislative changes when he highlighted the fact that the new section 198 ‘focused attention on 
only one way in which employment has been externalised’. As Theron predicted, client 
companies turned towards other forms of externalisation by simply claiming that labour 
brokers were in fact ‘outsourced service providers’ (CWAO, 2019). Where this hasn’t been 
possible, client companies have replaced labour broking with other precarious employment 
schemes to continue to exert tight control over the labour process and over workers. There are 
a growing number of examples of the move towards zero-hour contract work, learnership 
programmes and project work (CWAO, 2019). This dissertation looks at all these post-198 
restructuring initiatives in closer detail.  
What has become clear in the post-198 period is that brokered and contract workers have to 
embark on long struggles in order to win their rights to be made permanent and to be equalised. 
These struggles often continue to take place outside the ambit of trade unions, even in cases 
where brokered workers are union members (Englert & Webster, 2018; Englert & Runciman, 
forthcoming). This replicates the dynamic that Sinwell (2015) described in his research on the 
organising strategies of mineworkers on the platinum belt, who were at once official members 
of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) and continued to organise 
themselves independently through workers committees in the aftermath of the Marikana 
Massacre. There have been contradicting accounts of the trajectory that labour broker workers 
take once winning permanent jobs. In some cases, they have re-joined unions in the hope of 
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benefitting from participating in the official industrial relations framework (see Dickinson, 
2017a & 2017b; Englert & Runciman, forthcoming). In other cases, however, workers take 
confidence in the victories they have won for themselves, and a lingering distrust of the unions 
who ignored them for years means that they persist with organising themselves through their 
own structures (Englert & Runciman, forthcoming). 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that analyses of the labour process from different historical periods 
under capitalism can help us better understand what is happening in South African workplaces 
today. The chapter began with a review of Marx’s (1990) original contributions, which framed 
changes to the capitalist labour process under early competitive capitalism in terms of capital’s 
struggle for control over workers and over the extraction of surplus value. This helps provide 
a theoretical framework on which this study rests, as it seeks to investigate the link between 
precarious forms of employment and management control over the valorisation process in the 
manufacturing industries in South Africa today. The chapter then looked at Braverman’s 
(1974) resurrection of labour process analysis to explain the changes that had taken place under 
mass production, which emerged during capitalism’s monopoly phase. Braverman linked 
capital’s struggle for control to the question of deskilling. This part of the chapter also noted 
the important responses to Braverman that called for closer attention to the question of worker 
agency, which reminds us that capital’s struggle for control over the labour process inevitably 
generates resistance. This dissertation, therefore, proceeds from an understanding of deskilling 
as a long-run tendency that operates within the context of the social relations of production – 
relations which either speed up this tendency or slow it down. 
In this chapter I have argued that the question of deskilling can also be understood in the 
broader context of the global development of capitalist production, and not simply at firm or 
even national level. The restructuring of the global production regime under the phase of 
neoliberalism has opened the space for capital to better exploit masses of unskilled labour in 
the Global South. This dissertation is, therefore, ultimately based on an understanding that 
South Africa’s location in the imperialist division of the globe continues to render it an 
abundant source of cheap, unskilled labour for international capital to exploit. As a result, it is 
argued that the form that lean production takes in this country will continue to be based 
primarily on developing mechanisms to better exploit this so-called competitive advantage.  
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In light of this, the chapter reviewed literature that documents the rise of precarious forms of 
employment in the current period, much of which links its proliferation to a post-apartheid 
labour relations framework that promotes ‘regulated flexibility’ (see 2.4.2). Despite the 
important contributions made in this body of literature, I have argued that precarious forms of 
employment have not been sufficiently studied in relation to their actual role in the industrial 
labour process. This generally results in the mistaken assumption that precarious workers 
occupy a substratum of the labour process in manufacturing companies, where they often 
continue to be regarded as purely a source of ‘numerical flexibility’ for capital (see 2.4.3). I 
argue instead that precarious workers play an integral role in the production of surplus value 
for manufacturing companies on a permanent basis and, therefore, suggest that precarious 
forms of employment should be studied in terms of the longer-term control that they provide 
capital over its rate of surplus value.  
The chapter closes by looking at how the trade union movement’s failure to organise precarious 
workers has made it easy for capital to circumvent the 2015 amendments to section 198 of the 
Labour Relations Act (LRA), which imposed a limit on labour broking. The amendments 
initially posed a serious threat to capital’s rate of surplus value, which had clearly become 
heavily dependent on the low wages and workplace control that labour broking provided. The 
chapter, however, notes that capital’s response to the legislative changes has been to first ignore 
them and then to restructure to circumvent them. This dissertation looks at how this process is 
unfolding in more detail.  
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3. Methodology 
This chapter explains the background to this research project and shows how the research 
question was informed by my experience of working at an organisation that works closely with 
precarious workers. The chapter then explores the methodological approach to the research. It 
justifies the use of a multi-sited case study research approach. It then details the different data 
collection methods used. One such method, workplace mapping, has been streamlined for the 
purposes of this research project. This chapter, therefore, also provides a reflection on the 
suitability of this hybridised form of mapping for future research. Finally, it explores the 
questions of reflexivity and ethics involved in conducting research with workers.  
3.1 Background to the research: volunteering at CWAO 
This research project is informed by my experience of two-and-a-half years of work as an 
activist and volunteer at the Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO). CWAO was founded in 
2011 to support the struggles of a growing mass of workers in precarious forms of employment. 
It offers free legal advice to any worker that approaches the office for assistance. More 
importantly, however, CWAO operates as an organising centre for precarious workers. Its 
location opposite the Germiston train station means that it is able to attract workers from across 
the industrial areas and townships on the East Rand and beyond.  
In 2015, CWAO launched the Big New Rights campaign which looked to organise labour 
broker and contract workers around their rights to permanent jobs under section 198 of the 
LRA (see Runciman & Webster, 2017; Englert & Webster, 2018; Rees, 2019). The campaign 
has seen over 12 000 workers win permanent status (CWAO, 2019) – only a drop in the ocean 
of the millions of workers currently under labour broking and other similar forms of precarious 
employment (Webster & Francis, 2018). From my experience, the major success of the 
campaign is that it has also introduced a huge number of young workers to active struggle for 
the first time where they have witnessed, first-hand, that they can challenge their employer and 
win. 
My role at CWAO was to produce a newsletter that documents the struggles of precarious 
workers at different workplaces. Eight editions of The New Worker have been published since 
the first in June 2017. I also helped to produce agitational and educational material to strengthen 
workplace organising efforts, mostly in the form of pamphlets. Through this work I developed 
a knowledge of the struggles that were taking place at a range of different companies. One of 
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the major difficulties that CWAO faces in supporting the organising efforts of workers is that 
the organisation generally does not have access to workplaces, many of which are highly 
fragmented. CWAO has, therefore, had to develop alternative methods for its organisers to 
understand the dynamics within each workplace. In early-2017, CWAO created a ‘company 
profile form’ which each organiser would fill out when new workers approached the office for 
support (see Annexure A). The form was an attempt to try and establish, among other things: 
the number of permanent/precarious workers in each company, the number of different 
subcontracted employers inside each company, the relationships between different groups of 
workers and the recent history of organising or unionisation by workers. In many cases, the 
fragmented layout of the workplace means that just getting this basic information is extremely 
difficult. The general approach to this research project was informed by this experience. I felt 
that it would be useful to get a better understanding of how exactly capital is organising its 
labour power in its industrial workplaces and what this means for the potential to build 
solidarity between different groups of workers inside the workplace.  
After the amendments to section 198 of the LRA in 2015 and the Constitutional Court’s ‘sole 
employer’ ruling in 2018 (see previous chapter, 2.4.5), a common response for companies has 
been to declare that labour brokers are in fact ‘service providers’ and are not covered by the 
LRA’s definition of a ‘Temporary Employment Service’ (TES) (CWAO, 2019). My interests 
in the details of the industrial labour process developed as a result of witnessing the extreme 
lengths that labour broker workers have to go through to prove that their labour contributes to 
the ‘core business’ of the client companies where they work. In order to win their rights to be 
made permanent, the onus is placed on brokered workers to demonstrate that they do not 
perform the work of an outsourced service but are central to the production of the client 
company’s goods. The nature of what both companies and institutions like the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) deem to be a core versus a non-
core/outsourceable function appear to be completely arbitrary. This influenced my research 
question which looks to uncover the different jobs that precarious workers do in an industrial 
workplace and their role in the creation of surplus value for the client company. Indeed, it 
seemed obvious that these client companies only use workers under various precarious 
employment schemes as a way to increase their own profit margins. I therefore set about to 
better understand the (sometimes obscure) logic behind capital’s use of these schemes.  
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CWAO has also recently picked up on an increasing use of zero-hour contract work, learnership 
work and project work (CWAO, 2019). These developments are clearly a response to the 
Constitutional Court’s ‘sole employer’ ruling, as capital searches for new employment schemes 
to keep labour cheap and easy to control. Part of the motivation for this research is also, 
therefore, to understand how different companies are restructuring their labour processes in 
response to the court ruling and also in response precarious workers who are organising to 
demand their rights.  
3.2 A multi-sited case study approach  
One of the main debates in the literature on the labour process internationally has been centred 
around methodological approaches. In the previous chapter (see 2.2.2) we looked at the post-
Braverman literature on the labour process, some of which was criticised for being over-reliant 
on using the case study as a means through which to make generalisations about trends and 
tendencies in capitalist production. In a scathing assessment, Burell (1990: 294) even suggested 
that this body of literature amounted to little more than empiricist ‘punctuation’ in what he 
hoped would eventually become a ‘really good story’. This ‘good story’, he said, would consist 
of new attempts at a ‘metanarrative’ which seeks to understand the development of the 
capitalist labour process in its ‘totality’ (Burell, 1990: 294). In a somewhat similar fashion, 
Adler (2007) argued that the decline of labour process theory in the 21st Century is a result of 
its drift from Marx’s theoretical foundations. He proposed a ‘paleo-Marxist’ (or ‘retro-
Marxist’) approach which starts its analysis of the labour process through the lens of Marx’s 
original abstractions. Unfortunately Adler’s methodological approach led him to mistakenly 
identify a long-run upskilling tendency under capitalism. For Kabat and Sartelli (2014) this 
was because he relied on a ‘reinterpretation of other studies’ on occupational and educational 
shifts using his ‘paleo-Marxist lenses’ at the expense of ‘empirical research of his own’ (ibid: 
845). What is required instead, these scholars suggest, is a better marriage of empirical research 
and theoretical abstraction that avoids the pitfalls of both empiricism and detached theory: 
The only way to grasp contemporary labor process changes is to study them. 
No magic theoretical lenses could rescue us from post-structuralist confusion 
if we do not focus on new empirical research. The problem that remains is how 
to achieve that goal avoiding at the same time a narrow focus on study cases 
and an extremely aggregate depiction insufficiently founded. The answer 
directs us to the core of our methodological proposal that is the study of the 
branch industry cases. It must to be stressed that this approach not only 
represents an intermediate level of analysis, but more importantly, it also 
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allows us to comprehend the historical sequence of labor process 
transformations which consequently enables us to decipher its main tendencies. 
(Kabat & Sartelli, 2014: 846) 
This dissertation looks to build on this proposal. By using a multi-sited case study approach, 
this thesis intends to provide a window into ‘what is really happening’ (Theron, 2005: 300) in 
the ‘hidden abode of production’ (Marx, 1990; Webster, 1985) in the manufacturing sectors in 
South Africa today. 
The case study as a research method comprises of an in-depth investigation into a particular 
phenomenon, where the focus is on a particular iteration of the phenomenon under question 
(Yin, 2018: 50). The use of a multi-sited case study approach simply allows the researcher to 
study the different forms the phenomenon in question may take, and allows the researcher to 
make generalisations based on a broader set of scenarios (ibid: 96). Qualitative research always 
generates debate on whether or not the findings can be generalised to other contexts and, as we 
have seen above, case study research is especially susceptible to such critiques. Here it is 
important to note the distinction that Yin (2018: 79) makes between ‘statistical generalisation’ 
and ‘analytic generalisation’. He argues that ‘a fatal flaw in doing case studies’ is to present 
the findings as being statistically representative of the entire phenomenon that is being studied 
(ibid). Case studies and even multi-sited case studies will always be ‘too few in number to 
serve as an adequately sized sample to represent any larger population’ from which one could 
draw statistical generalisations (ibid). Case studies, Yin argues, should rather be thought of as 
an ‘opportunity to shed empirical light on some theoretical concepts or principles’ (ibid). He 
continues:  
The goal is not unlike the motive of a laboratory investigator in conducting and 
then learning from a new experiment. In this sense, both a case study and an 
experiment have an interest in going beyond the specific case or experiment 
[…] to strive for generalisable findings or lessons learned – that is, analytic 
generalisations. (Yin, 2018: 79) 
For Yin, the analytic conclusions that arise from more than one case, as with the scientist who 
does more than one experiment, are usually more convincing than those that arise from a single 
case (Yin, 2018: 110). A major reason for this is that by replicating the method of inquiry 
across different sites, the researcher can pick out trends and discrepancies in the results. It also 
limits the risks involved in the single-sited case study where the case in question may be a 
complete outlier. Of course, the flip-side of the coin is that, due to the inevitability of time 
constraints in the research process, a multi-sited case study may lack the detail of the 
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conventional single-sited study (ibid). This is indeed the risk, but hopefully one worth taking 
if we are to be able to draw appropriate analytic generalisations of the trends and tendencies at 
play.   
The use of a multi-sited case approach also made sense from a practical point of view. Yin 
(2018: 110) suggests that ‘when you have the choice (and resources), multiple-case designs 
may be preferred’. CWAO supports groups of workers that are organising themselves at more 
than 300 workplaces in Gauteng and beyond. My role in the organisation meant that I kept 
abreast of the developments taking place at a number of these workplaces. I was, therefore, 
already in a good position to pursue a multi-sited case study approach before the research 
project commenced.  
3.2.1 Selecting the cases 
The work that I did at CWAO meant that the selection of individual workplaces for this study 
could be made in an informed way through ‘purposive sampling’ (see Bryman, 2008). The 
selection of cases was based on the following four criteria: (1) I chose to look at two companies 
each in two different industries in manufacturing; (2) companies were selected to provide a 
picture of different types of labour processes, ranging from simple or labour-intensive 
processes to more complex or highly automated processes; (3) companies were also selected 
to provide a picture of worker struggles at different levels of development, ranging from 
companies where workers are politically weak to companies where workers have waged 
serious challenges to management control; (4) finally, and most importantly, companies were 
selected to provide a picture of the different ways that capital organises its labour power 
through various combinations of precarious employment schemes. A determining factor here 
was to sample a range of different ways that companies have restructured in response to the 
2015 amendments to section 198 of the LRA which placed a limit on labour broking.  
I eventually settled on four workplaces based in Ekurhuleni, east of Johannesburg. Two from 
the chemical industry, Reckitt Benckiser and PFG Building Glass, and two from food 
processing, Pioneer Foods and Simba Chips. Reckitt was identified because it continues to use 
multiple labour brokers and outsourced companies at every level of the labour process. The 
workplace is also physically divided between a number of different functions of the labour 
process to keep workers separated. PFG was selected because it outsources the most labour-
intensive part of its labour process as a logistics function, while the actual production line is 
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highly automated. Pioneer Foods was selected because it uses a labour pool of contract workers 
doing ‘project work’ on production lines. The combination of hi-tech and extremely low-tech 
machinery in Pioneer’s production process was also a determining factor. Finally, Simba was 
selected because a long struggle saw almost 500 labour broker workers win permanent jobs 
through section 198 of the LRA. The company responded with retrenchments and followed 
this up by employing new workers through a government-partnered learnership scheme. 
3.3 Data collection 
This research project relies on qualitative data to provide a rich picture of the nature of the 
labour processes in the different companies. The purpose of sourcing qualitative data for this 
research is to go beyond the surface level research that counts workers by industry or job grade 
or employment status, and rather to investigate what work different types of workers actually 
perform in the manufacturing workplace. This allows us to better make sense of the logic 
behind capital’s use of various employment schemes as well as the logic behind workers’ 
responses to the changing nature of work in the current period.  
Observing and participating in worker meetings as well as internal CWAO meetings on 
organising strategies over two-and-a-half years served to deepen my knowledge of the nature 
of workplace changes in recent years. Interviewing workers for the CWAO newsletter over this 
period also inadvertently contributed to a personal archive which effectively became fieldnotes 
once I embarked on the research project. When the research project officially commenced, data 
was collected primarily through semi-structured individual and group interviews. Some of 
these interviews took the form of workplace mapping exercises which consisted of a 
streamlined or hybridised version of the approaches used by Webster and Bischoff (2011), 
Brooks et al. (2017) and Englert (2018). Document and online sources were also used to 
reinforce this approach and test the accuracy of the data gathered in the interview and mapping 
processes. This forms part of a method called ‘triangulation’, which pits different sources of 
information against one another to reduce the inevitable subjective element contained in each 
of the sources (Hlatshwayo, 2013: 131). The use of multiple data sources and the replication 
of the same research method for each case reinforces the ‘reliability’ of the findings and 
increases their ‘external validity’ – i.e. it allows the researcher to generalise from their findings 
(see Yin, 2018: 87). The following sections discuss the different research methods in detail.  
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3.3.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews formed the primary method of data collection. This was done to 
grant participants the freedom to discuss issues that they consider to be important (Bernard, 
1989). In some cases, this meant that workers explained their jobs in the finest details, while 
in other cases it meant that workers spoke about the workplace in terms of struggles that they 
were waging. Despite taking different routes, in both cases I ended up developing holistic 
pictures of the labour process in each workplace as well as the workplace dynamics at a 
political level. Of course, there remain some gaps in the data due to the extreme levels of 
workplace fragmentation. It was not always possible to interview workers from every part of 
each workplace nor from each different subcontracted company in each workplace. Despite 
this, I found that in group interviews workers were able to piece together their collective 
knowledge of the workplace, which could overcome many of the obstacles imposed by 
fragmentation.  
The selection of interviewees was made through a process of purposive sampling. This entailed 
targeting individuals that are well placed to give strong insights on the research questions being 
posed, but also ensuring that participants with a range of characteristics are interviewed 
(Bryman, 2008). For example, where possible, I tried to speak to workers of different ages, 
genders as well as workers under different job categories. In some instances, I was able to 
interview key informants. Blee and Taylor (2002: 106) explain that a key informant is someone 
who is ‘asked to serve as an expert to inform the researcher about’ a particular topic, while an 
ordinary respondent interviewee mostly speaks based on personal experiences. For this 
research, key informants consisted of workers that have spent over a decade working at a given 
company; workers who have worked in a range of different job grades and across different 
functions of the labour process in different parts of the factory; and CWAO organisers with 
detailed knowledge of a large number of workplaces. I was able to interview key informants 
for Reckitt Benckiser, PFG and Simba. For Pioneer, I conducted interviews with a group of 
workers who had been dismissed for launching a CCMA case to claim their rights to permanent 
jobs. As a result of their situation, these workers were available to sit in longer interviews and 
meetings than many of the other workers and key informants who participated in this study.  
Altogether I conducted 12 interviews: six one-on-one interviews and six group interviews, 
which ranged from two to five workers per group (see Annexure B). The length of the 
interviews ranged between one hour and two-and-a-half hours. In general, each interview ran 
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for about an hour-and-a-half. In total, 15 people were interviewed: three CWAO organisers 
and 12 workers; nine men and five women. The interviews were all conducted in English, 
although in the group interviews there were some moments where workers chose to switch to 
IsiZulu and Sesotho often in order to debate issues with one-another. When workers felt it was 
necessary they would then translate back into English, generally explaining what they had 
resolved or where they continued to disagree.  
Finally, it is important to note that I kept in contact with many of the respondents via Whatsapp. 
This meant that in the process of analysing the data I was able to fill in many of the gaps that 
weren’t covered in the interviews and pose any further questions that emerged. In the end, this 
formed an essential part of the data collection process.  
3.3.2 Mapping the labour process  
A number of the interviews took the form of mapping the labour process of each company. The 
mapping method I employed was informed by the horizontal mapping approach that Webster 
and Bischoff (2011) propose, and which Englert (2018) employed in his recent research on 
Heineken’s brewery in Sedibeng. The aim being to identify the different workers in a 
workplace, their work and employment conditions and the specific work that they do. For 
Webster & Bischoff (2011), this process can foster unity between workers that are otherwise 
isolated in their places of work. Similarly, for Brooks et al. (2017), mapping the workplace 
allows organisers and workers to visualise power relations and mobilise their power 
accordingly. For this research project, however, I was less interested in mapping the power 
relations inside each factory and more interested in simply trying to use the mapping tool to 
understand how capital chooses to organise its labour power along the production process – 
i.e. through the use of different forms of employment. Due to time constraints, I did not set out 
to produce an exact map of each factory. Instead, I found that I was able to get an idea of their 
general layout using Google Maps. The workers then took me through where each step of the 
labour process is located in the factory. They then identified which groups of workers did what 
jobs and what exactly each job entailed. The pictures developed in these exercises were useful 
to show how capital uses different forms of employment at different levels of the labour process 
as a means of control (see next chapter). Although the streamlined version of workplace 
mapping that I employed does not provide as much detail as Englert’s (2018) map of the 
Heineken brewery for example, I would argue that this hybridised method is useful for 
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researchers (and potentially also worker organisers) that want to understand how management 
organises its labour at a wider spread of companies.   
3.3.3 Participant observation 
Gans (1968) argues that participant observation research takes place on a continuum. The 
researcher, for Gans, can play the role of either observer or participant or more often an 
amalgamation of the two. He describes these three roles as ‘total researcher’, ‘total participant’ 
and ‘researcher-participant’ and argues that one may embody a different one of these identities 
at different moments of the research process (ibid: 302). I was an active volunteer at CWAO 
long before I decided to take on this research project. Much of the analysis in this thesis is 
generated as a result of participating in the daily life of the organisation, including meeting 
with workers and taking part in organising initiatives. At one level, therefore, this research 
project can be said to have taken the form of ‘total participation’ (ibid). My position as an 
almost full-time volunteer also made it possible to carry out research interviews with workers 
and CWAO organisers with relative ease since I was already treated as a ‘comrade’. Every 
second Saturday at CWAO’s offices, around 300 workers hold their own general meeting under 
the banner of the Simunye Workers Forum (SWF) (CWAO, 2019). At each meeting, the 
agenda starts with an open mic for workers to raise issues faced in the workplace. Sitting in on 
these meetings proved to be especially informative and allowed me to develop a general image 
of the nature of work in a wide range of companies and industries in South Africa today. After 
the general meetings, workers from each workplace hold their own smaller meetings where 
their struggles are discussed more in-depth. Participating in some of these meetings as a 
CWAO volunteer as well as a researcher helped deepen my understanding of individual 
workplaces. In many of these situations I, therefore, took on the role of ‘researcher-participant’ 
(ibid). Finally, I also performed the role of ‘total researcher’ in certain one-on-one interviews, 
especially with workers who were not aligned to the CWAO.  
3.3.4 Document and online resources 
Access to CWAO’s workplace files meant that I was able to compare the data from the 
interviews and mapping exercises to evidence contained in official documents. Workers’ pay 
slips allowed me to ascertain different job titles, pay grades, work hours etc. Where possible, 
CCMA forms and signed registers were used to get as close to accurate figures for the number 
of workers in different workplaces and different positions. Where this was not possible, 
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workers together estimated numbers during group interviews. As noted above (3.3.1) this 
process often generated debate amongst them, as they attempted to count from memory each 
work station and each production line and identify which workers were placed where. 
Online resources helped me to understand the production processes in some of the companies. 
Pioneer Foods, for example, has videos of the production processes of some of its plants on 
YouTube. These were shown to workers from the Clayville plant, who then could compare the 
different types of production processes and machinery that they worked on. PFG proudly 
display a detailed description of the float glass process on their website, complete with a 
diagram of the production line. Workers were able to show me exactly who worked where 
using the diagram. For Reckitt Benckiser, online sources, in particular the websites of its labour 
brokers, helped me develop a picture of the motives behind restructuring initiatives. Finally, 
for Simba, online sources such as news articles and historical documents helped me piece 
together a history of the major struggles and restructuring initiatives at the Isando plant over a 
period of 30 years.  
3.4 Reflexivity as an activist and researcher 
If my research interests have been informed by my experience at CWAO then so has my 
approach to carrying out the research. In its daily operations the organisation seeks to support 
the self-organising initiatives of workers and constantly guards against leading the struggles of 
workers on their behalf. This organisational culture has strongly influenced my approach to 
engaging in working class organisations as an activist. In a context like South Africa where 
class, race, gender and language produce a stark imbalance of power relations, activists have a 
responsibility to navigate this terrain in a politically principled manner. This means taking the 
back seat in letting workers lead and organise their own struggles. But it also means using one’s 
particular skills, which are often developed through an accumulation of privileges, in the 
service of building worker organisation. This requires constant reflection on even the smallest 
decisions to find the right balance between the two.   
This approach to reflexivity, which was developed in practice, informed my approach to 
reflexivity from and academic perspective. Hlatshwayo (2013: 113) captures much of the 
sentiment of this approach when he says that ‘researching a “subjugated class” must not be 
mistaken for speaking for a “subjugated class”’. I would add that researching a subjugated class 
must also be done in the service of that class. This builds on Englert’s (2018: 26) use of the 
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concept of ‘militant research’ which he argues ought to be conducted with the view towards 
producing ‘knowledge with immediate and, maybe, longer term political use’. It also follows 
in Burawoy’s (2007: 35) approach to ‘public sociology’ which suggests that research ought to 
be centred around the questions ‘knowledge for whom?’ and ‘knowledge for what?’ 
By taking a side, this thesis sets itself up in the Marxist tradition which identifies objective 
truth as a weapon of the oppressed classes. This diverges from the positivist notion that value 
free research leads to objectivity (Crawford, 2006). Instead, it argues that the objective reality 
is more likely to be revealed by the researcher whose work is conducted in the service of that 
class which has an interest in revealing it. This tradition also differs from post-modernist 
literature where the idea of one objective truth is rejected. Instead, here the pursuit of 
objectivity and truth is the goal. In this way, the use of a reflexive approach to interrogating 
one’s subjectivities and one’s actions as a researcher is not an end in itself. It is done to arrive 
at a better understand of things as they are. The purpose of using multiple sources (see 3.3 
above) to cross check information is key to this process.  
3.5 Ethics  
This research was carried out to comply with the University of Johannesburg’s ‘Code of 
Academic and Research Ethics’ (UJ Ethics, 2019). This research project was also guided by a 
personal and political ethical commitment to support the struggles of workers. All interviewees 
participated on the basis of informed consent. Each participant was explained the aim of the 
research. In many cases, the worker interviewees felt passionate about participating in a project 
that looked to reveal the true nature of work inside industrial workplaces in South Africa today. 
I decided that all interviewees would remain anonymous. This was not a straightforward 
decision. Anonymising the worker effectively writes their individual analytical insights and 
academic contributions out of history, and can in some cases run the risk of setting up the 
researcher as the sole producer of knowledge. It is hoped that the content of this dissertation 
will demonstrate that this is far from the case. The decision to use aliases is based on CWAO’s 
experience in recent years, where workers that have appeared in the news or on social media 
inevitably receive backlash from their employers. This was the case at Heineken where a 
number of workers that appeared in the media were subsequently singled out for dismissal on 
trumped up charges. In another case, a picture of striking Proctor and Gamble workers carrying 
sticks that was posted on CWAO’s Facebook page was used as evidence in court by company 
management as a means to interdict workers from demonstrating outside the factory gates. In 
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a context in which employers often resort to such methods to wage their battles, I decided it 
was best not to reveal the identity of any of the interviewees, including CWAO organisers who 
could easily become the target of legal attacks for some of the comments contained in this 
dissertation.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining how the research question was formulated as a result of my 
experience of volunteering as an activist at the CWAO. The chapter then explored the value of 
a multi-sited case study approach, while also acknowledging its potential shortcomings. Close 
attention was paid to the questions of how to produce appropriate ‘analytic generalisations’ 
from empirical data (Yin, 2018: 79). Central to this is, firstly, to use multiple sources to produce 
data that is verifiable and, secondly, to repeat this process of data collection across the different 
study sites. The chapter covered the different data collection methods used for this study and 
showed how one such method, workplace mapping, was adapted for the purposes of this 
research. Finally, this chapter provided an explanation of the approach that I have taken to the 
questions of reflexivity and ethics in the research process. 
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4. Precarious workers and the industrial labour process 
The empirical research presented in this chapter provides a window into ‘what is really 
happening’ (Theron, 2005) in the ‘hidden abode of production’ (Marx, 1990; Webster, 1985) 
in South Africa today. What is distinctive about this research is that it looks to unite two fields 
of inquiry: one on precarious forms of employment and the other on the political economy of 
the labour process. These inseparable fields have surprisingly remained somewhat isolated 
from one another in South African sociology.   
The chapter outlines the organisation of the labour process in four companies on the East Rand, 
namely: Reckitt Benckiser, PFG Building Glass, Pioneer Foods and Simba Chips. It 
specifically looks at the physical layout of each of the workplaces, identifies where workers 
under different forms of employment are located in the production process and describes the 
type of work that they perform. The findings demonstrate that, in the current period, precarious 
workers are found in every job grade and at every level of the labour process on an ongoing or 
‘permanent’ basis. Such empirical evidence contradicts the assumptions embedded in the 
mainstream sociological literature on the post-apartheid workplace (see Webster & Von Holdt, 
2005) – i.e. literature which locates permanent workers as a ‘core’ in production and, as Theron 
(2005) argues, largely treats precarious workers as a purely ‘flexible’ labour force that moves 
in and out of work on the ‘non-core’ functions at the fringes of the factory.  
Ironically, the cases in this study indicate that the positions that are often most precarious in 
the current period are those held by permanent workers. These workers are generally 
beneficiaries of the victories won through the militant trade union struggles of the past. It is 
precisely because they earn higher wages and have greater job security, relative to their 
precarious worker counterparts, that capital constantly looks for ways to get rid of them. In 
each workplace, this layer of the old ‘core’ workforce has been steadily eroded over recent 
decades to make way for precarious workers who have primarily been employed under labour 
brokers. In July 2018, however, the Constitutional Court’s ‘sole employer’ interpretation of the 
2015 amendments to section 198 of the LRA meant that labour broking as capital’s chosen 
form of precarious employment came under threat (see 2.4.4). The four cases presented here 
each demonstrate how client companies have managed to circumvent section 198, either by 
repackaging labour brokers as ‘outsourced service providers’ (i.e. labour broking in disguise) 
in order to persist with externalisation, or by turning towards altogether different precarious 
employment schemes such as project work and learnership programmes. This chapter looks at 
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how each of these precarious employment schemes provide capital with more than just cheap 
labour but also with qualitatively different forms of control over workers, their organisations 
and, consequently, over the extraction of surplus value.  
In each case we also look at what decades of restructuring has meant for the state of worker 
organising in the workplace. What is revealed is a picture of trade unionism in disarray and, in 
many cases, workers deeply divided and in retreat. At the same time, however, these cases also 
show signs of new struggles emerging, often led by ordinary precarious workers themselves. 
In summary, the presentation of each case is structured broadly around the following themes: 
(1) management’s organisation of the labour process; (2) the forms of control that the different 
employment schemes afford management over workers and over the production of surplus 
value; (3) management restructuring in response to the section 198 amendments and in 
response to worker struggles for permanent jobs; and (4) the state of worker organising in the 
workplace today.  
4.1 Reckitt Benckiser: A highly fractured labour process 
Reckitt Benckiser is a FTSE100 British multinational consumer goods company with 
operations in 64 countries. It claims to employ over 40 000 workers across the world (RB 
Annual Report, 2018). Its factory in Jet Park produces well-known household, hygiene and 
medical products for both the local and international market, such as Cobra floor polish, Jik 
bleach, Dettol antiseptic, Nugget shoe polish, Blitz firelighters, Gaviscon antacid and a range 
of aerosols (Eric, interview, 26/08/2019). The workplace is characterised by the multiple layers 
of division that management creates between workers through the physical layout of the 
workplace, the use of multiple different employers from different industries, job grades and 
shift work. This case demonstrates the extent to which the management of manufacturing 
companies are willing and able to fracture the labour process to ensure control over it, where 
externalised workers from a number of different subcontracted companies are employed at 
every level of the labour process and in every job grade.  
4.1.1 Reckitt’s organisation of the labour process   
The workplace in Jet Park is physically divided into different sections that each house an 
important function of the labour process. The four main functions are receiving, production, 
warehousing and dispatch. There is also a waste management department and an import/export 
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plant on the premises. Movement around the workplace and between the different functions is 
highly restricted by the use of a biometric system of fingerprint scanners. Figure 1 (below) 
depicts Reckitt’s organisation of the plant. It shows how different functions of the labour 
process are housed in physically separate parts of the workplace and it identifies the different 
subcontracted companies that employ workers in each function. Mapping the labour process in 
this way allows us to visualise the extent to which the workforce at Reckitt is atomised along 
spatial and employment lines. It is not, however, able to show how workers are even further 
atomised as a result of shift work, but this is dealt with in section 4.1.3. Using Figure 1 as a 
guide, this section details the nature of work in each function of the labour process.  
Source: Interviews, mapping exercise 
In receiving, an estimated 30 workers from three labour brokers – Carrus, Transman and 
Ubuntu – work as clerks, reach truck drivers and forklift drivers alongside a handful of 
Reckitt’s permanents in the same positions. Chemicals and other raw materials are moved from 
the trucks and stored in a small warehouse space between receiving and production. A forklift 
driver from production then fetches the raw materials to take into the main factory.  
Figure 1: Reckitt Benckiser’s fractured labour process 
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In production there are an estimated 200 workers whose labour contributes to the running of 
15 production lines. A minority of these workers are Reckitt’s permanents, with the 
overwhelming majority employed by Carrus, Transman and Ubuntu. For years, the only 
permanent Reckitt employees in production were a handful of line leaders and supervisors (see 
Table 1 below), which are both viewed by workers as management positions (Eric & Siya, 
interview, 11/06/2019). This finding suggests that capital is not averse to replacing their entire 
permanent workforce with precarious workers where possible. In other words, there appears to 
be no inherent limit to the process of ‘eroding the core’ (Kenny and Webster, 1998) of a 
company’s permanent workforce. Just as Webster (1985) noted that white workers were 
gradually moved out of production and into management positions under apartheid, a small 
section of Von Holdt and Websters’ (2005) ‘core’ of permanent workers have taken the same 
trajectory post-apartheid. Of course, the majority of Reckitt’s old permanents would have been 
retrenched or turned into subcontracted workers themselves over the years, ultimately leaving 
no core left to speak of (Eric & Siya, interview, 11/06/2019).  
Table 1: Job titles and employers in production at Reckitt 
Source: interviews, mapping exercise 
After the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the ‘sole employer’ interpretation of section 
198 of the LRA in July 2018, Reckitt chose to insource only the machine operators who were 
previously employed by each of the three labour brokers. Some workers believe that this was 
Job title  Type of work done Name of employer 
Supervisor Management position Reckitt Benckiser  
Line leader Management position Reckitt Benckiser  
Operator Machine operating on the 
production line 
Carrus  
Transman       Insourced 2018 
Ubuntu  
Forklift driver Transport raw materials into 
production and finished 
products to DHL warehouse 
Carrus 
 
Refiller Mix chemicals and manually 
refill production lines 
Carrus  
Transman 
Ubuntu 
General worker Packing, sorting, 
promotions, machine 
operating 
Carrus  
Transman 
Ubuntu 
Cleaners Cleaning Carrus  
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done to prevent the potential development of a joint struggle for permanent jobs (Eric, 
interview, 26/08/2019). The newly permanent operators still, however, constitute a minority of 
the workforce inside production. Brokered workers in production continue to work as refillers, 
general workers and forklift drivers (see Table 1 above). Refillers mix the chemicals for the 
various products and manually refill the lines. General workers carry out various packing and 
sorting tasks, both on the production lines and elsewhere in the factory. For example, many 
work in promotions – a section of the factory set aside for the packaging of products for 
discounted sales. General workers are also called on to operate machines on the lines when 
required. Most cleaning work in the factory is done by ordinary workers, who are expected to 
clean their lines and machines at the end of each shift. Only two workers are employed 
specifically as cleaners, both under Carrus. 
The warehouse is outsourced to DHL which employs about 50 of its own workers as forklift 
drivers, packers and sorters. Only one DHL worker interacts with forklift drivers from 
production in order to do a stock-take of the products handed over. A DHL forklift driver then 
moves the products into the warehouse where they are prepared for distribution. 
Dispatch/Distribution is outsourced by DHL to a company called Vital Distribution Solutions 
which has no contract with Reckitt itself (see figure 1 above for a graphic representation of this 
double-layer of subcontracting). Vital employs only six of its own workers as supervisors and 
contracts out the work of loading and driving its trucks to a labour broker called Staffing 
Solutions, who supply them with around 50 workers. When products are ready for distribution, 
a DHL forklift driver from the warehouse will offload products at dispatch for Staffing 
Solutions workers to load onto the Vital trucks.  
All in all, the workers who are directly involved in the production of a Reckitt product at its 
Jet Park plant, from the receiving of raw materials to the distribution of the final product, work 
in four separate parts of the workplace under at least seven different companies (see figure 1). 
This has not even taken into account the waste management department and the import/export 
plant. Since movement around the workplace is highly restricted, it was difficult to even 
estimate the number of workers in these departments let alone establish the nature of the work 
in either. Waste management workers are supplied by Carrus, but we were not able to establish 
the direct employer of the import/export workers (as the question mark in figure 1 indicates). 
It was also not possible to establish the number of workers supplied by Supercare to clean the 
Reckitt offices.  
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4.1.2 Fracturing the labour process for control 
Figure 1 demonstrates how Reckitt management maintains a primary level of control over 
workers by dividing the workplace along spatial lines. Eric, a CWAO organiser who previously 
worked at Reckitt as a Carrus general worker in production, was a key informant for this 
research. His experience of both working at the company and then later organising workers in 
different parts of the company meant that he was able to develop a picture of the workplace as 
a whole, whereas ordinary workers struggle to do so. He explains that this is a result of the 
extent to which a worker’s movement in the factory is controlled by a biometrics system of 
finger scanners: 
There is a finger scanner at the main gate, another one at security and another 
one at the entrance of production. Then each and every line has a finger print 
to calculate your hours. You scan in at the beginning of your shift and then you 
scan when you go for lunch. They put those ones to prevent workers taking 
long breaks. (Eric, Interview, 26/08/2019) 
Reckitt’s biometrics system, like many other workplace surveillance technologies, serves as a 
tool to extract the maximum amount of real labour from a worker’s labour power (see 
Manokha, 2019). It also provides management with a very effective mechanism to keep 
workers divided. Indeed, the only two groups of workers in the entire workplace that are able 
to meet regularly are receiving and production workers. Although these workers are kept apart 
during work time, Eric argues that they can still find ways to meet and even organise together: 
Production and receiving workers eat together in the same canteen and see each 
other before work or on the train. In production if you want to meet with a 
worker from receiving to organise or something you can go to the receiving 
warehouse to request something. Then inside you can talk. (Eric, interview, 
26/08/2019) 
On the other hand, the physical divisions between production/receiving workers and the 
workers in the rest of the workplace are much more difficult to overcome: 
It is only the forklift drivers from production who can meet the workers under 
DHL when they hand over the products or fetch empty pallets. I think 
warehouse and dispatch workers are using their own canteen. We never used 
to see them […] As for the workers in the import and export side … we don’t 
even know them. We used to start and end shifts at different times. It can be a 
whole month without seeing them. When you see them going inside [the 
factory] before their shift they are not wearing overalls and they have their own 
entrance, so we don’t even know which company they are under. (Eric, 
interview, 26/08/2019) 
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Figure 1 also demonstrates how the workforce is divided along employment lines, where 
externalised workers from a number of different subcontracted companies are used at every 
level of the labour process. Reckitt management organises its labour in this way to ensure an 
even deeper level of political control over workers. Labour brokers and outsourced companies 
not only supply Reckitt with cheap labour but also operate as a mechanism to keep workers 
divided and politically inert. In production, for example, workers doing the same jobs are 
employed by four different companies – Reckitt, Carrus, Transman and Ubuntu. This 
constitutes an attempt to ensure that worker organising efforts are channelled in four different 
directions in production alone. 
Reckitt management secures greater technical control over the rate at which surplus value is 
extracted through a range of measures which ensure that it firstly retains absolute political 
control over the workplace. The fracturing of the labour process between physically separate 
functions, multiple employers, job grades and shift work ultimately serves to atomise the 
workforce, preventing workers from acting together in their collective interest. This allows 
Reckitt to keep labour cheap and enforce a strict regime of high work intensity. The extreme 
level of political control it secures over workers also allows it to bypass all sorts of worker 
rights – like the right to better-paid permanent jobs for labour broker workers and (as we will 
see in the following section) the right to overtime pay for weekend work. 
4.1.3 Post-198 restructuring initiatives 
In 2016, Reckitt employed a new manager in production who introduced a new shift pattern. 
Production and receiving had previously operated on a traditional three shift pattern of a 
morning, an afternoon and a night shift, while the working week ran from Monday to Friday. 
On the weekends production dipped and was run by part-time workers or workers on overtime 
rates. In 2016, the new manager split workers into three teams to cover two twelve-hour shifts 
per day. This extreme lengthening of the working day allows Reckitt to extract higher rates of 
absolute surplus value. Each team now works a pattern of three day shifts, followed by three 
night shifts and then three days off. The change in shift pattern was accompanied by a small 
wage increase, with general workers, for example, moving from R25 per hour to R35 per hour. 
Management, however, now argues that its working week does not include a weekend as 
production runs constantly on three-day cycles. Consequently it insists that it no longer has to 
pay overtime rates for weekend work (Eric, interview, 26/08/2019), which opens up a whole 
new avenue for the extraction of relative surplus value. This is amplified by the introduction 
  
 
68 
of the finger print scanners on production lines which allows management to deduct wages 
according to the exact number of minutes ‘wasted’ by each worker. Finally, the move to this 
shift pattern also means that workers inside production are now even further divided from one 
another, since they find it almost impossible to interact with workers from different shifts as 
they no longer overlap. It is important to note that the change to this particular shift pattern 
appears to be on the rise in recent years. Companies like Kellogg’s and Mister Sweet have also 
adopted this shift pattern as a response to workers winning permanent jobs under section 198 
(field notes, The New Worker). 
In 2018, when the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the ‘sole employer’ interpretation of 
section 198 of the LRA, Reckitt decided to offer the operators permanent contracts. This, some 
workers believe, was a politically motivated insurance measure meant to prevent operators 
from uniting with the other labour broker workers in a single struggle for permanent jobs. 
Indeed it has little to do with an actual reliance on the skills of these workers as one might 
assume, since, as Eric explains, ‘a week is more than enough to learn to operate [...] you just 
watch while you work and then you can do it’ (Eric & Siya, interview, 11/06/2019). Reckitt’s 
valorisation strategy is heavily reliant on securing what Burawoy (1982) would describe as a 
despotic form of control over its workforce through the use of a number of subcontracted 
employers. To prevent workers from claiming permanent jobs under section 198, the labour 
brokers at Reckitt have remodelled themselves as outsourced service providers – a devious 
manoeuvre that Carrus somewhat surprisingly explain in detail on their own website:  
We are very confident that the [new] Carrus Business Process Outsourcing 
(BPO) service offering provides our clients with the ideal alternative to the 
traditional labour broking solution, whilst retaining the flexibility and cost 
effectiveness of the aforementioned model. The traditional temporary 
employment service will remain intact for employment shorter than 3 months 
and for fixed term contract requirements. 
BPO, also known as Functional Outsourcing, is an outsource process (logistics, 
picking and packing, sales, cleaning, etc.) to a third party which allows the 
outsource partner to assume the entire labour law risk. This model establishes 
an ‘Arm’s Length’ relationship between Carrus and the Client, as Carrus 
assumes de facto control over the outsourced process and provides the Client 
with labour flexibility within the confines of a service level agreement. 
You can basically outsource any process of your choice, i.e. your core business 
is what you choose it to be. (Carrus, 2019: n.p.)  
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The frank admission that the core business of a client company is what they ‘choose it to be’ 
supports Englert’s (2018) argument that the boundary between a manufacturer’s core and non-
core functions has become increasingly arbitrary (if not completely meaningless). Indeed, the 
claim that labour brokers are actually outsourced service providers of non-core functions has 
become a primary means by which capital is managing to circumvent section 198 (CWAO 
2019 Midterm Report). It is important to note that Theron (2014) predicted that this would be 
the most likely outcome of LRA amendments even before they came into effect in 2015.  
Manufacturing companies have outsourced functions such as cleaning, security and 
distribution for many years, while it has also become common to outsource the warehouse 
space inside a factory as a logistics function (as is the case with DHL at Reckitt). What we are 
now seeing, with examples such as Reckitt, is a move towards the so-called ‘outsourcing’ of 
workers who actually contribute to the manufacturing of goods inside the factory so as to avoid 
having to employ labour broker workers directly as per the requirements of section 198. By 
reclassifying only machine operating as a core function and all other work in production as 
non-core, followed by drawing a clear division of labour between permanent workers as 
machine operators and subcontracted workers in all other positions, Reckitt has attempted to 
safeguard itself in case workers launch a section 198 case to claim permanent jobs.  
4.1.4 The state of worker organising at Reckitt  
Unsurprisingly, worker organising at Reckitt in recent years has been weak. What would have 
once been a Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union 
(CEPPWAWU) factory now has no properly functioning union. The General Industries 
Workers Union of South Africa (GIWUSA) was organising labour broker workers inside 
production for a short period with limited success, as Eric explains:  
When GIWUSA workers went on strike in 2012 most of them were dismissed. 
They were labour broker workers. After that it [GIWUSA] was there but it was 
not visible anymore. Maybe it was less than ten workers left in the union. They 
were using it like legal aid. (Eric & Siya, interview, 11/06/2019) 
For Eric, the defeat of the strike meant that the workers that remained had lost faith in the union 
as a weapon of collective struggle and instead used it as they would a private law firm like 
Scorpion or Legal Wise for representation in individual cases (see Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu, 
2011). The long-term ramifications of the strike also meant that the new labour broker workers 
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hired to replace those that were dismissed feared that they too would lose their jobs should they 
attempt to unionise.   
Currently, workers in production and receiving do not appear to be waging any open struggles. 
In dispatch, however, the National Transport Movement (NTM) has recently recruited the 
Staffing Solutions truck drivers. These workers have also been waging a struggle for permanent 
jobs under Vital through CWAO and the SWF over the last year and a half. For Eric, Reckitt’s 
organisation of the plant means that workers are compelled to wage their struggles in different 
directions: 
The workers of Staffing [Solutions] say they want their jobs under Vital. They 
say ‘we don’t know Reckitt, we don’t know DHL’. It’s not good politically 
because they can’t unite with the rest of the workers in the factory. (Eric 
interview, 26/08/2019) 
More recently, permanent DHL warehouse workers have turned to CWAO for assistance. 
There appears to be a recurring cycle where organising initiatives emerge from different groups 
of workers in different parts of the plant but are waged independently of one another. This 
ensure that Reckitt management retains tight political control over the workplace.  
Although organisations like GIWUSA, the NTM and CWAO have all been involved in worker 
organising efforts at Reckitt in recent years, none have been able to seriously challenge the 
structural divisions between workers that have been created by management’s organisation of 
the labour process. This poses a challenge for the line of thought which suggests that unions 
simply need to be convinced of the importance of organising precarious workers. What we see 
here is that, like Dickinson’s (2015) research on the inventive organising approaches of 
brokered Post Office workers, organising brokered industrial workers is more than just a 
question of political will but also a question of being able to rethink and develop appropriate 
organising strategies. Although unionists, labour experts and academics alike have sounded the 
alarm on the role that outsourcing and labour broking plays in dividing workers, the actual 
extent to which manufacturing companies like Reckitt are willing to fracture the labour process 
in order to exert complete political control over workers is rarely acknowledged.  
4.2 PFG Building Glass: A bifurcated labour process 
PFG Building Glass is a division of the PG Group which was established in Cape Town in 
1897. In 1950s Britain, Alastair Pilkington developed the float process for producing large flat 
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sheets of glass (Ryan, 2019). The automation of much of the float process since then means 
that the majority of work at PFG today is conducted by workers away from the production lines 
in the moving, warehousing and distribution of the glass. In this example we look at how 
manufacturing companies like PFG choose to externalise the most labour intensive elements 
of the labour process inside their factories as logistics functions. Far from handing over control 
of a large part of the labour process inside the factory to another company, the findings reveal 
that the ‘outsourcing’ of this work allows PFG management to increase its control over the 
labour process as a whole.  
4.2.1 PFG’s organisation of the labour process 
The PFG site in Springs has two main plants, one which produces building glass and the other 
automotive glass. There are a few smaller factories on site, as Figure 2 (below) shows. The 
first cuts glass to specialised sizes on the request of PFG’s clients. The second is a glass  
laminating plant. The third receives different varieties of imported glass from India, China and 
Argentina and workers then replace any insignia with PFG logos. Unfortunately, due to scope 
of the project, I was not able to develop a detailed picture of the labour process in each. Finally, 
there is a glass recycling area which is outsourced to a small company called Thembekile Waste 
Management (Ryan, 2019; PFG group interview, 14/05/2019). 
My research focussed on the larger of the two main plants, which produces large flat sheets of 
glass for building purposes. The factory houses two highly automated float glass lines (see 
Figure 2). In the receiving phase, suppliers’ trucks deliver silica sand, soda ash, dolomite, 
limestone, sodium sulphate and recycled glass cullet which are deposited into large silos (Ryan, 
2019). These silos feed the hot end of the lines where a furnace turns them into molten glass 
which then floats along a bed of molten tin. Engineers and specialists are based in a control 
room while permanent workers are stationed on the hot end of the line in positions of process 
controllers to monitor chemical and temperature levels. The cold end of the line, where glass 
is cut and stacked, is operated by ordinary PFG permanent workers. A handful of workers on 
the cold end of the line are also employed under a learnership programme. The cutting and 
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stacking of glass is automated which means workers are merely required to monitor the process 
and reset the stackers if needed (see Annexure C). 
Source: interviews, mapping exercise 
After the glass is lifted from the line by an automatic stacker and stacked in batches of fifty 
sheets, it is warehoused and prepared for distribution. This is the most labour intensive work 
in the factory and is carried out by hundreds of labour broker workers, working in teams of 
four: one forklift driver, one crane operator and two handlers. There is no physical division 
between production and warehousing; they both take place in different halves of the same 
factory, as Figure 2 (above) indicates. PFG management, however, treats them as separate 
functions. Warehousing is outsourced along with distribution as logistics functions to Imperial 
Logistics. The distribution workers (truck drivers and assistants) are directly employed by 
Imperial but the workers inside the factory’s warehouse are employed under the labour broker 
LSC Masakhe which is a subsidiary of Imperial. As is the case with almost all labour brokers, 
LSC now also claims to be a ‘service provider’ to avoid the implications of section 198 (PFG 
group interview, 14/05/2019). 
Figure 2: PFG’s bifurcated labour process 
  
 
73 
4.2.2 Post-198 bifurcation of the factory  
The division of labour between permanent workers on the production lines and externalised 
workers in logistics functions was not always so clear cut. For many years, permanent and 
brokered workers worked alongside one another in the same jobs, both on the production line 
and in the warehouse. In 2015, however, management restructured the plant. Around 30 
production line workers that were employed by a labour broker called Capacity were insourced, 
while all of PFG’s permanent workers that had been working in the warehouse were sent to 
work on the line. Alfred, a worker leader employed by LSC, explained the change quite simply: 
Before 2015 we used to work with the permanents. Now they try by all means 
to keep labour broker workers alone. (PFG group interview, 14/05/2019) 
Alfred himself started out at PFG under a government-sponsored learnership programme in 
2013, which consisted of a five month theory component focussing on the technical side of 
glass making as well as an eight month stint working on the production line. He eventually 
took a job as a crane operator under LSC due to the shortage of jobs in production. For the 
purposes of this research project, his detailed knowledge of both the production and logistics 
phases of the labour process meant that he was able to act as a key informant.  
In hindsight, Alfred and other LSC workers recognised that PFG’s reorganisation of work in 
the factory was linked to the 2015 amendments to section 198 of the LRA (PFG group 
interview, 14/05/2019). By drawing a clear division of labour between permanents in 
production and subcontracted precarious workers in logistics, PFG management acted 
proactively to prevent the latter from claiming their rights to permanent jobs. It was not long 
before LSC workers were told that they were in fact not labour broker workers, but were 
employed by an ‘outsourced service provider’ (ibid).   
Despite its supposed outsourcing, logistics work both inside and outside of the factory still 
clearly plays a crucial role in the PFG labour process. As an entry on their website suggests, 
PFG continue to invest heavily in logistics machinery and continue to exert a significant level 
of control over the design of logistics work processes:   
A critical part of the glass supply process is the way the glass sheets and pallets 
are loaded, transported and offloaded. PFG spends a considerable amount of 
time and effort to refine this process, to achieve its take out on time delivery 
and order fill rates. Domestically, millions of Rands are spent on refurbishing 
grab devices (our own and our customers), refining the configuration of loading 
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on delivery trucks, and evaluating the off-loading procedures of customers to 
ensure maximum with minimal breakages, during this process. (PFG, 2019) 
In keeping with this, as Alfred explains, PFG management have refused to give Imperial full 
control of the factory’s warehouse: 
Not long ago [in 2019] Imperial asked to be given full management of the 
warehouse, because PFG make Imperial pay for breakages reported by the 
clients once the glass is delivered. Imperial say if they had control over the 
warehouse they can be responsible for breakages, but still PFG want their 
manager to oversee things in the warehouse. (Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019) 
What these findings reveal is that the outsourcing of work inside the factory is not a case of 
PFG management handing over full control of a major part of its labour process to another 
company. Rather, it is a case of subcontracting to offset risk (see Theron, 2005), which 
simultaneously allows PFG to tighten its control over the entire labour process in the factory.  
For PFG, the risk associated with the employment contract of the majority of the workers in 
the plant is offset to LSC Masakhe and Imperial. Just as importantly, so are the health and 
financial risks associated with the dangerous task of handling and moving huge sheets of glass. 
On the one hand, PFG retains control over the logistics infrastructure and influences the design 
of logistics work processes (PFG, 2019; Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019). On the other hand, the 
production targets established in Service Level Agreements allow it to pass on the burden of 
enforcing a regime of high work intensity under dangerous working conditions to its 
subcontractors. Alfred explains how this burden is then transferred onto LSC workers 
themselves:  
Sometimes if the crane fails, if there is a problem with the hydraulics, it [the 
batch of fifty sheets of glass] will come down, and you will die. The company 
took all its workers to the line, where it is safe. There you just sit on the chair 
and the [stacking] machine does the job. Where there is difficulty, where it's 
dangerous, they put labour broker workers. You can get hurt, they don’t care. 
They will tell you that your safety is in your hands. If anything happens they 
get their lawyer to say you were negligent […] They removed those cranes that 
you sit in because they said they were too expensive. You use a remote control 
and walk behind the crane. Twelve hours [per shift], walking up and down. 
Sometimes the crane can travel a distance of [around 200 meters]. You go 
there, you come back, you go there, you come back […] The trick with 
operating the crane when you lifting up and dropping down the pack … you 
have to see if the handler has grabbed the pack. If you move the crane back at 
the wrong time you will just crush them. So the guys are afraid to do this job. 
(Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019) 
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Alfred’s comments offer interesting insights into the logic behind PFG’s anxiety to ensure that 
workers in the warehouse remain externalised. He notes that, due to the high level of 
automation, work in production is routine and safe while the line speed determines its intensity. 
In contrast, work in logistics is dangerous and physically taxing which requires more direct 
(and devious) methods of control to ensure that production targets are met. A regime of low 
wages, long work hours and high work intensity under dangerous working conditions is 
achieved through the imposition of third party employers which ensure that workers remain 
politically weak and unable to direct their frustrations at PFG itself.  
4.2.3 The state of worker organising at PFG 
In 2015, LSC workers were approached by PFG’s permanents to join the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). This was a major step forward in uniting workers 
who had previously never organised together, despite working side-by-side for over a decade 
(PFG group interview, 14/05/2019). Prior to this, permanent workers were members of the 
Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPWAWU), but, 
according to Alfred, the union was in the pocket of management:  
The management got an organisation for the permanent workers called 
CEPPWAWU. They never met with the workers, they just came to meetings 
with management. (Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019) 
CEPPWAWU never attempted to organise brokered workers at PFG. Tebogo, a worker who 
started at PFG in 2007 under a labour broker called Lebogile before being moved into LSC in 
2008, explained that up until joining NUMSA in 2015 brokered workers had been prohibited 
from unionising:  
As LSC Masakhe [workers], we were not allowed to join CEPPWAWU. The 
management for Masakhe said that on PFG premises agents [labour brokers] 
are not allowed to have a union. In such a way that you must be a slave. By 
then people didn’t know about their rights. (PFG group interview, 14/05/2019) 
LSC workers treated the arrival of NUMSA with hope, joining during a mass meeting with 
permanent workers in 2015. Despite uniting under one organisation, the restructuring of the 
plant served to deepen divisions between permanent and brokered workers on the shop floor, 
as Tebogo explains:  
Even in the [NUMSA] mass meetings there were two agendas in one meeting, 
for permanents and for LSC. So we realised that there was no need to be in 
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those meetings because the things that we want are not the same. We’ve only 
had three mass meeting since 2015. But since then we meet separately. Our 
needs are not the same so we can’t meet together […] On the noticeboard now 
they [shop stewards and union officials] announce meetings for either 
permanents only or LSC only. The union is divided. (PFG group interview, 
14/05/2019) 
This is significant because it suggests that unions like NUMSA which have at least shown a 
willingness to recruit precarious workers have not been able to develop appropriate strategies 
to organise them. Englert & Runciman (forthcoming) arrive at a similar conclusion in relation 
to unions’ attempts to organise workers at Luxor Paint in Jet Park. It is also indicative of the 
size of the task facing the labour movement in healing the shop floor divisions caused by the 
neoliberal restructuring of the labour process.  
After three years of struggling to get the union to take up their demand to be made permanent, 
LSC workers have grown suspicious about the role that NUMSA shop stewards and officials 
play at PFG. Towards the end of 2018, they started holding meetings in the nearby township 
of KwaThema outside of the auspices of the union and in the absence of shop stewards, who 
they fear have been bought off by management (LSC worker meeting with CWAO, 
14/05/2019). Around the same time, LSC workers turned to CWAO and SWF for assistance in 
taking up a section 198 case at the CCMA. In the process of preparing for arbitration, LSC 
workers found out that NUMSA had launched a section 198 case on their behalf at the Labour 
Court a few months earlier. This resulted in the postponement of their CCMA case. Having not 
been consulted by the union before it launched the Labour Court case, LSC worker leaders 
grew even more suspicious and insisted that the union was ‘blocking all [their] positive moves’ 
(ibid). They argued that the union should have gone to the CCMA where these cases are 
resolved in a fraction of the time.  
The increasingly high level of distrust that LSC workers hold towards the union appears to be 
borne from a feeling of repeatedly being used to support the struggles of permanent workers 
without the solidarity being reciprocated, as Alfred explains:  
The main issue they said ‘you guys if you join, we will fight to get you a 
permanent job’. We didn’t know then that these guys were looking to reach the 
number [of workers that PFG] wanted for recognition [of the union]. Then they 
came with this trick to say that our issue is difficult because we are called 
service providers […] They keep saying ‘we will come to your issues’. 
Meanwhile the permanents keep on buying cars. (PFG group interview, 
14/05/2019) 
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Ultimately, LSC workers feel that their treatment as outsiders in their own workplace by 
management is replicated inside the union by shop stewards and officials (PFG group 
interview, 14/05/2019). A major source of their growing distrust of the union has been the 
approach that NUMSA officials took to two strikes – one led by LSC workers and the other 
led by permanents.  
4.2.4 A tale of two strikes 
In November 2017, LSC workers embarked on a strike to demand permanent jobs and back-
pay from January 2015 – i.e. for the months that they should have been equalised on better-
paid permanent contracts as stipulated in section 198 of the LRA. As LSC workers 
demonstrated outside the factory on the first morning, NUMSA officials arrived to tell them 
that due process had not been followed to gain protection for the strike, as Tebogo explains: 
The RS [NUMSA’s Regional Secretary] came to tell us that we are not 
supposed to strike, to go back to work. Around 12 o'clock the union shut the 
strike. (PFG group interview, 14/05/2019) 
On the one hand, this experience served to spark the frustrations of LSC workers who began 
to harbour suspicions that the union did not, in fact, have their best interests at heart. As 
Tebogo’s words above indicate, workers perceived it to be the union (and not management) 
that ended their strike which had taken them months of preparation. On the other hand, 
however, Alfred notes that the strike served as a demonstration of the integral role played by 
logistics workers in the functioning of the factory:  
Management tried to operate the cranes when we went outside to keep 
production running. The strike was called off before lunch, and when we came 
back it was a mess. There was glass everywhere. (Alfred, interview, 
02/04/2019) 
Despite the defeat of their strike, LSC workers took confidence from the fact that their labour 
could not be replaced as easily as management thought.  
In April 2018, PFG’s permanent workers decided to embark on a strike of their own. As it 
unfolded, it deepened the LSC workers’ suspicions that their role in the union was to support 
the struggles of permanent workers. But, at the same time, it also served to confirm the weight 
of their own bargaining power in the factory. Tebogo explains:  
Xilongo [NUMSA’s Regional Secretary] told them [permanent workers] their 
strike won’t be successful because LSC Masakhe employees were inside [the 
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factory] and PFG will use them to do your job. There are LSC workers who 
have been trained to operate the line. (PFG group interview, 14/05/2019) 
LSC workers eventually decided to down tools in solidarity to join the strike in 2018. If, as 
Lenin (1964: 311) says, ‘strikes are a school of war’, then the lesson that LSC workers took 
from participating in the two strikes was that their collective labours are central to PFG’s 
profits. In a meeting with CWAO organisers in early 2019, Tebogo made this point 
emphatically: 
We are working on Logistics. If the permanent workers from the lines go out 
to toyi-toyi and leave us behind it means the glass will continue to be delivered 
to the customers. We work in logistics and distribution … the most important 
part of PFG. (PFG worker meeting with CWAO, 14/04/2019) 
These insights contradict the literature which would identify subcontracted (and especially 
outsourced) workers as part of a ‘non-core’ (Von Holdt and Webster, 2005). LSC workers are 
effectively arguing that they are central to the PFG labour process, which is behind their 
decision to demand permanent jobs under PFG and not under Imperial.  
Tebogo is also alerting us to fact that the automation of much of the work on the production 
line means that workers there are easily replaceable. In contrast, work in logistics requires a 
significant level of knowledge of the warehouse and slightly more experience to operate the 
machinery. It is this exact dynamic – the increasingly precarious nature of the jobs of 
permanent workers – that Alfred argues is the cause of much of the tension that exists between 
permanent and LSC workers: 
There are those permanents who undermine the labour brokers. Some of them 
fear that if the labour broker workers can win their cases [to be made 
permanent] then maybe they can lose their job. Because they know that some 
of the labour broker workers are skilled and can take positions of permanents. 
For them its fine that there are labour brokers because they look you down. But 
there are also those permanents who say ‘no man these guys are doing a good 
job’. There are those who are willing, they even come to our strikes and strike 
with us. (Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019) 
This is a useful insight and reminds us of the shortcoming of the current utilisation of the 
concept of precariousness to refer to only non-permanent workers. What Tebogo and Alfred’s 
analysis reveals is that automation, labour broking and other new forms of employment render 
precarious the jobs of the entire workforce in a company like PFG – including the jobs of better 
paid permanent workers. Indeed, for Alfred, this common experience of precariousness 
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provides fertile ground to overcome differences and build solidarity across the workplace 
divide. 
4.3 Pioneer Foods: Precarity as a source of control 
Pioneer Foods is South Africa’s second largest food group and exports packaged food goods 
to 80 countries across the world. It also has operations in Nigeria, Botswana and Namibia. In 
July 2019, PepsiCo reached an agreement to acquire Pioneer for $1.7 billion (about R24 billion) 
as part of their drive to capture the African market (Pioneer Foods, 2019). Pioneer has a number 
of factories across South Africa with some significant differences in the way that they organise 
their labour. At the Sasko bakery in Olifantsfontein, for example, the majority of workers in 
production are employed under the labour broker Adcorp Blu (Matthews, interview, 
13/06/2019). Just a few minutes down the road in their Clayville factory Pioneer employs all 
workers directly, although the majority are kept on revolving one-month contracts. This case 
provides a different example of how companies like Pioneer are navigating the post-198 
landscape. By turning to alternative methods of organising their labour, in this case through 
the creation of an internal labour pool based on contract and project work, a different but no 
less thoroughgoing form of control is exerted over the labour process. At the Clayville factory, 
control is secured by preying on workers’ fears of not being granted a contract renewal each 
month. Beyond this, a hierarchy of insiders (workers on permanent contracts) and outsiders 
(workers on short-term contracts) creates a scenario in which the former are used to manage 
the latter.  
4.3.1 Pioneer’s organisation of the plant 
The plant in Clayville is made up of three departments, each housed in a physically separate 
part of the factory. The first produces Safari and other snack bars. The second produces 
Bokomo corn flakes as well as corn flakes packaged for Pick n Pay (a major South African 
retailer). The third department produces Moir’s powdered desserts, such as jellies, custards and 
cake mixes as well as other powder-based products like baking soda and instant mash. Pioneer 
management hires ‘independent contractors’ to supply raw materials for each of the three 
departments as well as to distribute their products. The independent contractors load and 
offload their own trucks, which allows Pioneer to operate without large receiving and 
distribution functions.  
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In the Bars department, under 50 permanent workers run two production lines. Although they 
have permanent status, the majority of these workers are paid less than the workers in the rest 
of the factory, including the contract workers. The Corn Flakes department houses one highly 
automated production line that produces corn flakes, which is run by fewer than 10 permanent 
workers per shift and under 30 in total. An automated palletiser (which some workers call a 
robot) does the job that teams of end-of-line packers do in the other two departments. The 
workers in Corn Flakes are better paid and hold a higher status than those in the Bars 
department.  
In the Moir’s department, over 100 workers are divided by job grade and contract type. There 
are less than 15 permanent workers, of which four are ordinary workers that operate machines 
while the rest are process controllers who operate machines and oversee the running of 10 
production lines. Although process controllers do some work on the lines, they are nevertheless 
viewed by other workers as an arm of management. Another 20 workers are currently 
employed on a 6-month contract, which started in June 2019. Prior to this, these 20 workers 
had spent two years in a ‘learnership programme’. Instead of studying, they worked in the 
positions of machine operators and general workers.  
Finally, in the Moir’s department, over 80 workers are employed on one-month revolving 
contracts and have been for over two years. This number remains stable for the most part, but 
increases during peak season before the Christmas period. These workers are referred to by 
management as C4Cs (Casuals for Company) – an employment scheme that started in 2016. 
They are employed as mixers, line packers, end-of-line packers and forklift drivers but they are 
also often required to operate machines on the line. Furthermore, C4Cs are also called on to 
work in the Corn Flakes and Bars departments when production demands require extra labour. 
Pioneer management justifies the use of revolving one-month contracts by telling workers that 
they are only employed to carry out ‘project work’. In other words, each batch of a particular 
product supposedly counts as a new ‘project’. This allows Pioneer to vary production in 
relation to market demand (i.e. a form of just-in-time production). More importantly, however, 
this contract/project work scheme is used as an everyday control mechanism to drive up the 
intensity of labour and to prevent workers from organising or unionising, as we will see in the 
following sections.   
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4.3.2 The organisation of the Moir’s labour process 
Corn flakes is a highly automated department which means that management is less reliant on 
the labour component to reach production targets, while Bars is smaller and currently has a 
small production demand which means that it only currently operates a day shift. The Moir’s 
department, on the other hand, is the largest in the plant and exhibits a more complex division 
of labour between contract and permanent workers. Despite the simplicity of the labour 
process, which only really requires the raw materials to be mixed and packaged, much of the 
work in this department is still done manually. I was able to develop a detailed picture of the 
labour process inside Moir’s from a group of dismissed C4C workers who had worked in the 
department from 2016 to January 2019 (see 3.3.2).  
The labour process in the Moir’s department has three phases: mixing, work in progress and 
production line work. In mixing, there are three machines which mix together raw materials to 
produce large bags (or ‘bales’) of the final product for each of the 10 production lines (Pioneer 
group interview 2, 25/05/2019). Only two forklifts are allowed to operate in the Moir’s 
department, which is located on the second floor of the factory directly above the Corn Flakes 
department, due to the fact that the building has structural faults. Workers say that the floor 
beneath them feels like it could collapse at any point. In order to move the raw materials to the 
mixing machines and the final product to the lines, C4Cs in mixing (who are only men) are 
forced to use pallet jacks and often even have to carry the large bales on their shoulders. At 
work in progress, a sample of the product is tested in a small lab to ensure that the right 
quantities of raw materials have been mixed together. The C4C workers then move the bales 
to the start of the lines, where they are hung up to be emptied into a machine that packages the 
products into small sachets.  
On the line, machines are usually operated by permanent machine operators and the former 
learners who are now employed on six-month contracts. C4Cs often also operate these 
machines according to Thando, who worked as a line packer up until January 2019 before being 
dismissed:  
The permanents can go for smoke breaks for as long as they want. Thing is, we 
[C4Cs] can operate machines but we are not allowed. So we take over then. 
(Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019) 
Amanda, who is also employed as an line packer, clarified the role of contract workers in the 
factory saying that ‘we are actually general workers’ (Pioneer group interview, 25/05/2019). 
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Although management formally forbids C4Cs from operating machines (apparently for 
insurance purposes since they have not had official training), they turn a blind eye to ensure 
that there are no breaks in production. Highlighting the deskilled nature of this work, Thando 
explained the task of operating one of these machines as merely being ‘a question of pushing 
start and stop’ which requires no training (Pioneer group interview, 25/05/2019). In fact, these 
workers are also tasked with cleaning the machines a couple of times a day, either at the end 
of shift or whenever a new flavour of jelly or a different cake mix is being produced. This 
requires them to use tools to disassemble and reassemble the machines – a skill that another 
C4C worker leader, Zama, says they are forced to pick up quickly on the job:  
They said we all have to clean our lines, but when we clean the permanent 
operators disappear. We take the machines apart and clean ourselves because 
we fear our contracts won’t be renewed. (Pioneer group interview 2, 
25/05/2019) 
The C4C line packers, who rely on the incentives attached to daily production targets, are 
forced to take over the running and dis/reassembly of the machines despite the risk of losing 
their jobs if something goes wrong while they are doing so. This is a very real threat as the 
machines often malfunction (sometimes spectacularly – emitting clouds of powder which cover 
the factory), as Thando notes:  
Sometimes we have to repack sachets into the one machine on line 10 when it 
breaks. They call it handwork because the machine is old … Jesus used to use 
it! I can say most of the lines work 50% okay. All the machines are old. It is 
difficult to reach the targets because they are always breaking. (Pioneer group 
interview 1, 27/04/2019) 
Most of the 10 production lines have one machine that packages the mixed product into sachets 
and another that then places the sachets into boxes (two of the lines which package the products 
into plastic tubs have different machines). C4C line packers, almost all of whom are women 
workers, are stationed along a conveyor belt between these two machines (see Figure 3, below).  
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Source: interviews, mapping exercise 
Their task is to pat each sachet down so that it is flat enough to be fed into the boxing machine. 
Zama demonstrated the tedious nature of this work: ‘you don’t see the sachets, you just do like 
this [fast hand motions as if she were playing a drum]’ (Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019). 
Line packers do this for either nine or 12 hours each day, depending on their shift schedule.  
You don’t sit, you standing the whole 12 hours. Your feet swell up. Sometimes 
at home I can’t even stand to make food. (Amanda in Pioneer group interview 
2, 25/05/2019) 
As products come off the line, an end-of-line packer stacks them onto pallets and moves them 
to distribution using a pallet jack. This job, like the work done in mixing, is usually reserved 
for the small number of men workers under C4C contracts.  
4.3.3 Precarity and contract hierarchy as control mechanisms 
While the Corn Flakes department is highly automated, which increases the productivity of 
labour, the Moir’s department is technologically backwards and runs on a model of low wages 
and high work intensity. According to Thando, Pioneer management persist with this regime 
in the Moir’s department despite the apparent availability of more advanced machinery: 
The manager was telling us about a new machine they are considering buying 
if we don’t reach targets. Normally, with people working three shifts, they 
make 10 000 cases per week. He says the machine can make about three times 
that amount. They use this [threat] to make us work like slaves. (Pioneer group 
interview 1, 27/04/2019) 
C4Cs are well aware that they could easily be replaced by newer machines – a fact which, 
Thando notes above, ironically allows management to persist with its labour intensive model 
based low pay and high intensity. The precarity of their contracts ultimately also allows 
management to drive up work pressure.  
Figure 3: The organisation of labour along a Moir’s production line 
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The workers most responsible for reaching daily production targets are the line packers. The 
work in this position is relentless and the intensity is higher than any other position in the 
factory. If the sachets are not flat and uniformly spread out on the conveyor belt as they move 
into the boxing machine (see Figure 3 above), the machine may malfunction which stops 
production for as long as it takes to fix and clean the machine. Although line speeds set the 
pace of this work, Zama explains that management offsets the responsibility of determining 
line speeds to the permanent workers employed as process controllers and operators:  
The speed depends on the operator and how many packers are on the line. The 
supervisor will put pressure on the process controller who will put pressure on 
the operator, then they turn up the line speed. The fast speed only makes it 
difficult for us – the packers. (Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019) 
If Marx (1990) argued that automation allows the capitalist to hide behind the machine which 
bears the brunt of the worker’s frustration, then here management hides behind the process 
controllers and operators, who become the target of the contract workers’ frustrations. ‘You 
can be friendly with the operators at lunch or outside work … not in the factory’, Amanda 
explained (Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019). C4C packers fight with operators and 
process controllers over the speed of the line on a daily basis. The latter, C4Cs argue, represent 
an arm of management, as Thando’s experience attests to: 
Sometimes you are not even allowed to go to the toilet because the line is 
running so fast. One day I was on my periods, so I just went to the toilet. The 
process controller reported me to the management and I got a warning. 
(Thando, interview, 16/05/2019) 
The only workers in the factory that are invited to management’s year end functions are the 
process controllers, which C4C workers argue is further proof that they operate as ‘izimpimpi’ 
(management spies) (Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019). The hierarchy of contract types 
allows management to ‘disperse conflict’, as Burawoy (1982: 67) argues, away from a 
‘hierarchical conflict’ between boss and worker and towards ‘lateral conflict’ between different 
groups of workers. This increases management control tenfold and has disastrous implications 
for worker organising, as the following section demonstrates.  
4.3.4 The state of worker organising at Pioneer   
The Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) – an affiliate of the South African Federation 
of Trade Unions (SAFTU) – had a presence at the Clayville factory until early 2019, but only 
ever organised the permanent workers in each department. Today most permanent workers 
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appear to have left FAWU to join the Agricultural Food And Allied Democratic Workers Union 
(AFADWU), which was launched by former FAWU officials who wanted to stay inside the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). As we will see in the following section 
on Simba, AFADWU is also making inroads into other companies that have traditionally been 
dominated by FAWU, with the SAFTU affiliate appearing to be in a state of generalised 
turmoil.  
C4Cs never joined FAWU, largely out of fear that management would not renew their contracts 
having formally forbid them from unionising. These workers also argued that they never joined 
FAWU because the shop stewards were generally process controllers who, they believe, carried 
out management’s orders inside the union. One such order was that C4Cs are prohibited from 
unionising, as Thando explains:  
FAWU is also to blame for us not joining. I once filled out a form [to join 
FAWU]. I gave it to the shop steward but he said I’m not allowed because I’m 
a C4C. (Thando, interview, 16/05/2019) 
Much of the academic literature on workplace change acknowledges that unions have been 
slow to respond to the rise of precarious work and have struggled to find ways to recruit and 
organise precarious workers. It does not, however, acknowledge that there are cases such as 
this where union structures or union representatives refuse to organise or even just sign up 
precarious workers.  
As a result of FAWU’s attitude towards precarious workers at Pioneer, C4C contract workers 
began to organise themselves as an independent collective in December 2018 to claim their 
section 198 rights to permanent jobs. They approached the CWAO and SWF for advice and 
quickly chose to launch a ‘deeming’ case at the CCMA. Management responded swiftly by 
singling out a group of 29 of the most active workers who were then not given new contracts 
in January 2019. This has made the task of building organisation inside the factory amongst 
the less militant layer of C4C workers extremely difficult. Pioneer management has been able 
to use these developments to reinforce their regime of fear amongst highly precarious contract 
workers, which ensures that it can persist with its low-wage, high-intensity model.  
Since the 29 workers understood that according to section 198 they were already the ‘deemed’ 
permanent workers of Pioneer, six of them decided to launch an unfair dismissal case at the 
CCMA. A few weeks later the next 23 launched another case. In May 2019, a CCMA 
commissioner ruled that as so-called ‘project workers’ they do not qualify for section 198 rights 
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and, as a result, were not unfairly dismissed but had simply come to the end of their contracts 
(see Annexure D). Subsection 198B(3)(a) of the LRA says that workers can be employed on 
fixed-term contracts for longer than three months if ‘the nature of work for which the employee 
is employed is of a limited or definite duration’ (LRA, 2015). Despite the fact that most C4Cs 
have worked at Pioneer for an ongoing basis for over two years – and, therefore, the ‘nature’ 
of the work is not of a limited duration – the commissioner chose to side with Pioneer 
management to deny C4C workers their rights to permanent jobs. This opens up a whole new 
avenue for capital to bypass section 198 and move beyond labour broking towards a form of 
employment that is possibly even more exploitative, as the above findings suggest. 
4.4 Simba Chips: Perpetual restructuring of the labour process 
Simba’s factory in Isando is a well-known Johannesburg landmark, bordering the highway 
between the city and O.R. Tambo International Airport. The Isando factory has also been the 
site of intense struggle over the last three years, as labour broker workers fought to win their 
rights to permanent jobs under section 198 of the LRA. At its height, the recent struggle at 
Simba was more than just a struggle for permanent jobs and the associated increases in wages 
and benefits; it expressed itself as a struggle against Simba management’s tight control over 
the labour process which had been secured through two-and-a-half decades of perpetual 
restructuring of the plant. These restructuring initiatives meant that by 2015 up to 90% of the 
workers in the plant were employed by labour brokers on low wages and long work hours 
(Sihle & Vuyo, interview, 18/04/2019; The New Worker 1, 2017). The 2015 amendments to 
section 198 of the LRA and the subsequent struggles of brokered workers have forced Simba 
to restructure once again, as it looks for new sources of cheap labour and new means to keep it 
cheap. This case demonstrates how the construction and reconstruction of the labour process 
is determined by the state of the class struggle in the workplace. It explores how Simba 
management constantly looks for new ways to swing the balance of forces in its favour in order 
to secure ever tighter control over the labour process and the extraction of surplus value.  
4.4.1 Simba’s organisation of the labour process 
The labour process in Simba’s Isando plant is broken up into the four main functions of 
receiving, production, warehousing and distribution. Like Reckitt, each function takes place in 
a separate part of the workplace, between which a worker’s movement is highly restricted. 
Prior to winning permanent jobs in September 2018, almost the entire workforce in the factory 
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was directly employed by the labour broker Adcorp Blu. Figure 4 below details the 
organisation of labour in the plant during the first half of 2018. 
Source: interviews, mapping exercise, The New Worker 
In production and receiving, 402 Adcorp Blu workers, most of whom are women, worked 
alongside approximately 40 of Simba’s permanent workers. Although their payslips 
categorised them as general workers, they did the same work as the permanent machine 
operators, packers and forklift drivers. Cleaning work in production is contracted out to 
EcoWize. In warehousing, 65 Adcorp Blu workers were employed as packers, pickers and 
forklift drivers. Distribution was the only function of the labour process in which the majority 
of workers were permanent employees of Simba by early 2018. However, of the 102 drivers 
and driving assistants in distribution, 94 had previously been employed under the labour broker 
Capacity. In 2015, Simba management began a process of gradually insourcing all of these 
workers which took three years.  
The workers under Adcorp Blu waged a three-year struggle for permanent jobs under section 
198 of the LRA. On 28 June 2018, management signed a settlement agreement at the Benoni 
CCMA to agree to take all Adcorp Blu workers on permanent contracts. Just 24-hours later 
workers were told that Simba would be retrenching 142 packers from production due to 
operational requirements, which included a plan to purchase new machinery such as automated 
palletisers (Bassier & Potlaki, 2018). In the end, 467 Adcorp Blu workers were made 
permanent on 1 September 2018, followed by the retrenchment of 75 newly permanent packers 
from production in December 2018. On top of this, almost the entire workforce in warehousing 
and distribution was moved to a new distribution centre in Elandsfontein, called PepsiCo Park. 
Figure 4: Simba’s labour process prior to the victory of brokered workers 
  
 
88 
The new palletising machinery never arrived. By January 2019, Simba had replaced the 
retrenched packers in production with 90 new workers employed under a learnership 
programme run by the Department of Employment and Labour. 
4.4.2 A history of perpetual restructuring  
Over the last three decades, Simba has restructured on a number of occasions, leading to 
significant changes in both the size and character of the workforce in each of the four main 
functions. In the early 1990s, almost the entire workforce at the Isando factory of well over 
1000 workers were employed directly by Simba on permanent contracts (John, interview, 
17/06/2019). By early 2015, permanent workers made up only a fraction of a workforce which 
totalled just over 600.  
I was able to develop a timeline (Table 2 below) of some of the more notable instances of 
restructuring that have taken place since the 1990s, thanks largely to an interview with a 
worker, John Mokoena, who started working for Simba as a merchandiser in Cleveland, near 
Germiston, in 1991. He first moved to the Isando factory in 1996  to work in distribution as a 
driving assistant – a position he still holds despite having recently been relocated to the 
distribution centre in Elandsfontein.  
The timeline demonstrates how Simba management began by outsourcing some of the smaller 
functions of the labour process in the late-1990s, while cleaning work inside the factory was 
first fully outsourced in 2008. The turn towards labour broking began in distribution with the 
introduction of LSC in 2004, which was replaced by Capacity in 2007. By 2010, Simba 
management began to use labour broker workers inside production and in the warehouse.  
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Table 2: Timeline of restructuring initiatives at Simba, Isando 
Sources: Interviews, The New Worker, field notes, archival material 
The gradual introduction of labour broking into the four main functions of the labour process 
predated a major phase of restructuring which took place between 2012 and 2014. John 
1996 Vehicle maintenance work outsourced to auto services companies. 
1998 Merchandising outsourced to PacknStack. 
1999 PepsiCo buys Simba.  
2004 Distribution workers moved into LSC Masakhe (labour broker). Some 
distribution of Simba products is subsequently outsourced to smaller 
companies for a short period as Simba trucks are used to deliver Pepsi 
products. 
2006 Distribution function returns to normal as Simba trucks deliver Simba 
products (using brokered workers as drivers and assistants), while the 
distribution of Pepsi products is outsourced.  
2007 Distribution workers moved into Capacity (labour broker and Adcorp 
subsidiary). 
2008 Cleaning work outsourced. 
2010 Capital (labour broker and Adcorp subsidiary) brought in to employ workers 
in receiving, production and warehousing. 
2012 to 2014 Major restructuring in production: 
- mass retrenchments of permanent workers, mostly packers 
- upgrading of permanent machine operators into technicians 
- introduction of new packaging machinery  
- increase of labour broker work 
2015 Distribution workers insourced from Capacity. 
2017 Capacity and Capital merge to form Adcorp Blu which becomes the direct 
employer of workers in receiving, production and warehousing.  
2018 
(September) 
402 Adcorp Blu workers in receiving and production as well as 65 Adcorp Blu 
warehousing workers sign permanent contracts with Simba after three-year 
long struggle for permanent jobs under section 198 of the LRA. 
December 
2018 to 
January 
2019  
Major restructuring of the plant: 
- Retrenchment of 75 newly insourced packers in production 
- Warehousing (65 workers) and distribution (102 workers) functions 
relocated to PepsiCo Park Distribution Centre in Elandsfontein 
- 90 workers employed in production as packers under Department of 
Labour-sponsored “learnership” programme 
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explained how, during this period, the introduction of new packaging machinery and ‘robotic 
palletisers’ effectively eliminated some of the most labour intensive work in the production 
process: 
Recently, before 2013, [packets of] chips used to be packed [into boxes] by 
people by hand. Now it is a machine that packs, even the box is sealed by the 
machine, the pallet is packed by machine and so on […] The number [of 
workers in production] has deteriorated. I can say maybe 70% has gone. (John, 
interview, 17/06/2019) 
According to John, management changed the conditions of packing work before bringing in 
the new machinery to convince permanent workers, who were mostly older women, to take 
retrenchment packages:  
When they started this retrenchment they removed the chairs, they told them 
that they must not pack the chips sitting down, they must stand up […] They 
were old and could not stand that. They ended up accepting this retrenchment. 
(John, interview, 17/06/2019) 
The retrenchments were accompanied by the upgrading of permanent machine operators into 
technicians. This opened the door for Simba to bring in more labour broker workers, who soon 
made up over 90% of the workforce in both production and the warehouse.  
4.4.3 Destroying the union 
John argues that the upgrading of operators was a politically motivated manoeuvre which 
resulted in the removal of most of the FAWU shop stewards from the shop floor, while the 
retrenchment of packers destroyed the union’s rank and file at the plant:  
They [management] started changing things, saying ‘as you are now a 
technician, now you fall under management, you are no longer allowed to 
participate in the union […] you don’t have to be a shop steward’. That is when 
they killed the union – when they started retrenching those people [and 
removing the machine operators]. (John, interview, 17/06/2019) 
FAWU’s presence at Simba’s Isando plant dates back to the early 1980s under its precursor – 
the Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU). Worker struggles at the Isando factory 
during this period have an important place in the history of the South African labour movement. 
In 1984, one such struggle saw around 400 workers down tools in response to the dismissal of 
three workers – one for throwing away a single potato (FOSATU Worker News, 1984). Simba 
summarily dismissed all of the striking workers. As members of SFAWU, workers set up the 
Simba Workers Committee which organised an historic boycott of Simba products. The 
  
 
91 
boycott quickly spread from the East Rand to other parts of the country. Within three months, 
Simba management agreed to take back all the dismissed workers making it one of the first and 
most effective consumer boycotts of the period and paving the way for more of its kind 
(Mabuza, 2016). In 1986, SFAWU and the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) merged 
to become FAWU, which benefitted from this history of militancy at the Isando factory and 
was able to maintain relatively strong structures at the plant for decades to come.  
John, who joined FAWU in 1991, assessed the efficacy of the union based on the influence 
that he and other ordinary workers had in making decisions and not so much in terms of the 
wage increases it secured. Up until 2014, FAWU held annual national meetings specifically 
for Simba, where thousands of rank and file workers from different plants across the country 
would meet to discuss wage demands and prepare for strikes. For John, the decline of the union 
became clear when these meeting stopped and as union officials began to meet more regularly 
with management inside the plant without a mandate from workers:  
When the union was still doing good for us […] we would tell our negotiator 
that if they don’t want to give us that R4000 increase [it is okay] but if it is less 
than R2000 we rather go to strike. That is how they [used to] negotiate. Now 
we will only hear by the rumours that Simba is giving us R600 increase. Then 
all of a sudden our managers will come with papers and say the company has 
agreed with your union […] here is the paper, sign here. (John, interview, 
17/06/2019) 
During this period, John says that the union also stopped holding elections for shop stewards 
and by 2015 there were no shop stewards left in distribution where he worked. John eventually 
resigned from FAWU in March 2019 – 28 years after joining the union. Although he is aware 
that FAWU faces its own internal problems, John insists that the terminal decline of the union 
at the Isando plant began with the restructuring in 2012: 
When the company changed these things, the union should have in the first 
place resisted those changes [the retrenchments and the removal of operators 
from the shop floor]. (John, interview, 17/06/2019) 
4.4.4 Worker organising at Simba today 
The collapse of FAWU in the years following the restructuring of the plant meant that the 
majority of the workforce – i.e. the newer labour broker workers – remained without an active 
and effective union. Some still held FAWU membership, but when the changes to section 198 
of the LRA came into effect in 2015 these workers turned to the CWAO and the SWF for 
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assistance. A long struggle to claim their rights ensued under a worker-run structure called the 
Simba Workers Forum, where they had to fend off fresh attempts at restructuring in production. 
In an educational pamphlet titled ‘How to strike over unilateral changes’, CWAO explained 
this restructuring attempt and how workers were able to resist it: 
In April 2018, Simba management moved [labour broker] workers from 
operating positions into packing positions. The workers who were moved were 
originally employed to work as operators and had been doing this work for a 
long time. Simba basically ‘demoted’ the workers. The workers referred a 
dispute to the CCMA and issued a 48-hour strike notice to their bosses. Simba 
quickly reversed the changes and put the operators back in their positions. 
(CWAO Pamphlet, 2019b) 
Management was ultimately moving brokered workers out of operating and into packing 
positions as an attempt to bypass the ramifications of section 198. In a similar fashion to the 
Reckitt and PFG examples, Simba looked to redefine their core business as purely that of 
making chips. They attempted to move all Adcorp Blu workers into auxiliary positions in 
production, such as packing and forklift driving, which Simba management began to refer to 
as ‘outsourced services’ (Sihle & Vuyo, interview, 18/04/2019). The attempted separation of 
brokered and permanent workers into different jobs was also done in order to avoid a sub-
clause of section 198, which says that brokered workers should be treated ‘not less favourably’ 
than permanent workers who do the same work (LRA, 2015). This meant that the Adcorp Blu 
operators were supposed to earn the same wages and benefits as permanent operators after 
three months of work.  
The organised power of workers, who had been meeting in their hundreds as the Simba 
Workers Forum almost every second weekend for over two years, forced management to 
backtrack on these changes. It was the increasing militancy of brokered workers that eventually 
forced Simba management to sign a settlement agreement at the CCMA on 28 June 2018, 
where they recognised all brokered workers as their permanents and committed to giving them 
permanent contracts. By 1 September 2018, brokered workers signed permanent contracts with 
better wages and benefits – just a few months after Simba management’s last gasp restructuring 
attempt which was aimed at avoiding this exact scenario.  
A second major phase of restructuring got under way in December 2018 when 75 packers were 
retrenched from production, while warehousing and distribution workers were relocated to a 
new distribution centre 25 kilometres away. By January 2019, the retrenched workers in 
production were replaced by ‘learners’ who were supplied by the Department of Employment 
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and Labour on 12-month contracts. A CWAO organiser who works closely with Simba workers 
laughed off the idea that there would be any upskilling of workers during the so-called 
learnership programme: ‘they are saying it is 12 months training … to become a packer? Even 
one hour training is too much’ (Sihle, interview, 09/08/2019). He insists that Simba has merely 
replaced cheap labour with cheaper labour, saying that ‘the Department [of Employment and 
Labour] has become just another labour broker’ (ibid). One important factor to note about the 
turn towards ‘learnership’ workers  by companies like Simba is that these workers are not 
covered by the National Minimum Wage Act which was introduced in 2019. Like project work 
at Pioneer, the rise of learnership work opens up new alternatives to labour broking and 
subcontracted employment in general.  
Common to both the major phases of restructuring – the first from 2012 to 2014 and the second 
in beginning in December 2018 – has been the subsequent realignment of the balance of forces 
in the workplace in management’s favour. The incremental introduction of labour broking and 
outsourcing in the 1990s and 2000s weakened FAWU’s structures at the plant and laid the 
foundation for the first major phase of restructuring that ultimately destroyed the union at the 
plant. The second major phase of restructuring did not, however, take place on management’s 
own terms. But the fact that it was able to retrench and relocate a large section of its workforce 
only months after hundreds of workers won permanent jobs gives us an insight into capital’s 
approach to industrial relations in the current period. Armed with the financial power to 
restructure at a moment’s notice and with easy access to ever cheaper sources of unskilled 
labour (in this case with the state as middleman), companies like Simba are able to respond to 
setbacks by going on the offensive.    
A significant number of both old and new permanents now appear to have joined AFADWU – 
the same COSATU union which has recently made inroads at Pioneer. It is not clear if workers 
are aware that it is a COSATU affiliate, but it is entirely possible that the majority who have 
joined are unaware. John says that AFADWU has also replaced FAWU at all Simba 
workplaces around the country, and he looks forward to a proposed national meeting of Simba 
workers towards the end of 2019. But despite old and new permanents uniting under one union, 
the recent restructuring initiative has divided the former brokered workers – both politically, 
by instilling distrust between ordinary workers and a smaller group of worker leaders who 
signed off on the retrenchments, and geographically, by moving warehouse and distribution 
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workers to the PepsiCo Park distribution centre. This division has opened the space for 
management to once again regain political control over workers.  
Brokered workers fought their struggle for permanent jobs outside the union and then 
proceeded to unionise in the aftermath of their victory. This is a similar finding to Dickinson’s 
(2017a) research on the struggles of the non-unionised ‘Maberete’ at the Post Office who 
formed a union upon their winning of permanent contracts – the argument being that once 
workers become permanent they see their struggles as best waged inside the traditional 
industrial relations framework. It is interesting to note, however, that the newly unionised 
workers at Simba are already looking to rebuild the Simba Workers Forum as a fighting 
structure outside of AFADWU.  
4.5 Conclusion 
As a labour process study, this chapter focussed specifically on the way that labour power is 
organised in the factories of four manufacturing companies on the East Rand: Reckitt 
Benckiser, PFG Building Glass, Pioneer Foods and Simba Chips.  It was shown that capital 
uses precarious workers at every level of the industrial labour process – from the receiving of 
raw materials to the production of commodities and through to their warehousing and 
distribution – and often in greater numbers than permanents. Englert’s (2018) recent study on 
Heineken’s Sedibeng brewery originally found that although the brewing of beer was reserved 
for permanent workers, precarious workers performed jobs in the bottling phase of the 
production process. He suggested that the location of precarious workers on a ‘core function’ 
of the labour process ultimately disrupted Von Holdt and Webster’s (2005) core/non-core 
schema. This dissertation bolsters these findings by showing that precarious workers are indeed 
located at the very heart of production and often to a far greater degree than they are at 
Heineken.  
In fact, at each workplace in this study precarious workers were found in positions that are at 
the very epicentre of production itself – i.e. working as machine operators on production lines. 
What these findings indicate is the extent to which production work has been deskilled in these 
factories. Of the four companies, it was only at PFG that workers could identify a job that took 
longer than a week to master, and those belonged to engineers and professionals (see 4.2.1). 
The deskilled nature of production work in South African industry today is an important factor 
in the intrusion of precarious forms of employment into the so-called ‘core functions’ of the 
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labour process. This is something that has been overlooked in much of the South African 
literature on workplace change.  
The findings show that despite the ease with which skills can be picked up on the job, 
precarious workers nevertheless tend to spend years at the same client company performing 
the same jobs as permanent workers. This supports Theron’s (2005) argument that the primary 
function of precarious forms of employment is not the ‘numerical flexibility’ that they provide. 
Rather, it can be deduced that these employment schemes have a central role to play in a 
manufacturing company’s valorisation strategy over a longer period. Each case in this study, 
therefore, analysed the particular application of precarious forms of employment to the 
production process in relation to the control that they afford the management of the 
manufacturing company over the process as a whole.  
The analysis of the labour process provides a picture of the varying degrees to which capital 
looks to fragment the labour process along spatial and employment lines in the current period 
(see Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4). This ultimately results in the extreme atomisation of workers inside 
the factory – the real extent of which has been under analysed in the literature and in the general 
debate on the effects of precarious work. In each case, the workers that were interviewed 
described how management’s organisation of the labour process creates deep divisions 
between different groups of workers. The control that this divide and rule strategy affords 
management over workers at a political level inevitably translates to greater control over the 
production of surplus value at a more technical level.  
The deep dependence of the contemporary industrial labour process on precarious workers is 
borne out by capital’s response to the 2015 amendments to section 198 of the LRA. Like 
hundreds of other client companies across South Africa (see CWAO, 2019), the companies in 
this study have shown no signs of being willing to obey the law and employ labour broker 
workers permanently after three months. Instead they have either restructured to circumvent 
the law by continuing to externalise workers through ‘outsourced service providers’ or they 
have begun to test out alternative schemes of precarious employment such as ‘project work’ 
and ‘learnership programmes’. Again, what this demonstrates quite clearly is that, while unions 
may be able to defend a dwindling number of permanent jobs and while legislative changes 
and the struggles of brokered workers may have forced some companies to insource workers, 
capital’s approach in the current period continues to be to replace permanent workers with 
precarious workers wherever possible.  
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This has serious implications for the future of trade unions, which, as the examples above 
suggest, have been unable to develop an effective response to the rise of precarious forms of 
employment. Webster (1985) originally revealed how white craft unions responded to the 
influx of cheap black labour into the metal industry under apartheid by defending the jobs and 
pay grades of their members at the expense of the then new black workers. This study has 
shown that unions like CEPPWAWU and FAWU have taken the same approach to the influx 
of cheap precarious labour into their industries in the post-apartheid era. These unions’ 
unwillingness to organise precarious workers has only contributed to the growth of precarious 
forms of employment at each workplace, which ultimately weakened their workplace structures 
to the point of their eventual collapse at all four factories. The unions that have, on the other 
hand, attempted to organise precarious workers in some of these workplaces have not had great 
success in doing so. GIWUSA and NTM, for example, have both tried to organise brokered 
workers at Reckitt. The former were defeated by an intransigent management that dismissed 
almost all of its members during a strike, while the latter have only been able to recruit the 
small number of workers employed in dispatch. In recent years, NUMSA has made some 
headway in uniting precarious and permanent workers under one union at PFG. The reality, 
however, is that inside the workplace it operates as two separate unions. What this example 
demonstrates is that simply recruiting precarious workers into unions does not overcome the 
divisions between different groups of workers that have been created through decades of 
neoliberal restructuring.  
Although the findings present a picture of trade unionism in crisis, there were, however, 
numerous signs of emerging worker organising efforts from below. In each workplace these 
were led by precarious workers themselves, where they have employed a number of different 
tactical approaches to using different organisational forms to advance their struggles. First, 
precarious workers at PFG and Reckitt have both at some point attempted to wage their 
struggles for permanent jobs through trade unions. Second, precarious workers at both of these 
companies have also built their own structures outside of the unions to pursue struggles that 
they believe their union representatives or shop stewards will not take up. Third, workers at 
Simba and Pioneer have waged their struggles outside of the unions altogether, and have built 
their own workplace structures. In both of the latter two scenarios, precarious workers have 
affiliated their workplace structures to the SWF and have sought the assistance of CWAO 
which provides organising and legal advice. Finally, in Simba’s case, workers eventually 
joined a union once they won permanent jobs. Within months, however, they looked to 
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resurrect the Simba Workers Forum in order to respond to a management counteroffensive that 
had radically restructured the workplace. This wide range of organisational approaches is 
indicative of a period in which workers are both desperate to access the benefits and protections 
associated with the official industrial relations system (which is often the primary reason for 
joining trade unions) and yet are aware – or quickly become aware – of its limitations in being 
able to advance their struggles (which is why in other cases they continue to search for solutions 
outside of the traditional form of registered unionism).   
  
 
98 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
As a multi-sited case study of four industrial workplaces on the East Rand, this dissertation has 
contributed new empirical and analytical findings to the study of workplace change and the 
rise of precarious work in post-apartheid South Africa. This concluding chapter begins by 
restating the aims of the research. It then draws out the analytical and empirical findings of the 
dissertation. By utilising a Marxist reading of the political economy of the labour process, the 
conclusion to this dissertation challenges some of the assumptions and analytical weaknesses 
that are present in much of the established sociological literature on the post-apartheid 
workplace. Finally, it proposes directions for further research.  
5.1 Restating the aims of the dissertation and summarising the chapters 
This dissertation aimed to uncover exactly how manufacturing capital has reorganised its 
labour process in recent decades. More specifically, the research aimed to unveil how 
manufacturing companies are choosing organise their labour power inside their factories today 
and explore the logic behind the use of different forms of precarious employment schemes. 
The findings from four factories in Ekurhuleni have shown how the industrial labour process 
has become heavily reliant on precarious forms of employment – particularly labour broking – 
as mechanisms of labour control in the post-apartheid period. A central contribution of this 
research has been to document a range of different management restructuring efforts that have 
emerged since 2015 in response to the amendments to section 198 of the LRA and in response 
to the struggles of labour broker worker who are claiming their new rights to permanent jobs.  
Chapter 1 began by noting that the workforce in the manufacturing industries remains relatively 
large, despite decades of neoliberal restructuring which has resulted in falling employment and 
a decline in unionisation. It was, therefore, argued that rebuilding organisation among 
industrial workers remains central to the task of rebuilding a labour movement for the near 
future. The chapter explains that an important motivation for this research project is to 
contribute to a better understanding of how neoliberal restructuring – most notably the 
introduction of precarious forms of employment – has radically transformed the terrain of 
workplace struggle in the manufacturing industries in the post-apartheid period.  
Chapter 2 argued that both the literature and general debate on precarious forms of employment 
have generally located precarious workers as a substratum of the capitalist labour process. 
Returning to Marx (1990), Braverman (1974) and other contributors to labour process theory, 
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the chapter framed the debate on precarious forms of employment around capital’s struggle for 
control over the labour process. It argued that the rise of precarious forms of employment in 
South Africa should be studied in relation to the forms of control that they afford capital over 
the production of surplus value.   
Chapter 3 detailed the methodological approach to the research. It justified the use of a multi-
sited case study, focussing on four industrial workplaces in Ekurhuleni. It reflected upon case 
selection and the data gathering techniques used in the research process.  
Chapter 4 structured the findings of each of the four cases around four broad themes. First, 
each case presented a description of how the labour process is organised and focussed on how 
management organises its labour power inside the factory. Second, each case explored the 
specific forms of control that the different precarious employment schemes afford management 
over workers and over the production of surplus value. Third, the cases detailed management 
restructuring initiatives in response to the section 198 amendments and in response to worker 
struggles for permanent jobs. Fourth, the chapter assessed the state of worker organising and 
trade unionism in each workplace. 
This concluding chapter draws on the analytical and empirical findings from the multi-sited 
case study to contribute to the theoretical debates on workplace change in the post-apartheid 
period.  
5.2 Precarious workers and the extraction of surplus value: challenging the core/non-core 
schema 
Building upon Englert’s (2018) analysis, the dissertation advanced a critique of Von Holdt and 
Webster’s (2005) core/non-core schema, as it demonstrated the importance of precarious 
workers in even so-called ‘core’ functions of the production process. The research presented 
confirms that precarious workers are indeed located at the very heart of production, and, as 
each of the four cases demonstrate, often to a far greater extent than they were in Englert’s 
study of the Heineken brewery in Sedibeng, Gauteng. At all four companies in this study, 
precarious workers not only work inside production but also operate machines on the 
production lines. This reveals capital’s willingness to replace their old core workforce with 
precarious workers wherever possible.  
  
 
100 
It must, however, be noted that there are also examples of companies moving brokered workers 
out of their positions as machine operators, at the heart of production (see Reckitt Benckiser 
4.1.3 and PFG Building Glass 4.2.2). This dissertation has shown that capital is currently 
looking for ways to bypass the 2015 amendments to section 198 of the LRA, which sought to 
restrict the use of labour broking to work that is of a ‘genuinely temporary nature’. Under the 
new law, brokered workers are automatically ‘deemed’ permanent workers of the client 
company where they work after three months (LRA, 2015). Multinational companies like 
Heineken, Reckitt Benckiser and PFG are managing to bypass the Act by reclassifying large 
parts of their labour process as ‘non-core’ functions which they claim have been ‘outsourced’ 
to ‘service providers’. This has allowed them to continue to externalise the employment 
relationship with a majority of their workers on a permanent basis, despite no longer officially 
using labour brokers. At both Reckitt and PFG, management has narrowed the definition of its 
‘core functions’ to such an extreme extent that it only covers the work of machine operators on 
the production lines and other higher-paid supervisor or professional positions. Simba 
management were only prevented from doing the same by the militant response of a large layer 
of well-organised workers who threatened to strike (see 4.4.4). At Reckitt and PFG, brokered 
workers in the small number of operating positions have either recently been insourced or 
replaced by permanent workers as a means to create a new, clear line of divide between work 
that is outsourced and work that is part of a company’s so-called ‘core business’. 
The dissertation builds upon the critique advanced by Englert (2018) (see also Englert and 
Runciman, forthcoming) of Webster and Von Holdt’s (2005) categorisation of precarious 
workers as ‘non-core’, by confirming that many of these workers are found at the very heart of 
production. It, however, also goes beyond the critique by highlighting the changing nature of 
what capital chooses to define as their ‘core business’. In light of this, it is no longer sufficient 
to demonstrate the growth in importance of precarious work by simply locating precarious 
workers at the ‘core’ of a manufacturing company’s labour process. This is firstly because 
capital is constantly shifting the goalposts in terms of what they choose to define as a ‘core 
process’. And secondly, because the automation of production lines constantly renders 
redundant those workers who would have traditionally been considered ‘core to production’ 
(i.e. first the craft worker and then the machine operator). Black et al. (2017) show that as 
‘capital intensification has proceeded rapidly’ in the post-apartheid era, ‘employment in 
manufacturing has fallen at a compound annual rate of 1.3% per annum from 1994-2011’. 
Considering the large number of workers that still remain in all sorts of auxiliary positions in 
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the workplaces in this study, the majority of jobs lost are likely to have been those on the 
production lines where a worker’s repetitive movements are generally easier to replicate in a 
machine. So, while it is important to note that precarious workers are indeed found at the centre 
of production, it is also important to note that industrial capital relies on far fewer workers 
involved in the actual manufacturing of goods than it once did. In contrast, as automation 
continues to replace jobs on production lines at a faster pace than elsewhere in the factory, the 
relative proportion of all sorts of auxiliary workers in industrial workplaces will likely continue 
to rise – and, therefore, so will their relative importance to the functioning of the labour process. 
What is important then is not so much to ask if precarious workers inside a factory are central 
to capital’s own arbitrary definition of a ‘core production process’, but rather to ask whether 
or not they are central to the production of surplus value for companies like Heineken, Reckitt, 
PFG, Pioneer and Simba. The conclusion to this dissertation, therefore, looks to reframe the 
debate on precarious forms of employment in terms of the role that they play in the valorisation 
process of the manufacturing company. 
5.3 The deskilling of production work and the collective nature of the industrial labour 
process 
This dissertation has contributed to debates on deskilling in production work. Machine 
operators are often considered to make up a skilled or semi-skilled layer of the workforce in an 
industrial workplace, both in terms of the grading of jobs during negotiations between unions 
and management but also in much of the literature on the labour process (see Webster, 1985; 
Thompson, 1989; Englert, 2018). This can, and often does, lead to the conclusion that the 
labour power of these workers is of greater value to capital. Braverman (1974), however, 
rejected the knee-jerk association of machine work with skill as little more than technological 
fetishism. In Labour and Monopoly Capital, he used the chemical industry as a prime example 
to demonstrate the often thoroughly deskilled nature of machine operating work, arguing that: 
the picture of mechanization and skill cannot be completed without reference 
to those industries where mechanization has made the process so automatic that 
the worker takes virtually no physical part in it whatsoever. This theoretical 
ideal can be but seldom realized, and most plants considered ‘automatic’ still 
require a great deal of direct labor of all sorts. But in the chemical industry it 
very often comes closer to realization than elsewhere, because of the nature of 
the continuous processes employed and the possibility of moving the entire 
product-in-preparation within enclosed vessels and piping. Thus the chemical 
operator is singled out, time and again, as the outstanding beneficiary of 
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‘automation’, and the praises of this job are sung in countless variations. The 
work of the chemical operator is generally clean, and it has to do with ‘reading 
instruments’ and ‘keeping charts’. These characteristics already endear him to 
all middle-class observers, who readily confuse them with skill, technical 
knowledge, etc. Yet few have stopped to think whether it is harder to learn to 
read a dial than to tell time. (Braverman, 1974: 224) 
Almost 50 years later, computer chip technology has eliminated even some of those tasks 
which Braverman insisted require hardly any skill (see Schroeder, 2007; Sewell, 2012). At 
Reckitt today, unskilled general workers often operate the machines when the operators take 
lunch breaks or are off sick. The almost total deskilling of this work also meant that it was 
possible for Reckitt to employ low-paid, unskilled labour broker workers as operators for many 
years (see 4.1.1). At Pioneer, the C4C project workers also operate machines when the 
permanent operators take lunch, go for a smoke or use the toilet. They also often have to operate 
the lines during night shift when there are fewer permanents around. The skill required to 
operate one of these machines was explained by one worker as matter of knowing when to 
press start and stop (see 4.3.2). At Simba, machine work has been deskilled to the point where 
management, in its failed attempt to restructure production in April 2018, could remove all the 
brokered workers from operating positions and replace them with permanent workers from 
packing positions without any pause in production (see 4.4.4). At PFG, Alfred insisted that 
operating the stacking machines on the cold end of the line is so straightforward that the 
operator merely has to monitor and reset the machine when needed (see 4.2.2). Even the 
supposedly skilled position of process controller on the hot end of the line, he argued, can be 
learnt by simply job shadowing for a short period. It is interesting to note that, having studied 
the process of glass making during the theory component of his learnership, Alfred argued that 
he felt over-qualified for the work that he actually did on the production line during the 
learnership’s practical component (see 4.2.2; Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019).  
From the point of view of skill, these four cases demonstrate that there is often very little 
difference between those workers found on production lines as machine operators and the rest 
of the workers in a factory. If we treat the value of a worker’s labour power as the socially 
necessary labour time required to produce it (Marx, 1990), and all it takes for an unskilled 
general worker to learn to operate a machine in many of these workplaces is a few extra days 
of sporadically looking over the shoulder of the machine operator, then it is fair to argue that 
there is a negligible difference between the value of an operator’s labour power compared to 
that of an ordinary general worker. The managements of these companies are more than aware 
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of this fact, which is why they are choosing to use cheaper, unskilled, precarious workers in 
the positions as machine operators at the heart of production wherever possible. 
The fact that better-paid permanent workers often still occupy the positions of machine 
operators and process controllers must be understood in relation to the state of the class struggle 
inside the workplace. Webster (1985) originally showed how under apartheid the white craft 
unions defended the categorisation of their members’ jobs as ‘skilled’ despite their objective 
deskilling. This effectively reserved better paid positions for white workers in the face of an 
influx of cheap black labour into the metal industry at the time. In the current context, unions 
like FAWU and CEPPWAWU have taken the same approach to the influx of precarious 
workers into their industries (see 4.2.3; 4.3.4 and 4.4.4). The bargaining power that these 
unions amassed through a previous phase of struggle has, for a finite period of time, allowed 
them to reserve job grades such as machine operators for their members and defend the grading 
system which privileges these positions. The consequences of this approach, however, has been 
the total collapse of these unions at each company (see 4.1.4, 4.2.3; 4.3.4 and 4.4.4), as capital 
inevitably finds ways to replace unionised, permanent workers with cheaper, precarious 
workers that these unions do not to organise.  
The above findings contradict the commonplace assumption that there exists a major difference 
in skill between machine operators at the centre of production and auxiliary workers elsewhere 
in the factory. As a result, they lend support to Marx’s (1990) homogenisation of labour thesis. 
This is not to suggest that there are not different types of work being done, but rather to argue 
that the division of different types of deskilled labour amongst a more homogenised mass of 
labour powers is one of the defining features of the industrial labour process in South Africa 
today. Indeed, it is only the collective labour of the whole mass of homogenised workers that 
allows for the smooth functioning of the labour process. Although this may seem obvious, 
establishing this is crucial to understand where and how value is produced in the industrial 
labour process. The next section, therefore, shows that just as the labour process proceeds 
through the collective effort of the entire factory’s workforce, so does the process of creating 
surplus value.  
5.4 The creation of surplus value as a collective process 
The dissertation has returned to a more traditional approach to Marxist labour process analysis, 
where changes to the workplace are studied in relation to capital’s struggle for control over the 
  
 
104 
extraction of surplus value. To better understand where and how surplus value is created in the 
contemporary industrial labour process, we must very briefly turn to the debate on productive 
versus unproductive labour.  
Marx’s (1990: 644) contribution to this debate was to quite simply clarify that labour is 
productive when it contributes to the creation of surplus value for capital. All labour that does 
not contribute to the creation of surplus value for capital is, therefore, unproductive. In an 
industrial workplace, the labour of the machine operator and the labour of the cleaner are both 
considered to be productive because, as Brooks (2005) argues, ‘if [the cleaner] wasn’t there the 
whole factory would have to stop while the workforce cleaned – and the surplus value would 
be lost’. In other words, the labour of the permanent machine operator in the so-called ‘core’ 
and the labour of the precarious auxiliary worker in the ‘non-core’ are productive (i.e. capable 
of producing surplus value for capital) only when they form part of the collective labour of one 
production process (see Marx, 1990: 644).  
This can be demonstrated by going back to the example of the LSC Masakhe workers at PFG, 
who halted production in the entire factory when they withdrew their auxiliary labours during 
their strike (see 4.2.4). As logistics workers, their labour not only produces new value but is 
also integral to the realisation of the value created by the labour of workers on the production 
line. This is because without the warehousing and distribution of the glass there would be no 
sale, which would render the labour of workers in production ‘wasted labour’ (see Marx, 1990: 
131). This, if nothing else, should make us rethink the terminology of ‘core’ and ‘non-core’, 
since the labour of LSC workers in the latter stages of the labour process is so clearly central 
to PFG’s profits.  
5.5 The rising share of value created in the so-called ‘non-core’  
Although we have established that the labour of a worker can no longer be considered to be 
productive in the individual sense, it is nevertheless worth undertaking a further level of 
abstraction to try and break down the share of surplus value that different types of workers 
contribute to the final commodity and, more importantly, to the whole mass of commodities in 
the current phase of capitalist production. The value of a commodity, for Marx (1990), is equal 
to the socially necessary labour time that is crystallised in it. During the era of craft work, a 
skilled craft worker would spend an awful lot of labour time to produce a single product. Their 
labour would, therefore, contribute a large share of the value in the final commodity. The 
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auxiliary worker who would move the finished products from the craft work station and prepare 
them for sale, would spend far less labour time working with each product than the craft 
worker. Their labour would, as a result, only contribute a tiny fraction of the value in a given 
commodity. We can, therefore, conclude that the labour of craft workers may have been central 
to the production of surplus value for capital. But the craft worker has been eliminated from 
modern industry. Today it is the machine operator that sits at the centre of production. It is easy 
to assume, simply by noting their location in the production process, that these workers 
continue to be the main source of surplus value for capital. But is this really the case?  
The mechanisation or automation of work on production lines exponentially increases the 
productivity and intensity of the labour of workers located in production – especially the 
machine operators. It is true, therefore, that the labour of the machine operator can generate 
higher rates of relative surplus value for capital, but only for a given period of time. Once these 
technological advances are equalised across an industry, the advantages in the productivity and 
intensity of labour which had increased the rate of relative surplus value are lost (see 2.1.5). 
When this transpires, the socially necessary labour time required to create each commodity 
falls and, therefore, the labour of the machine operator contributes less fresh value to each 
individual commodity than it did before the new technology was introduced.2 On the other 
hand, one could argue that the labour of the forklift driver, for example, continues to contribute 
the same amount fresh value to the final commodity as before – considering that the speed and 
carrying capacity of forklifts has remained relatively stable over time. This is because they still 
spend the same amount of socially necessary labour time to transport each pallet from the 
production line to the warehouse. If the automation of production work means that the labour 
of machine operators contributes less value to the individual commodity once the newer 
machinery equalises across an industry, and the labour of the forklift driver contributes the 
same amount of value as before, then we can argue that the share of value contributed by the 
forklift driver to the individual commodity rises in proportion to the falling share contributed 
by the machine operator.  
More importantly, the introduction of new machinery on production lines generally comes with 
retrenchments of production workers. This means that once the technology equalises across the 
 
2 Of course, the new machine that the worker operates does transfer a fraction of its own value into each final 
commodity. But, as ‘dead labour’ (Marx, 1990: 508), machines do not create fresh value and therefore do not in 
themselves create surplus value. 
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industry, the collective labours of production workers contribute less surplus value to the total 
mass of commodities. At the same time, the increased levels of production that comes with 
automation of the production line requires capital to employ more forklift drivers to prevent 
bottlenecks, since one driver can only transport a finite number of pallets each day. As a result, 
the labour of forklift drivers will not only contribute a higher share of the surplus value in the 
individual commodity, but collectively their labour will contribute a greater share of the surplus 
value in the total mass of commodities.  
This abstraction is built upon the assumption that the automation of production work outstrips 
the automation of work in auxiliary functions like forklift driving. Capital, of course, will look 
to automate wherever it is profitable to do so. At Pioneer and Simba we have witnessed the 
automation of the auxiliary work of packing and palletising at the end of production lines (see 
4.3.1 and 4.4.2). But it is always easier to automate closer to the production lines. The cost of 
automating warehouse work (as Amazon has done in the US using robots and surveillance 
technology (see Chen, 2019; Evans, 2019)) is not cost effective in countries with large reserves 
of cheap labour. As the above findings demonstrate, the industrial workplace in South Africa 
today is generally still characterised by large numbers of auxiliary workers both inside 
production and in the other functions of the labour process (almost always under precarious 
forms of employment) and a smaller number of workers who operate the machines that actually 
make the products (often also precarious workers but still in many cases permanent workers). 
We can, therefore, assert that the share of value contributed by the former (i.e. workers in 
auxiliary positions) is crucial to the profits of the manufacturing company in the current phase 
of capitalist production. So, to continue to refer to these workers as ‘non-core’ is, at the very 
least, analytically unhelpful.  
5.6 Externalisation as a mechanism of control over the rate of surplus value  
The dissertation has demonstrated that manufacturing companies such as Reckitt, PFG and 
Simba have opted to  ‘externalise’ essential functions of their own labour processes.  This raises 
a critical question: why have they chosen to externalise sources of surplus value? The logic of 
capitalist competition means that a manufacturing company will not invite subcontracted 
companies into its own factory unless there is a clear economic imperative to do so. In other 
words, there is no reason for a manufacturing company to hand over a profitable function of 
its own labour process to a rival capitalist, unless doing so also significantly increases the 
manufacturer’s ability to extract surplus value. It is, therefore, important to study all forms of 
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externalisation that are permanent fixtures in the industrial workplace in terms of the role they 
play in the client company’s valorisation strategy.   
In a country like South Africa, which has a rich and recent history of militant worker struggles, 
externalisation has become a central means through which capital has been able to regain 
political control over the workplace. Although the literature acknowledges that externalisation 
makes it difficult for workers to mobilise their power against the company that is ultimately 
responsible for their conditions of employment (Theron, 2005; Dickinson, 2017a), the cases in 
this dissertation provide fresh insight into the everyday practical realities of the demobilising 
and disorganising power that different approaches to externalisation have on workers and their 
organisations. For example, Reckitt’s use of seven different employers in the four main 
functions of its labour process is indicative of capital’s anxious desire to divide workers, and 
reveals the extent to which capital is willing to fracture the labour process in order to do so (see 
4.1.1). PFG, on the other hand, has not fractured its workforce to the same extent, but its 
separation of permanents in production and externalised workers in logistics is similarly 
effective in creating deep divisions between the different groups (see 4.2.3). At both these 
companies CEPPWAWU has collapsed, and despite GIWUSA having attempted to organise 
brokered workers at Reckitt and NUMSA doing the same at PFG, divisions remain and 
management retains a firm grip on control. The political control over workers that is brought 
about by their division between different employers effectively opens the space for the 
manufacturing company to exert greater technical control over the rate at which they are 
exploited – i.e. over the rate of surplus value.  
Beyond simply dividing workers and weakening them politically in order to exploit them, 
externalisation also plays the added role of opening up legal avenues for increasing the rate of 
exploitation. As we saw in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.3), the creation of worker rights under the 
Factory Acts in 1800s Britain effectively restricted the rate at which labour could be exploited 
inside a factory – most notably by limiting the length of the working day (absolute surplus 
value). This meant that capital continued to subcontract work out to the ‘domestic industries’ 
where these rights did not apply (Marx, 1990: 591). In the current context in South Africa, the 
use of labour broking and outsourcing inside factories effectively bypasses worker rights 
because, despite being covered by labour legislation, externalised workers are in practice not 
considered ‘employees’ at the company where they work (Theron, 2005; Theron, 2014; Englert 
& Webster, 2019). Externalisation, therefore, also creates a barrier between the worker and the 
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company that is ultimately responsible for the abuse of their rights – i.e. the client/manufacturer 
(Theron, 2005; Dickinson, 2017a). Indeed, the cases in this study show that externalised 
workers find it extremely difficult (but not always impossible) to claim their rights against the 
client company. For example, at Reckitt and PFG which both fall under the chemical industry, 
management is able to argue that the ‘outsourced’ workers in warehousing and distribution fall 
under the Road Freight and Logistics Industry (RFLI), which is covered by a Bargaining 
Council Agreement that is notable for extreme levels of downward variation. One important 
clause in the collective agreement allows for a ‘compressed working week’, which says that 
‘an employer may require the employee to work up to 15 hours a day, inclusive of meal 
intervals, without overtime pay’ (NBCRFLI, 2016: 28). In other words, the 45 ordinary hours 
that a worker normally works in five or six days can be squeezed into three much longer days, 
with no overtime pay. This opens up avenues for increasing both absolute surplus value (by 
extending the working day) and relative surplus value (by driving down the price of labour 
power as a result of the elimination of overtime rates). It is no wonder then that the RFLI is 
intruding further and further into the factories of manufacturing companies like Reckitt and 
PFG. By subjecting workers to the regulatory framework of a whole different industry, 
outsourcing becomes an extremely profitable proposition for companies like Reckitt and PFG. 
So far we have seen that externalisation provides the manufacturing company with control over 
its rate of surplus value by providing a mechanism to weaken workers politically and to bypass 
their rights. This means that externalised workers can more easily be forced to work longer 
hours for far less pay and benefits. Their presence in the factory also acts as a weight, dragging 
down the bargaining power of permanent workers. On top of the above, externalised forms of 
employment also provide the manufacturing company with greater control over the intensity 
of labour inside their factories. Externalised workers at PFG, for example, explained how they 
work relentlessly on 12-hour shifts walking extreme distances each day due to the knowledge 
that if they slow down they can easily be replaced (see 4.2.2). More direct forms of control are 
often required away from production (i.e. a formal subsumption of labour), where machines 
and line speeds do not set the pace of work (real subsumption). It is here where externalised 
forms of employment often become the primary mechanism through which to increase the 
intensity of labour. The burden of driving workers to their physical and mental limits is 
ultimately passed on to the management of a subcontracted company through production 
targets set in Service Level Agreements (see 4.2.2). Thus, over and above externalising the 
labour law risk associated with the employment contract (Theron, 2005); subcontracting can 
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also be described more generally as the externalisation of risk associated with running a 
‘despotic workplace regime’ (Burawoy, 1982) based on high work pressure, since the 
frustrations of workers can be re-directed towards the intermediary and away from the client.  
5.7 The flow of surplus value from subcontractor to client 
In the previous sections I have argued that all supposedly ‘non-core’ functions of the industrial 
labour process contribute to the creation of surplus value. Far from ‘externalising’ many of 
these functions because they are unimportant, this dissertation has shown how manufacturing 
companies use various forms of subcontracting in order to increase the rate at which surplus 
value is produced throughout the labour process. It is important here to briefly identify how 
the bulk of the surplus value produced by externalised workers is inevitably appropriated by 
the client – and not, as might sometimes be assumed, by the subcontractor.   
Labour broking is a simple example that bears this out. The broker sells only the labour power 
of its workers to the client for a fee. If labour broking is to be profitable to the client company, 
then this fee can only ever be a small fraction of the surplus value created by the brokered 
workers. The majority of this surplus must be appropriated by the client itself. In the post-198 
era, however, capital is claiming that it no longer buys labour power from labour brokers. 
Instead they are supposedly buying a ‘specialist service’ from an ‘outsourced company’. If we 
are to take capital on its word, then the only conclusion we can draw is that these subcontractors 
are providing ‘services’ at far below their real value. Should Reckitt, for example, pay all its 
subcontractors at the full value of the ‘services’ they provide – which is effectively the entire 
manufacturing and distribution of Reckitt products – it would have no real means to extract 
surplus value for itself, since it hardly employs any of its own workers (see 4.1.1).3 Reckitt is 
effectively able to drive down the cost of these ‘services’ well below their actual value by 
pitting subcontractors like Carrus, Transman and Ubuntu against one another – increasing 
competition between them (see Englert, 2018). We can therefore say that, whether a 
subcontractor claims they sell labour power or a service, the majority of the surplus value 
 
3 Although Reckitt ultimately owns the means of production, machines do not create new value and, therefore, 
are not responsible for the creation of surplus value. Reckitt’s ability to extract relative surplus value from 
advantages in productivity as a result of mechanisation is not sustainable as a single source of surplus value, since 
it is in competition with multinationals like Unilever who are likely to match or better any productive advantages 
that Reckitt achieves. It, therefore, still has to extract surplus value from workers – which are supplied by 
subcontractors.  
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created by its workers is appropriated by the client. The subcontractor in the industrial 
workplace ultimately leads a ‘parasitic’ existence (see Marx, 1990: 591), merely leeching off 
the dregs of the surplus that its workers create. 
In section 4.2.2 we witnessed a perfect example of the power a client company exerts over its 
subcontractors when PFG refused to grant Imperial full control of their warehouse, despite 
making Imperial cover the cost of the breakages that occur there. Imperial Logistics may be a 
huge company, but it is no less dependent on the business of manufacturers like PFG for its 
survival. In reality, Imperial does not really provide a ‘specialised’ logistics service which PFG 
is incapable of doing itself, since PFG would have run its own warehousing and distribution 
functions in the recent past. Therefore, we can say that the primary service that subcontractors 
like Imperial provide is a mechanism with which to ensure that manufacturers like PFG retain 
tight control over workers, their organisations and over the production of surplus value.  
Considering that externalisation is so profitable for manufacturing companies who are 
effectively able to dictate how the surplus generated by subcontracted workers is distributed, 
it should be no surprise that companies like Reckitt and PFG have responded to the 2015 LRA 
amendments by finding a way to persist with externalisation in the form of service providing. 
5.8 Alternative forms of precarious employment and labour control post-198 
The dissertation has provided original empirical findings on how companies have responded 
the 2015 LRA amendments by finding a way to persist with externalisation in the form of 
service providing. At Pioneer and Simba, however, we have seen examples of capital going 
beyond the traditional forms of externalisation altogether.  
Pioneer’s ‘project work’ scheme appears to be just as effective as externalised employment 
schemes in terms of the despotic control that it affords management over workers at a political 
level. ‘Trouble makers’ (i.e. any workers that try to organise other workers or even just join a 
union) are easily dismissed by not being granted new one-month contracts on the basis that the 
‘project’ that they were working on has come to an end. This level of extreme contract precarity 
also allows management to enforce a valorisation regime based on low wages and very high 
work intensity under hazardous health conditions.  
The dissertation further demonstrated the apparent rise of ‘learnership’ work schemes at 
companies like Simba, PFG and Pioneer in the post-198 period. In the case of Simba, the 
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Department of Employment and Labour appears to have had direct involvement in supplying 
the learners (see 4.4.4) – which suggests that, in the wake of the legal limits imposed on labour 
broking, the state is taking on a more active role in providing capital with alternative 
mechanisms for wage suppression and labour control. After all, this is consistent with the recent 
legislative attacks on the right to strike and picket (see Runciman, 2019).  
It is important to note that the learners in each of the above cases have been supplied for 
positions that are objectively unskilled (such as packing jobs at Simba), and the ‘learnerships’ 
appear to very rarely consist of a theory component. Where they do, such as at PFG, workers 
argue that there is no point being ‘upskilled’ for skilled positions that are in such short supply 
(see 4.2.2). Considering the extent to which work has been deskilled in manufacturing, more 
research needs to be undertaken to assess the extent to which learnerships operate as cheap 
labour control schemes in the current period, and to assess whether or not such schemes are 
growing post-198.  
5.9 Trade union organising approaches and capital’s valorisation regime 
The cases in this dissertation each present a dire picture of the state of trade unionism in the 
manufacturing industries. CEPPWAWU and FAWU have both had long and important 
histories in their respective sectors. Despite their rich histories, the approach of these unions to 
the influx of precarious workers into their industries in the post-apartheid period has ultimately 
resulted in the eventual collapse of their workplace structures in all four of the cases in this 
study. Their unwillingness or inability to organise precarious workers has played into the hands 
of capital’s valorisation strategy for the post-apartheid period – a strategy which this 
dissertation has shown rests heavily on the exploitation of precarious workers.   
In the first decade or so after the democratic transition, much industrial sociology was focussed 
on the question of the role of trade unionism in the potential democratisation of workplace 
regimes (see Von Holdt & Webster, 2005; Dickinson, 2005). The despotic nature of the 
‘apartheid workplace regime’, it was suggested, could potentially be transformed through 
collective bargaining under powerful unions into regimes based on consent or codetermination 
(ibid). It is clear from the data presented in this chapter, however, that those unions that have 
bought into the project of codetermination have done so at the expense of precarious workers 
in their factories (see also Dickinson 2017a, 2017b; Englert 2018). What we see in each 
workplace in this study is that over recent decades capital has been able to effectively recreate 
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its ‘dualistic system of labour control’, which Kenny and Webster (1998) identified as the 
bedrock of its factory regime under apartheid. In other words, capital has returned to a factory 
regime based on ‘hegemonic control’ for one group of workers who are afforded collective 
bargaining rights and ‘despotic control’ for another group (ibid). Unions like FAWU and 
CEPPWAWU have ultimately responded to this restructuring of power relations at the point of 
production by narrowly defending the interests of only their own members (see 4.2.3, 4.3.4), 
which is reminiscent of the approach taken by the white craft unions under apartheid that 
Webster (1985) originally detailed. 
The more recent attempts of unions like GIWUSA at Reckitt and NUMSA at PFG to recruit 
and organise precarious workers is a welcome break away from the trajectory that the 
abovementioned unions have taken. However, at Reckitt the attempts to organise brokered 
workers was thoroughly defeated by an intransigent employer through mass dismissal, while 
at PFG the approach that NUMSA has taken to organising brokered workers separately from 
permanents has only served to entrench the workplace divide that management’s valorisation 
regime rests upon. It is clear that the new terrain of struggle either requires fresh approaches to 
organising workers or at least a return to the best of the old practices – i.e. practices that are 
based on building the self-organising power of workers on the shop floor, where those sections 
of the rank and file that are most willing to wage collective struggles are recognised as a 
fighting force around which to build. What we have seen in each of these four cases is that 
precarious workers themselves are, out of necessity, turning back to these earlier practices, 
largely as a result of the extreme levels of distrust that these workers have for shop stewards 
and union officials. Indeed, it is the self-led struggles of precarious workers for permanent jobs 
that have struck at the heart of capital’s chosen valorisation regime in many of these cases, 
more so than other organising initiatives over recent years. 
5.10 Direction for future research  
This dissertation has highlighted a number of important areas for future research. For example, 
more research is required on what the shift from labour broking to outsourcing means for 
workers, especially in cases where outsourcing means that workers fall under different 
industries where Bargaining Council Agreements have varied downwards on some of the basic 
worker rights in the BCEA. As already suggested in this chapter, more detailed studies are also 
required to assess the extent to which project work and learnership work are on the rise in the 
manufacturing industries in the post-198 period. The changing approach to shift patterns also 
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appears to coincide with management restructuring initiatives in the current period (see 4.1.3), 
and requires closer attention going forward. Lastly, further research needs to be done to gauge 
the extent to which this and other similar direct forms of precarious employment is growing in 
the aftermath of the section 198 amendments and the Constitutional Court’s sole employer 
ruling. For example, zero-hour contract work is another scheme that appears to be on the rise 
(although not at the workplaces in this study), often at companies where workers have already 
won struggles to get rid of labour brokers under section 198 (CWAO internal communication, 
02/10/2019). 
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Annexure A 
CWAO Company Profile 
 
 
Date: ________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Company name: ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. What the company makes: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
3. Names of all labour broker companies: __________________________________ 
 
 
4. How many workers in the workplace: ___________________________________ 
 
 
5. How many permanents: _____________________________________________ 
 
 
6. How many labour broker workers: _____________________________________ 
 
 
7. How many labour broker men: ________________________________________ 
 
 
8. How many labour broker women: _____________________________________ 
 
 
9. Shift work – yes or no: _______________________________________________ 
 
 
10. Night shift – yes or no: _______________________________________________ 
 
 
11. Weekend work – yes or no: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
12. How many hours per week do labour broker workers work?__________________ 
 
 
13. How many hours per week do permanents work? __________________________ 
 
 
 
14. Jobs and wages of labour broker workers: ________________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Jobs and wages (where information is available) of permanents: ___________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
16. Is there a union and who belongs to it? ______________________________________ 
 
 
17. How big is the organising team at the company? ______________________________ 
 
 
18. Labour broker workers’ main demands: ______________________________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
19. Organising plan for the company: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
What do you make at work that can help build a workers movement? For example, paint or 
cardboard for posters, plastic containers for water during marches, and so on:  
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Contacts: __________________________________________________________________ 
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Annexure B 
 
Interviews: 
Eric, Interview, 26/08/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Eric and Siya, interview , 11/06/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Alfred, interview, 02/04/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
PFG group interview, 14/05/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Pioneer group interview 1, 27/04/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Pioneer group interview 2, 25/05/2019. Thembisa. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Thando, interview, 16/05/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Matthews, interview, 13/06/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Pioneer group interview, 13/06/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
John, interview, 17/06/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Jacob, interview, 09/08/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
Sihle and Vuyo, interview, 18/04/2019. Germiston. [Digital recording in possession of author] 
 
Meetings: 
PFG worker meeting with CWAO, 14/04/2019. Germiston. [Notes in possession of author] 
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Annexure C 
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Annexure D 
 
  
 
129 
  
 
130 
 
